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Knowing the natural world: The construction of knowledge about evolution in and out of
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Evolution is a central underlying concept to a significant number of discourses in
civilized society, but the complexity of understanding basic tenets of this important
theory is just now coming to light. Knowledge about evolution is constructed from both
formal and “free-choice” opportunities, like television. Nature programs are commonly
considered “educational” by definition, but research indicates the narratives often
promote creationist ideas about this important process in biology. I explored how nature
programs influenced knowledge construction about evolutionary theory using a
combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches. Because misconceptions about
evolution are common, I examined how students’ conceptual ecologies changed in
response to information presented in an example of a particularly poor nature film
narrative. Students’ held a diversity of misconceptions, proximate conceptions, and
evolutionary conceptions simultaneously, and many of their responses were direct
reflections of the nature program. As a result, I incorporated the same nature program
into an experiment designed to examine the effects of narrative and imagery on evolution
understanding. After completing an extensive pre-assessment that addressed attitudes
and beliefs about science knowledge, students viewed one of four versions of the nature
program that varied in the quality of science and imagery presented. The effect of
watching different versions was only vaguely apparent in students with a moderate
understanding of evolution. The relationship was much more complex among students
with a poor understanding of evolution but suggested a negative effect that was more
influenced by public discourses about this “controversial” subject than conceptual
understanding. The relationships warranted examining learning from the perspective of
the consumers of these programs. I surveyed audience beliefs about the educational
value of nature programs and found that an overwhelming majority believed the
programs were “educational” and designed to teach about nature. The results were
particularly alarming because beliefs about the educational value may strongly impact
learning outcomes. An informal survey of nature programs aired during a “sweeps”
month indicated that poor presentation of science, and specifically evolutionary theory,
was indeed the norm. Indeed, nature programs may be contributing to the
“deconstruction” of knowledge about evolution both in and out of the classroom.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION

Antibiotic resistance, gene therapy, disease, food production, environmental
quality, and biotechnology are all areas of active biological research that address issues of
public concern. Indeed, all of these are issues where being an informed citizen requires
an understanding of evolution. Yet many Americans hold serious misconceptions about
evolution and the process of science (Nelson, 2000; Rudolph & Stewart, 1998;
Southerland, Abrams, Cummins, & Anzelmo, 2001; National Science Foundation, 2006).
The form of misconceptions can range from misunderstandings about terminology (e.g.,
“adaptation” and “fitness”; Alters & Nelson, 2002; Bishop & Anderson, 1990) to
misunderstandings about the process (e.g., the sources and causes of change – focusing
on individuals rather than populations; Bishop and Anderson 1990; Greene, 1990). These
misconceptions can have far-reaching effects. Indeed, proponents of intelligent design
take advantage of these types of misconceptions, held so commonly by the general
public, to foster consideration of their “alternative theory” in education. School boards
from Darby, Montana, to Dover, Pennsylvania, have voted to include, or are seriously
considering adding, intelligent design or creationism as part of the science curriculum in
their schools. Less than half of the American population accepts the theory of evolution
(National Science Foundation 2006), and the issue of whether and how evolution is
taught in public schools remains highly contentious. Science classes taught without
evolution will not only impact future citizenship but a future workforce in biological
research as well. Nevertheless, most adults are removed from formal education settings,
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and they must rely on other educational opportunities at the interface of science and
society to learn. Therefore, to counter these alarming trends, evolutionary biologists and
ecologists must look to all learning opportunities, both formal and free-choice/informal,
to educate the general public about one of the most fundamental concepts in biology. My
research explores how nature programming produced for television interacts with
viewers’ knowledge and understanding to ultimately affect their understanding of
evolution.
Exploring the contributions of learning that takes place outside of school is a
complex task, and theories about the nature of learning in these environments draw on a
variety of disciplines. Lucas (1991) suggests several issues that need to be addressed to
examine the impact and utility of informal sources of science learning. For example, how
do people process the information presented to them, and do authority and source affect
processing? And what should we expect of these informal sources given that often they
are intended to be both entertaining and educational (Lucas 1991)? Recently, researchers
have started incorporating theories about how people learn science in school to learning
in museums and other informal environments (Anderson, Lucas, & Ginns, 2003).
Indeed, this approach strongly supports a view of learning that recognizes that the
concepts held by individuals are the result of more than just the formal explanations
learned in school. Learning involves a complex combination of school experiences, as
well as culture, language, and personal experiences and observations (Wandersee,
Mintzes, & Novak, 1994). In fact, the role of the individual in knowledge construction is
reflected in the use of “free choice” terminology: “free-choice” science education implies
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some intrinsic motivation of the learner, “informal” refers to the setting of the learning
event, i.e., outside the formal school setting (Falk, 2001).
Television is one source of free-choice science education, and it can be a powerful
tool for mass communication. More than 280 million television sets are in use in the
U.S., and these sets are turned on 5 hours/day on average (Nielson Company, 2009).
These viewing habitats suggest that most people will spend more of their lives watching
television than they will in school. Moreover, broadcasted programs are available 24
hours per day, and channel diversity is increasing. Indeed, over half of the general public
(51%) considers television their leading source of science news and information
(National Science Foundation 2006). Recently, cable and satellite markets have
expanded to include stations with science-based programming within an entertainment
context; The Learning Channel, Discovery Channel, and Animal Planet broadcast
programs with considerable science content. Along with the trend for internet videos, the
conversion to digital television will increase the number of channels even more. As a
result, the likelihood that individuals will be exposed to science programming that will
affect their understanding of ecological sciences is high.
The accuracy with which nature programs actually represent nature has received
much attention recently. Both Bousé (2000) and Mitman (1999) clearly endorse
embracing a highly skeptical view of the reality presented in wildlife films, warning that
this genre is driven by the need for compelling story lines rather than scientific accuracy.
In fact, the most beautiful and engaging nature films often include narratives that endorse
creationist accounts of life on earth (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006). As part of the
narrative, many wildlife films individualize the “struggle for existence”; they humanize
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the dramas (e.g., the orphan that struggles to survive and returns victorious to breed) that
can mislead viewers to teleological and Lamarckian misconceptions about evolution.
Indeed, Aldridge and Dingwall (2003) and Dingwall and Aldridge (2006) show that
references to evolution in nature programs are often teleological – that is, they imply
evolution is driven by some purpose. These authors conclude that the narratives in this
genre actually increase the differences in understanding of evolution between the general
public and biological scientists (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006). They note “it is highly
questionable whether wildlife and nature programming is making an appropriate
contribution to the preparedness of civil society to deal with key issues in biological and
environmental sciences” (p. 148).
Indeed, the video images so important to a well-crafted program may interact with
the narrative and become powerful “virtual witnessing” events (Kirby 2003, see also
Graber, 1990). The “plausibility” of pictorial images can have extensive impacts. For
example, scientific reconstructions of bat-winged pterosaurs were so influenced by early
artistic interpretations that Padian (1987) notes, “a picture is not only worth a thousand
words; however inaccurate, it may be worth a wealth of well-documented evidence to the
contrary” (p. 76). Clearly, virtual witnessing can result in an epistemological impact
difficult to overcome, especially with socially controversial topics such as evolution.
Research into the effects on learning from one beautifully crafted nature film suggests
that the misconceptions presented in the narration do indeed affect undergraduate
students’ understanding of evolution (Bright, Brewer, Snetsinger, & Perkins, 2003).
The essence of the problem, then, is that people continue to learn outside of the
classroom, and they may be incorporating mixed messages into their understanding
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depending on the formal and informal science sources from which they draw their
knowledge. Moreover, learning can be gradual and assimilative, implying incremental
changes in individuals’ conceptual understanding; or learning can be rapid, involving a
substantial restructuring of knowledge (Mintzes & Wandersee, 1998; Mintzes,
Wandersee, & Novak, 1997). Personal experiences comprise a powerful source of
perceived evidence that can be incorporated into “lay theories” about how the world
works. Where these lay theories relate to ecology, and evolution in particular, they can
lead to misconceptions that can be very difficult to alter (Wandersee et al., 1994). So, if a
nature program resonates on some level with individuals’ “lay theories” about evolution,
it may have long-lasting effects on learning. For example, people identify with
individuals, not populations, and the concepts of “improvement” and “adaptation”
frequently are applied to individuals overcoming adversity – everyone loves the triumph
of the underdog. Whether this application stems from a personal experience (such as a
sibling that overcomes a serious disease) or an experience they perceive from watching
television (such as the orphaned cheetahs that survive in the harsh and cruel savannah), it
may end up as an unconscious embodiment of the process of evolution. Of course these
events are relevant to biological evolution; who survives and who does not underlies a
major component of fitness and the process of natural selection. The focus on changes
within an individual, however, misrepresents the fundamental process of evolution – a
turnover among individuals within populations.
Evolution is a complex concept, and the path of least resistance is often the wrong
one. Picture someone relaxing in front of a large, high-definition television watching a
gorgeous nature film with a carelessly articulated narrative. Narration that incorporates
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teleology as a mechanism may not directly promote alternative “theories” to evolution,
such as “intelligent design” (Dingwall and Aldridge 2006), but it can promote alternative
conceptions nonetheless. Conceptual change is a complicated process, however;
concepts about evolution may be so interwoven that a change in one requires a change in
many others (Demastes, Good, & Peebles, 1996). New concepts cannot be easily learned
if alternative models that explain a phenomenon already exist in the learner’s mind
(Committee on Undergraduate Science Education, 1997). If undergraduate biology
majors do not have an adequate understanding of evolution even after a year of college
biology (Nehm & Reilly, 2007), how can we expect them to interpret beyond the
misconception-laden narratives of nature programs? Lawson and Weser (1990) show
that introductory non-major college biology students who were more skilled in reasoning,
however, were less likely to hold nonscientific beliefs than were students less skilled in
reasoning. Therefore, other metrics of understanding related to reasoning and
epistemological beliefs may be required to address the interaction between formal and
informal sources of science knowledge.
Personal epistemology, or beliefs about knowledge, may be closely tied to an
individual’s learning outcomes about evolution. Numerous models are available that
address how individuals’ beliefs about the certainty, source, justification, acquisition, and
structure of knowledge affect learning (see Duell & Schommer-Atkins, 2001).
Researchers generally agree that these beliefs play an important role in learning. For
example, if people believe knowledge is certain and passed down by authority figures,
they are less likely to question authority in the classroom (Schommer-Atkins, 2004) or in
free-choice learning environments. This can be particularly worrisome with regards to
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“ill-structured” problems (problems that cannot be solved with a high degree of certainty;
King & Kitchener, 1994) and controversial or socioscientific issues (issues that require
consideration of societal interest, effect, and consequence; Sadler 2004). Many
ecological issues can be framed within these contexts. Epistemological beliefs, therefore,
may be important in the interpretation of evidence regarding controversial topics, such as
the relationship between human immunodeficiency virus and the AIDS syndrome
(Kardash & Scholes, 1996), animals used in research (Zeidler, Walker, Ackett, &
Simmons, 2002), and evolution (Sinatra, Southerland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003).
Similarly, epistemology is a component of the Nature of Science (NOS)
framework (Sandoval, 2005). Many educators advocate teaching and learning the nature
of the scientific endeavor to help students overcome misconceptions about evolution and
other socioscientific issues (e.g., Khishfe & Lederman, 2006; Lombrozo, Thanukos, &
Weisberg, 2008; Nelson, 2000; Pigliucci, 2007; Scharmann & Harris, 1992; Working
Group on Teaching Evolution, 1998). NOS also is complex, however, involving abstract
concepts such as uncertainty and the tentative nature of conclusions. Certainly, teaching
NOS has met with mixed results (e.g., Abd-El-Khalick & Lederman, 2000; Akerson,
Morrison, & McDuffie, 2006; Khishfe & Lederman, 2006; Nehm & Schonfeld, 2007;
Sandoval & Morrison, 2003; Scharmann & Harris, 1992), and the research addressing
how NOS affects evolution understanding is limited (Crawford, Zembal-Saul, Munford,
& Friedrichsen, 2005; Lederman, 2006). Nevertheless, a sophisticated understanding of
NOS may be a valuable indicator of the acceptance of evolutionary theory.
What, then, is the influence of nature programming on knowledge development
related to ecology and evolution? Ultimately, two kinds of information are needed: (1)

7

whether viewers have and use the knowledge the nature program expects, and (2) what
knowledge viewers actually have and use to understand the nature program (Livingstone,
1998). Providing viewers with knowledge they can use about evolution when watching
nature programs depends on conceptual understanding of science and evolution. Wildlife
and nature films that present evolutionary science poorly may be particularly insidious if
audiences perceive the genre as educational. The prior experiences audiences have with
specific genres are critical in their textual readings and interpretation of new experiences
– for example, audiences expect certain types of character and plot development in soap
operas because of past experiences with soap operas, and they interpret these elements in
light of those past experiences (Livingstone, 1998). Moreover, emotional connections
affect recall and memory (Fujioka, 2005). Past experiences with educational
programming may leave audiences unaware that narratives in wildlife and nature
programs are shaped from dramatic perspectives rather than real-life perspectives (Bousé,
2000; Mitman, 1999). For example, in wildlife programs orphans are often main
characters in narratives, but life history evolution predicts that in species with high
parental care (as in most charismatic megafauna), orphans will rarely survive to
adulthood. Wildlife and nature programs are traditionally considered documentaries, a
title that confers meaning to audiences, yet they routinely incorporate drama, adding
emotional effect, so much so that Bousé (2000) suggested “docu-drama” as a more
accurate label.
In my research, I examined the educational impact of wildlife and nature
programs that address ecology and evolution (Figure 1.1). The overarching question for
my work was “How does television affect learning about evolution and the natural
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world?” Learning implies incorporating the “correct” information into knowledge
schema. The public understanding of science is fraught with misconceptions, especially
regarding difficult, and in the U.S. controversial, topics such as evolution. Ultimately,
individuals draw on a web of knowledge sources that may or may not reflect current
science understanding. Therefore, stemming from this broad overview question, I
explored whether or not poor representation of science resulted in development or
enhancement of misconceptions from a constructivist context. Specifically, I asked:
 Does the poor representation of scientific concepts in television lead to
misconceptions about evolution?
 Does personal epistemology and/or prior knowledge affect the influence of
wildlife and nature programs on evolution understanding?
 Do audiences perceive wildlife and nature programs as educational, and if so,
does that perception influence their interpretation?
 If audiences do turn to wildlife and nature programs for educational content in the
free-choice marketplace, are they getting good quality educational content?
 If understanding the nature of the scientific endeavor is important to acceptance of
evolutionary theory, how early can we begin to teach these important concepts?
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Figure 1.1. The research model. C2-C7 represent the chapters that address these theoretical constructs.
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Evolution
Understanding

Overview of Dissertation

Chapter 2. Literature Review: Evolution in education and discourse
Purpose: To examine the context of the research by examining the relevant literature

This research is highly interdisciplinary, bringing together communication,
conceptual change, cognition, educational psychology, evolution education, personal
epistemology, public understanding of science, and television production. Throughout,
the challenges of the nature of the scientific endeavor affect the decisions we make
regarding the nature of knowledge, our acceptance of uncertainty, and the extent we
accept the reality science paints. Chapter 2 reviews the literature related to evolution in
education and discourse in this light, exploring how the controversy arose, the
development of the theory of evolution, and finally how the controversy is situated in the
most influential public court of opinion – the marketplace of ideas.

Chapter 3: Fatal Flower frailties: Using nature films to help address misconceptions
about evolutionary theory
Purpose: To explore the conceptions students have about evolution and to determine the
impact a curriculum based on the film Fatal Flower has on those conceptions.
 Does the poor representation of scientific concepts in television lead to
misconceptions about evolution?
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Understanding evolution is important to citizenship, but ever since the topic was
returned to the science classroom in the late 1930s, educators have struggled with how to
teach this complex theory. Students bring prior knowledge to the science classroom,
prior knowledge that clearly affects learning (Clough and Wood-Robinson, 1987; Posner,
Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982). Their concepts about processes, such as evolution,
are often quite different from scientific explanations. These naïve conceptions arise from
a number of sources, including (1) those that begin with vernacular issues related to the
interpretation of “adaptation” and “fitness;” (2) those derived from personal experiences,
like overcoming disease, or raising pets; (3) those that come from informal sources
(television, internet, families, religions), such as wives tales about the nine lives of cats;
and (4) those that arise because formal education does not adequately address the prior
conceptions that students hold, resulting in newly constructed or modified alternative
conceptions (Alters & Nelson, 2002; Committee on Undergraduate Science Education,
1997). It is especially important that formal education engage prior conceptions because
the frameworks established in school affect whether knowledge construction outside of
the science classroom reflects scientific thinking. Wildlife and nature programs are
appealing and popular experiences, but they often represent evolutionary science poorly
(Aldridge & Dingwall, 2003; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006). If nature programs are used
as a source of learning outside of formal classrooms (or if they are used unconditionally
within the science classroom), then individuals are more likely to construct knowledge
that does not reflect scientific thinking. However, these programs may be valuable tools
in the science classroom, allowing teachers to use the narratives as examples of
inadequate explanations of the evolutionary process.
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Within a climate of controversy surrounding evolution education, the imperative
for research in student understanding is that much greater. The only consistent result
from a quarter century of research, however, is that broad misconceptions persist despite
coursework (e.g., Chinsamy & Plagányi, 2007; Jensen & Finley, 1996; Nehm & Reilly,
2007). Meaningful learning may necessitate the reconstruction of a significant segment
of the learner’s conceptual and propositional framework to include general and broadly
inclusive concepts (Posner et al., 1982; Mintzes et al., 1997; Nussbaum, 1989). More
recently, efforts have focused on the intricacy of student thinking and explicit approaches
to overcoming misconceptions. Understanding evolution requires knowledge of a
diversity of concepts that ranges from descriptive (e.g., populations and species) to highly
abstract (e.g., genes and probabilities) (Lawson, Alkhoury, Benford, Clark, & Falconer,
2000). Therefore, research that addresses the conceptual ecologies students hold may
provide valuable insight to how evolutionary knowledge is constructed and reconstructed.
This chapter explores the results of a curriculum designed using the nature
program, Fatal Flower, as a surrogate for students’ conceptions, providing valuable
insight to how students think about evolution in the context of their personal relationship
with their television experience. The curriculum uses the nature program to draw out
student misconceptions as a means to cultivate conceptual change. Specifically, the
research addresses the prediction that patterns of students’ misconceptions will include
more scientific conceptions after experiencing the curriculum than before. More
importantly, the design of the curricula provides a unique opportunity to examine the
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diversity of conceptions students hold at a single point in time as they transfer their
knowledge among similar circumstances.

Chapter 4: Seeing is believing: The impacts of nature film narratives on student
understanding of evolution
Purpose: To determine whether viewers incorporate the information presented in
television shows into their conceptual understanding of evolution
 How important are misconceptions perpetuated in broadcast television to
knowledge construction?
 Does prior knowledge, understanding of the nature of science, and/or personal
epistemology affect the influence of wildlife and nature programs on evolution
understanding?

Aldridge & Dingwall (2003) and Dingwall & Aldridge (2006) argue that wildlife
film narratives may not necessarily espouse alternative theories to evolution, but they
embrace an unexpectedly large number of teleological elements. Because the narrative
does nothing to convey the scientific account, viewers simply hear the narration without
disrupting whatever prior framing they have brought to the viewing, eventually leading to
an opening for creationism or “intelligent design” accounts of evolution. Indeed, the
video may serve as a powerful “virtual witnessing” event (Kirby, 2003), resulting in an
epistemological impact difficult to overcome with controversial topics such as evolution.
Although nature programs vary considerably in their structure, the ‘blue chip’ sub-genre
focuses on the organism in an environment of visual splendor, using a dramatic story line
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with a “grand” voice over, and marked by the absences of politics, people or historical
reference points (Aldridge & Dingwall, 2003; Bousé, 2000). Sadly, the magnificent
photography in these programs is marred by the most egregious abuse of evolutionary
science. I use an experimental manipulation of one nature program to explore how this
sub-genre of nature and science programs influences knowledge and knowledge
retention, the prevalence of misconceptions, and the application of knowledge gained
from broadcast.
Fatal Flower uses beautiful imagery in a traditional ‘blue-chip’ natural history
film that explores how different species of orchids have adaptations that enable them to
be pollinated by specific pollinators (insects and birds). These pollinators in turn have
adaptations that allow them to extract the nectar from specific orchids that they are
dependent on for food. Thus, from an educational perspective, the film appears to be an
excellent example of co-evolution and natural selection. Unfortunately, the film is full of
misconceptions (both intentional and inadvertent) and is a poor example of science in
nature films (Dissertation Appendix 1).
Preliminary examination of the results from the curriculum suggested that the
narration of Fatal Flower may indeed affect students’ understanding of evolution, but
essential data were lacking. I developed an experimental design that included
manipulation of the films narrative and imagery coupled with pre- and post-assessments
to determine the effects that poor presentation of evolution may have on students’
conceptions. I predicted that a new version of the narrative that reflected an accurate
presentation of evolutionary theory would enhance evolution understanding whereas the
misconception-laden original would not. In addition, I predicted that if the video
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functioned as a virtual witnessing event, then the imagery would greatly affect people’s
attention (both in terms of viewing and in terms of learning). Reducing the films visual
imagery to still images and/or less attractive imagery than the original version would
partition the effects of visual and narrative effects on understanding. As a result, the
experimental design included four versions of the program (original, manipulated
narration/original imagery, original narration/manipulated imagery, manipulated
narration/manipulated imagery).
Chapter 4 presents the results from pre- and post-assessments of students
watching different versions of Fatal Flower. The chapter addresses whether narrative
and imagery affected student conceptual understanding of evolution and explored the
potential indirect effects these types of visual “experiences” had on schema construction.
The chapter addresses a number of predictions:
1. Well-produced nature films provide a “virtual witnessing” experience for
viewers.
1a. Viewers incorporate the narrative framing into their understanding of
evolution (e.g., teleology, environment as the driving factor for
change).
1b. Viewers incorporate specific examples of imagery into their schema
for understanding evolution.
2. Poorly produced films (still imagery) will not serve as virtual witnessing
events.
3. Imagery and narrative interact in learning: viewers watching the revised
narratives with the original imagery will be less likely to incorporate
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misconceptions into their understanding of evolution than those watching the
original version or either version with still images.
4. Prior knowledge affects how the narrative framing is incorporated into
conceptions;
4a. Viewers with greater prior evolution knowledge will be less likely to
incorporate misconceptions than those with little prior knowledge.
4b. Viewers with an understanding of the Nature of Science (NOS) will be
less likely to incorporate misconceptions than those with little prior
knowledge.
5. Viewers’ personal epistemology affects how the narrative framing is
incorporated into conceptions; viewers that believe that knowledge is certain,
is handed down from authority, or that knowledge is simple, not complex, will
be more likely to incorporate misconceptions than viewers that understand
NOS.
5a. Incorporation depends on whether viewers believe they are viewing
educational programs (addresses the importance of credibility in
personal epistemology).
5b. Incorporation depends on whether viewers believe they are viewing
programs designed to be educational (addresses the importance of
authority in personal epistemology).
6. Viewers’ attitudes toward science and evolution affect how the narrative
framing is incorporated into conceptions.
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6a. Viewers that accept scientific inquiry as a way of thought will be more
likely to incorporate misconceptions than viewers that do not.
6b. Viewers that believe the age of the earth is less than 6000 years will be
more likely to incorporate misconceptions than viewers that do not.

Chapter 5: What is “educational” in a free-choice science world? Determining
what audiences believe about the educational value of nature programs
Purpose: To explore the goals and expectations audiences have coming into a free-choice
learning opportunity.
 Do audiences perceive wildlife and nature programs as educational, and if so,
does that perception influence their interpretation?

Nature film narratives are often fraught with misconceptions about evolution
(Aldridge & Dingwall, 2003; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006), but they are afforded a level
of credibility as documentaries about the natural world (Bousé, 2000). Unfortunately,
individuals who are motivated to learn from these free-choice opportunities also are most
likely to incorporate the broad knowledge messages that are communicated (Falk,
Heimlich, & Bronnenkant, 2008; Maurer & Reinemann, 2006). Research usually
approaches free-choice learning experiences from the educator’s perspective; the
underlying assumption is that these sources of science learning are good, quality sources
reflecting correct and current understanding. From the audience’s perspective, defining a
free-choice experience as “educational” is problematic because individuals must either
already possess the knowledge to assess the quality of the experience or rely on an
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assessment applied by some other source. In the “marketplace of ideas,” audiences are
not necessarily always able to judge the true value of competing ideas, and to distinguish
science from non-science. Audiences must look to descriptors like “educational” as they
consider free-choice learning experiences. So, individuals motivated to learn about
nature may assume that misconception-laden nature programs are providing an adequate
explanation of important ecological processes, such as evolution.
Personal epistemology also may have an important role in the impact wildlife and
nature programs have on the viewing public’s understanding of evolution. Indeed, beliefs
about knowledge play an essential role in learning. If viewers believe knowledge is
certain, then they may accept the information presented in wildlife films without
question. Similarly, if they believe knowledge is passed down from authority figures,
they may be even less likely to question the authority of free-choice learning
environments.
I surveyed potential wildlife film audiences to determine their understanding of
the educational context of wildlife films (e.g., are they meant to be educational? Are they
credible sources of information?) Missoula, Montana, is host to the International
Wildlife Film Festival each spring. Because the festival expends considerable effort to
engage the community, the likelihood that individuals have at least thought about wildlife
and nature films should be higher than a random sample of all adults in the U.S. My
approach was to assess public literacy regarding nature programs, with the assumption
that the sampled population would represent a slightly higher estimate of scientific
literacy with respect to nature programs than the public at large.
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Whether an individual defines something as educational or not depends on the
context. The survey I developed operationalized educational through a series of
questions designed to get at a specific context. For example, if a participant believed a
nature show was educational, then they might be more likely to believe it was accurate,
that the content was reviewed/approved by scientists, it told a story that really happened,
it presented the most current scientific understanding, people should learn from watching
it, it did not give wildlife human characteristics, and the content was reviewed/approved
by other filmmakers. In addition, if a wildlife/nature film was designed to be
educational, then viewers would be likely to believe that the primary goal of the program
was to teach about wildlife and nature, the program was written to explain and clarify
what we know about wildlife and nature, and the producers had advanced knowledge
about wildlife and natural sciences.
This chapter presents the results of a large-scale audience survey to determine
how the interpretations the audience makes of programs fits or challenges their prior
experiences and the role their knowledge may play in interpretation of the narratives in
wildlife and nature programs (Livingstone, 1998). Specifically, I predicted:
1. nature film audiences believe they are viewing educational programs
(addresses the importance of credibility in personal epistemology), and
2. nature film audiences believe they are viewing programs designed to be
educational (addresses the importance of authority in personal epistemology).
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Chapter 6: Sources and sentiment: How nature programs may be leading science
literacy astray
Purpose: To assess the science presented in nature and science programs.
 If audiences do turn to wildlife and nature programs for educational content, what
is the quality of the educational content?

Despite enlisting science consultants during production, many wildlife and nature
programs incorporate misconceptions about the science, especially about evolution
(Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006; Dissertation Appendix 1) Misconceptions are one type of
knowledge students bring into the classroom, and this prior knowledge clearly affects the
outcomes of their learning experiences (Posner et al., 1982). In fact, the misconceptions
evident in nature programs are highly similar to students’ ideas about evolution,
materializing as teleological and need-based misconceptions about this important theory
(Bright et al., 2003). Misconceptions can be especially egregious when they affect the
public’s understanding of difficult and controversial topics, such as evolution. The
theory of evolution is central to teaching biology, and public misconceptions have
considerable impact on the inclusion of evolutionary theory in educational curricula.
Certainly, public misconceptions about science may have broader affects if they impact
decision making about topics with scientific foundations (e.g., forest thinning, genetically
engineered crops) and public support for the scientific enterprise.
In a preliminary study, I designed the Science and Nature Program (SNaP)
assessment tool to elicit the prevalence of misconceptions in wildlife and nature
programming (Dissertation Appendix 1). I developed quantifiable criteria to evaluate
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whether or not nature films represent science and the scientific process accurately and
whether or not they use relevant metaphors to explain and interpret key ecological
concepts. My goal was to create a rubric that could be used to analyze the scientific
content of a broad selection of wildlife and nature programs.
Because SNaP permits quick and consistent assessment of the content available to
viewers, it can be used to evaluate a large number of nature programs in short order. This
chapter explores the science content, especially related to evolution, of programs
appearing on the most popular nature programming channels during a “sweeps” month.
If viewers are choosing to watch nature programs, they may do so because of their
perceived educational value. “Educational” content that promotes misconceptions,
especially about evolution, may significantly reduce the public’s understanding of
evolution. Therefore, science educators need to be aware of this potential influence on
prior knowledge both for the classroom and for civic discussions that involve evolution.

Chapter 7: Clio the Scientist: Using narratives to broaden the impacts of inquiry
Purpose: To determine the extent to which young children can be taught a complex
subject such as the Nature of Science
 If understanding the nature of the scientific endeavor is important to acceptance of
evolutionary theory, how early can we begin to teach these important concepts?

Understanding the nature of the scientific endeavor is critical to understanding
evolution and evaluating science in civil discourse. The nature of the scientific process is
very complex, however; even science teachers have difficulty grasping concepts such as
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the tentative nature of conclusions and theory ladenness (Akerson, Abd-El-Khalick, &
Lederman, 2000; Akerson et al., 2006; Lederman, 2006; Schwartz, Lederman, &
Crawford, 2004). Because of these perceived difficulties, the paradigm for teaching the
nature of science focuses on teaching very young students relatively simple views of
science that do not require abstract thinking (National Research Council, 2007). Recent
evidence indicates that children may be quite capable of sophisticated thinking, however,
but most curricula do not reflect what is now known about younger children’s cognitive
capabilities (National Research Council, 2007). In fact, early instruction in science can
have lasting impacts (Novak & Musonda, 1991). Chapter 5 reports on a scientific inquiry
about insect vision I developed for elementary school teachers and parents to help 1st and
2nd grade students explore issues related to the nature of science. Inquiry is a learneroriented approach to scientific investigations designed to engage students in active
learning. This inquiry includes a take-home story designed around the inquiry’s theme;
students read the story at home with their families and re-visit concepts they learned in
school during the inquiry about what scientists know and can know about insect vision.
One component of the National Science Foundation (NSF) GK-12 graduate
funding through the Ecologists, Educators, and Schools program required that
participants complete an original education research project for publication. This chapter
not only fulfills that requirement, it provides valuable insight to how young children learn
about the nature of the scientific endeavor.
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Scientific Significance
This research will significantly advance our understanding of learning in the free
choice/ informal science education sector. Few definitive studies have addressed how
and when learning scientific concepts from television occurs, and attitude studies about
perceptions of the environment after viewing nature programs do not examine the
resulting scientific understanding of the environment or environmental processes (e.g.,
evolution) necessary for environmental, ecological, or scientific literacy. Indeed, Kozma
(1994) suggested that it is time to move beyond concern with “proving” that media
“cause” learning and begin to ask what the actual and potential relationships between
media and learning are. My research will specifically examine what people learn about
evolution from wildlife and nature programs. Moreover, insight into the interaction of
personal epistemology, knowledge of the nature of science, evolution understanding, and
informal sources of learning will facilitate theoretical development and allow us to build
more accurate models of how people construct knowledge in the free-choice science
information sector. Lastly, a more thorough understanding of how the public constructs
knowledge about evolution will allow us to address this topic more thoughtfully in civic
discourse.
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CHAPTER 2.
LITERATURE REVIEW:
EVOLUTION IN EDUCATION AND DISCOURSE

Never before in history has understanding evolutionary science been so important
to the survival of the human species. Whether that understanding is directly related to
our survival with issues such as antibiotic resistance, what have now come to be known
as “super viruses”, and the struggle to understand and contain their influence – or less
direct effects related to climate change and the impacts on biodiversity – a basic
understanding of evolution is critical to civic and social decisions (Antolin & Herbers,
2001). These are broad topics where evolution plays a key foundational role. For
example, resistance requires understanding how modifications within a population of
bacteria come about and how time-honored drugs act as strong selective agents
(Genereux & Bergstrom, 2005). Similarly, the outcomes of climate change may be
extensive in terms of population variability and the ability to respond to new
environmental conditions. Recently, with the threat of a swine flu pandemic, civically
engaged people may turn to informal and free-choice science education sources to learn
the facts, issues, and policies associated with the subject. Rarely will these sources
address evolution, even though understanding the basic theory of evolution is a key
element in solving and preventing outbreaks. Understanding the basic tenets of
evolutionary theory has to be developed during formal education.
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“There is probably no other single subject within the discipline of biology that has
engendered as much misunderstanding and mistrust as has the subject of
evolution.”
– Ehrle, 1960 (p. 276)
Antolin & Herbers (2001) report a case of a fundamentalist surgeon who
unsuccessfully replaced a newborn’s heart with the heart of a baboon, without regard to
evolutionary history, because it was the right size and shape. Clearly, the implications of
policies that do not promote a strong and rigorous understanding of evolution in our
educational system can be great. “Balanced treatment” legislation sets up a false
dichotomy that implies only two viewpoints exist, despite mediating positions that have
dominated evangelical academies for decades (Marsden, 1991). Similarly, the strengths
and weakness legislation that passed in Louisiana “to allow and assist teachers,
principals, and other school administrators to create and foster an environment within
public elementary and secondary schools that promotes critical thinking skills, logical
analysis, and open and objective discussion of scientific theories being studied including
evolution, the origins of life, global warming, and human cloning” is a Trojan horse
designed to allow alternatives to methodological naturalism to enter the science
classroom. Critical thinking is already a requirement of scientific knowledge, and it
brings an understanding and acceptance of a level of uncertainty about the kind of
knowledge science generates. As science and technology progress, the proportion of
science-related discourses in our society is likely to increase (American Association for
the Advancement of Science, 1990), ironically at the same time legislation is eroding the
very principles that have permitted the success we all enjoy.
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Here, I examine both the ontological and epistemological commitments related to
science and evolutionary knowledge in our society. I begin by examining the legal
threats to evolution and science education, especially the shift in creationist tactics to
redefine the nature and scope of scientific knowledge. This strategic shift necessitates an
understanding of science as an endeavor and why the knowledge derived from this
materialistic approach is so respected. As such, I explore the philosophical nature of
science and the historical development of evolutionary theory in terms of ontological and
epistemic assumptions. The theory of evolution is a complex subject, however, and
evolution educators have been examining how people learn about this important topic for
a quarter century. Obviously, understanding what educators know about how people
understand evolution, the nature of science, and knowledge in general is important to
putting this controversy in context.
Ultimately, it is a question of how the public understands science, however.
Evolution is a socio-scientific issue (Sadler, Chambers, & Zeidler, 2004), and thus exists
in an environment where knowledge can be idiosyncratic, and where free speech is the
pre-requisite to “truth.” The “marketplace of ideas” is a competitive assortment of freechoice science education opportunities juxtaposed regularly with anti-evolution
messages. The opportunities for individuals motivated to learn about the controversy are
not always “educational” in terms of current science understanding, however, and
potential audiences must have sufficient knowledge to assess the sources themselves or
rely on other assessments of quality. As such, I conclude with an examination of one
type of free-choice science learning opportunity afforded a high level of credibility as an
educational resource, but whose contribution to science learning is highly questionable.
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History of Fundamentalist Opposition
Formal public education in the U.S. arose out of a demand for access to education
that was free and without regard to social class (Good, 1956). By the turn of the 20th
century, Dewey (1916) had formulated many of his ideas about democratic education,
arguing that in advanced societies learning by direct sharing was increasingly difficult as
“much of what adults do is so remote in space and in meaning that playful imitation is
less and less adequate.” Learning in a formal environment became disembodied from its
social context – it became an act in and of itself (Bruner, 1966). Formal learning
promoted ways of learning and thinking that were quite different from those nurtured in
practical daily activities. Learning the sciences involved moving outside of a natural
context – for example, numbers became things separate from their function as tools for
determining length and no longer connected to that which was being measured (Scribner
& Cole, 1973). Indeed, the interface of democratic education and non-contextual
learning has been at the heart of the debate about evolution education ever since Darwin’s
important treatise On the Origin of Species (by Means of Natural Selection, or the
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life). Dewey – ironically born the
year Darwin published this famous treatise – was influenced by Darwin’s approach to
science and how that approach could apply to education. He saw the battle to teach
evolution as a matter of citizenship, overcoming opinion and emotion and taking a
principled stand (Dewey, 1923).
Public education should help students overcome the fallacy of emotional
argument and teach reason for making political and economic decisions (Dewey, 1924).
Overcoming opinion and emotion is extremely difficult in science education. Unlike
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science, controversies in science education come from sources outside of the field and
grow from non-scientific considerations (Hildebrand, Bilica, & Capps, 2008). The clash
of creationism and evolution is, in effect, a struggle for the control of public education
and cultural hegemony (Taylor & Condit, 1988). It is a clash based on a fundamental
criterion – the rise in methodological naturalism as an evidential requirement (Pennock,
2003).
The Scopes “Monkey Trial” was the most infamous event highlighting
fundamentalist opposition to evolution, and it represented the first of many clashes
between those embracing a literal reading of the bible and the burgeoning evidence for
organic evolution. In 1925, Tennessee passed the Butler Act prohibiting teaching
evolution in all schools, even Universities. House Bill No. 185 (Public Acts of the State
of Tennessee, Chapter 27) focused specifically on Man’s place in the creation as taught in
the bible. John Thomas Scopes volunteered to challenge the law using the textbook A
Civic Biology: Presented in Problems, by George William Hunter, which included
sections titled “Man’s place in Nature” and “Evolution of Man” (Hunter, 1914).
Generally taking progressive stances in politics, William Jennings Bryan did not reject all
of evolutionary biology, only human evolution (Larson, 1997). Conflated by the tenets of
Social Darwinism, however, Bryan believed “Darwinism” caused German militarism in
World War I and threatened traditional religion and morality (Marsden, 1991). Bryan
typically joined movements in their final politicized stage (Larson, 2003), and the Scopes
Trial was no exception. He assisted the prosecutor A. Thomas Stewart, an Attorney
General of Tennessee (R. Moore, 1998). Although Scopes was found guilty (on the
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insistence of Clarence Darrow), Darrow succeeded in casting doubt on strict ontological
interpretations of the bible (R. Moore, 1998).
Evolutionists may have won in the court of public opinion, but not in the trenches
of biology education. Evolution all but disappeared from high school text books until the
late 1930s when two texts, though not popular texts, included extensive treaties on the
theory (Grabiner & Miller, 1974). Unlike physics and chemistry, biology was considered
a “soft” science, but in 1920, the Committee of Ten of the National Education
Association recommended that biology be taught prior to chemistry and physics in high
school curricula (McComas, 2007). Organizations that advocated science teaching as a
profession soon followed. The National Association of Biology Teachers (NABT) was
formed in 1938, in part, because of the inadequate place of biology in the curriculum in
many schools and to facilitate the dissemination of biological knowledge (Riddle, 1938).
In the next year, the Union of American Biological Societies, along with NABT,
distributed a survey to biology teachers from across the US to determine the subjects
related to biology that were taught. Results indicated that less than 50% of teachers
taught evolution as the “principle underlying plant, animal and human origin” (Riddle,
1942). Pressure from school officials often was cited as a reason for not including
evolution in the curriculum (Riddle, 1942). School administrators in Illinois, however,
were more than happy to pressure students to attend “voluntary” classes in religion
(Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish faiths), however. The common practice of mixing
religion and education in public schools was about to be challenged with the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
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An earlier case about the expenditure of tax-raised funds related to Catholic
instruction (Everson v. Board of Education 330 U.S. 1), had the court wrestling with the
Establishment Clause in a 5-4 decision, but McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S.
203 (1948) forced the U.S. Supreme Court’s resolution. In McCollum, the 8-1 decision
was clear:
“This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith. And it falls
squarely under the ban of the First Amendment (made applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth) as we interpreted it in. There we said:
‘Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force or influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will, or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice versa. In the words
of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect ‘a wall of separation between church and State’” (McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U.S. 203, 1948).
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The use of public funds to support religion, as opposed to science, was an
important condition. As long as public monies were not involved, students were free to
study religion (off of school grounds, and with their parents’ written permission; Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 1952). Shortly thereafter, the launch of Sputnik I prodded
fears of falling behind the Soviet Union technologically, and the U.S. government began
providing federal money for new science textbooks – the Biological Sciences Curriculum
Study (Grabiner & Miller, 1974). Evolution returned to the precollege curriculum. The
fear of not being competitive in global science competition had cascading effects. The
Butler Act, Tennessee’s antievolution law, was finally repealed in 1967 (Public Acts of
the State of Tennessee, Chapter No. 237, House Bill No. 48, 1967). The first “proevolution” case was soon to follow.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) distinguished between teaching
religion and teaching evolution. Arkansas had adopted an “anti-evolution” statute by
voter referendum in 1928 that made it unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported
school or university to teach or to use a textbook that teaches “that mankind ascended or
descended from a lower order of animals” (Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97). The
U.S. Supreme Court recognized the State’s power to specify the public school curriculum
but “the State’s undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does
not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a
scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the
First Amendment” (Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 1968).
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A New Era: Religion as “Science”
Clearly creationists recognized the important distinction in the law; public monies
could not be used to support religion. A “scientific approach” to the tenets of the bible,
however, represented a new direction that exploited the philosophical underpinnings of
science itself. Disillusioned by the BSCS to promote the theory of evolution in schools,
Walter Lammerts began the Creation Research Society in 1963 to realign science based
on theistic creation concepts and to publish creationist textbooks (Numbers, 2006).
Lammerts promoted a strict interpretation of the six days of Genesis, and with great
difficulty, finally found a textbook that served his ideology. The preface by Henry M.
Morris, current president of the Creation Research Society, included the first attempt to
put the “doctrine of evolution” on the same ground as the “doctrine of special creation”
(Numbers, 2006). Despite its claims, however, the authors of Biology: A Search for
Order in Complexity (by John N. Moore and Harold Slusher) chose “to discredit
evolution rather than make any case for creation” (Thwaites, 1980). Taking a similar
tack, Duane Gish, another charter member, wrote a letter to The American Biology
Teacher, published by NABT, in 1970 to introduce the Creation Research Society as a
group of “informed people” that do not accept that evolution is “a fact for which no
further proof is needed.” Shortly thereafter, Morris split from the Creation Research
Society to found the Institute for Creation Research and cater to the elementary grades
(Numbers, 2006). In 1974, Morris published Scientific Creationism (Creation-Life
Publishers, San Diego) that included his literal interpretation of Genesis (including a
young Earth, global flood, and special creation of plants and animals) re-packaged as a
scientific model (Numbers, 2006; Scott & Matzke, 2007).
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American Biology Teacher clearly did not endorse creationist views, but the
repackaging of creation science ultimately warranted some debate. Since its inception,
the journal had published articles about the teaching of evolution, the conceptual
difficulties, and the challenges (e.g., Beers, 1938; Ehrle, 1960; Packard, 1950). The
renewed interest in creation science and the dispute it provoked regarding adoption of
textbooks in California prompted editors of the American Biology Teacher to publish a
variety of letters and articles related to creation science in the classroom. The journal
published a lengthy review of Biology: A Search for Order in Complexity (Aulie, 1972a;
Aulie, 1972b) that attempted to expose the fundamentalist beliefs that interfere with
scientific interpretation of evidence without discounting the relevance of religion.
Theodosius Dobzhansky had just given his famous paper “Nothing in biology makes
sense except in the light of evolution” at the 1972 convention, when the journal published
“Evolution, creation, and the scientific method” by John Moore. The editors included the
disclaimer that “Although the views presented in this article are not acceptable to the
majority of life scientists, the editorial staff feels that our membership should be aware of
the creationist position as described by John N. Moore” (J. N. Moore, 1973). According
to Moore, “scientific activity involves the search for facts that can be observed or
demonstrated, and for laws that have been demonstrated also, by means of trustworthy
methods of discovery” (p. 23). He goes on to claim that repeatability, or reproducibility,
is at the core of the method, and that evolutionary theory is not repeatable (presumably
because no two species are identical). Within this context, Moore clearly distinguished
two models, the general evolution model and the creation model, and put them on even
ground as conceptual ontological and epistemological frameworks to explain origins.
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The last major article in the issue was the official statement of NABT, who joined the
“National Academy of Sciences, the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, and other learned societies in urging the State Board of Education to reject
inclusion of an account of special creation in State-approved science textbooks”
(National Association of Biology Teachers, 1973).
The “two models” rhetoric came to a head in 1982 in McLean v. Arkansas Board
of Education (529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258-1264). Arkansas had enacted a law mandating
“equal time” – the Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act
(Act 590). Plaintiffs included a number of churches, clergy, parents, and teachers that
brought suit as a check of the Establishment Clause. The judge ruled that creation
scientists “...cannot properly describe the methodology used as scientific, if they start
with a conclusion and refuse to change it regardless of the evidence developed during the
course of the investigation.”
Five years later, a similar case, Edwards v. Aguillard (482 U.S. 578, 1987), was
brought before the U.S. Supreme Court. Louisiana had enacted a similar “balanced
treatment” act, although this time in the guise of “academic freedom.” Although the
court ruled 7-2 that supernatural creation was a religious view and that the Louisiana
legislature had violated the Establishment Clause by promoting it in public schools, the
dissenting Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, indicated
that academic freedom was a legitimate secular purpose. Creationists had a loophole
(Pennock, 2003).
The rise of “intelligent design” was heralded with the publication of Of Pandas
and People by Percival Davis and Dean H. Kenyon in 1989. The book was a thinly
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disguised repackaging of creationist ideas, clearly documented by Barbara Forrest,
immediately after Edwards v. Aguillard. (In fact, Forrest discovered an editing error in
one version of the manuscript where the “c” and “ists” from the word “creationists” were
missed as “design proponents” was being substituted, leaving the passage to state
“evolutionists think the former is correct, cdesign proponentsists accept the latter view;”
Scott & Matzke, 2007.) Nevertheless, in their promotion of the book the Foundation for
Thought and Ethics, a group less tied to the literal interpretation of the bible, claimed to
be developing a high school text book that presented plausible, scientific alternatives to
conventional evolutionary theories: “[T]he book will not be subject to the major criticism
of creation, that the supernatural lies outside of science, because its central statement is
that scientific evidence points to an intelligent cause, but that science is silent as to
whether that intelligence is within or beyond the material universe. So the book is not
appealing to the supernatural” (Scott, 1990).
The scientific objections to Of Pandas and People were numerous and lengthy.
In her review, Eugenie Scott, an anthropologist, was particularly disturbed by the
treatment of human evolution (Scott, 1990). In addition, the book misrepresented
variation and its role in natural selection, as well as mutation as a source of variation
(Scott, 1990). Similarly, Frank Sonleitner wrote “What’s wrong with Pandas?”, and
according to the National Center for Science Education, the ongoing critique is now
longer than the actual book (http://ncseweb.org/creationism/analysis/sonleitners-whatswrong-with-pandas, last accessed 4/09).
Around the same time, the Discovery Institute was founded as a political think
tank and the official home of the “intelligent design” movement. From the Discovery
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Institute, the Center for Renewal of Science and Culture (renamed Center for Science and
Culture in 2002) developed the “wedge document” to pursue an aggressive public
relations program that would create an opening for the supernatural in the public’s
understanding of science and in the minds of policymakers (Forrest, 2007; Forrest &
Gross, 2004). Their success was apparent when President George W. Bush announced
support for teaching “intelligent design” and Rick Santorum was able to add equal-time
wording to the “No Child Left Behind” education bill (Pennock, 2003). (The language
was struck from the enrolled bill, however.)
The Discovery Institute was not prepared to test “intelligent design” in a court of
law, however. In October 2004, the Dover School Board in Pennsylvania passed a
resolution that:
“Students will be made aware of gaps/problems in Darwin’s theory and of other
theories of evolution including, but not limited to, intelligent design.
Note: Origins of Life is not taught”
(Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, Case 4:04-cv-02688-JEJ, Document 342,
2005). One month later, the board announced that teachers would be required to read a
disclaimer about the theory of evolution stating that the theory is not fact and significant
gaps exist. Furthermore, teachers were to state that “intelligent design” was a valid
alternative theory and recommend reading Of Pandas and People for any student
interested. Apparently, the Discovery Institute urged the board to repeal the measure,
fearing legal defeat (Forrest, 2007).
And a sound legal defeat it was. In December 2005, a federal district court struck
down the school district’s attempts, declaring the effort to be an unconstitutional
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establishment of religion (Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 2005). According to
Judge Jones, “intelligent design” not only violated the Establishment Clause, it was not
science. Although the judge did not use the test established in McLean v. Arkansas, he
invoked specific epistemological demarcation criteria. Science did not include
supernatural causes, and proponents of “intelligent design” could not change the
definition of science. Moreover, irreducible complexity was in fact testable and
refutable. Acceptance by the community of scientists also was an important
consideration in which “intelligent design” had failed. Nevertheless, a new strategy
emerged – one that has come full circle – to use an argument of rhetoric to win in the
public court of opinion.
The new tactic involved redoubling efforts at discrediting the evidentiary support
for evolution and its acceptance by the scientific community. These new efforts
represented an argument for ontology based on epistemological detraction. Their
objective was not to provide new scientific explanations but to make empirical arguments
to establish the limits of empirical science (Clark, Foster, & York, 2007). By suggesting
that the theory of evolution was not well supported with evidence, detractors argued that
science education needed to be teaching critical thinking skills. The implication was that
by being taught to think critically, creationism would become an option in scientific
discourse. This tactic had been reproached in both Kitzmiller and McLean:
“The court in McLean noted the ‘fallacious pedagogy of the two model approach’
and that [i]n efforts to establish ‘evidence’ in support of creation science, the
defendants relied upon the same false premise as the two model approach ... all
evidence which criticized evolutionary theory was proof in support of creation
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science” (McLean v. Arkansas, 529 F. Supp. at 1267, 1269). We do not find this
false dichotomy any more availing to justify ID today than it was to justify
creation science two decades ago.”
Clearly, the approach resonated with the public, however. Louisiana passed new
“strengths and weaknesses” legislation just 25 years after the “balanced treatment” act
had been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Edwards v. Aguillard (482 U.S. 578,
1987).
“The State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, upon request of a city,
parish, or other local public school board, shall allow and assist teachers,
principals, and other school administrators to create and foster an environment
within public elementary and secondary schools that promotes critical thinking
skills, logical analysis, and open and objective discussion of scientific theories
being studied including, but not limited to, evolution, the origins of life, global
warming, and human cloning” (Louisiana Senate Bill 733, Section 1. R.S.
17:285.1B, 2008).
After a much heated debate, Texas soon followed with science standards that conjure
“strengths and weaknesses” wording. The Texas standards were more direct in their
criticism of evolutionary theory, employing the discredited creationist idea that that
“sudden appearance” and “stasis” in the fossil record somehow disprove evolution
(National Center for Science Education press release, March 30th, 2009). Now students
were to “analyze and evaluate the sufficiency of scientific explanations concerning any
data of sudden appearance, stasis and the sequential nature of groups in the fossil
records” (Amendments Proposed for Science TEKS, Section 112.34(c) strike 7B, March
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27, 2009). Missouri, New Mexico, Florida, and Iowa have all introduced similar
legislation without success.

What Is this Thing Called Science?
Science is ill-defined; knowing what it is not may be easier to define than what it
is. McLean v. Arkansas was the first challenge to evolution that resulted in a precedentsetting “test” to determine whether an enterprise should be considered science. This test
came with considerable input from Michael Ruse, a philosopher of science, and Ruse
argued persuasively (the judge ruled that creation science was not science). He
maintained the most striking aspect of science was that it was an empirical enterprise
about the real world of sensation – including unobservables – and a search for order (i.e.,
unbroken, natural regularities). He added that laws affect explanation and prediction, and
associated with explanation and prediction was the idea of testability – confirmation and
falsification. One major difference between science and non-science was that scientific
explanations were tentative; scientists, as a community, give up on theories that fail to
answer to new or reconsidered evidence (although he freely admitted that not all
scientists give up their ideas). Religious individuals tended to be dogmatic, retaining
their ideas despite the evidence (Ruse, 1982a). But, Laudan argued that Ruse was
perpetuating a view of science that simply was not true (Laudan, 1982). He contended
that very little demarcates science from the so-called pseudo-science of creation science
(or any other). Moreover, many philosophers of science have concluded that no
universal, ahistorical, account is available that is capable of providing standards by which
to judge science (Chalmers, 1999; Clark et al., 2007). Nevertheless, a philosophical
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grounding of the nature of the scientific endeavor is vital to evolutionary biologists and
anyone interested in the creation-evolution controversy.
Alan Chalmers (1976, 1982, and 1999) asked a fundamental question about the
scientific enterprise, not to challenge science, but to understand sincerely why the
knowledge derived from science is so highly esteemed. Although he subscribed to the
concept that there is no general account of science that applies to all sciences at all stages
in their development, he tried to capture the distinguishing features of science in the face
of the philosophical challenges (Chalmers, 1999). Indeed, philosophers have been
debating the fundamental nature of science, including its epistemological, ontological,
and axiological, commitments for decades. The result has been a complex, and
sometimes contentious, discussion that can be pooled into two overlapping issues
(although by no means the only issues) related to public understanding. Epistemological
issues appeal to evidence and the nature of evidence used in science, and ontological
issues deal with the kinds of things there are in the world and what we can know about
them.

Epistemology
Traditional views of science have centered on the production of facts, observation
and experiment, and logical induction, but scientific knowledge cannot rest on such weak
appeals. Science cannot be derived from facts, as so many people assume, because facts
are not directly given to careful unprejudiced observations via the senses. Facts do not
exist prior to or independent of theory; facts have to be practically constructed and are
subject to revision and dismissal. They do not provide a firm reliable foundation for
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scientific knowledge. Because of this fallibility, scientific knowledge can neither be
conclusively proved nor disproved by appealing to observable facts (Chalmers, 1999).
Experimental results also are fallible. As with facts, results from experiments are not
derived via the senses in a straightforward manner, and judgments about the adequacy of
those results are dependent on theory. More importantly, appealing to experimental
results cannot settle a dispute between proponents of opposing theories because of this
circular dependency (in order to judge the adequacy of experimental results, scientists
appeal to theory, and those same experimental results are used as evidence for the
theory). Nevertheless, in a philosophical sense, if the experimental outcomes actually do
reflect how the world works rather than just theoretical views about the world, then
testing the adequacy of theories against experimental results has meaning (Chalmers,
1999). A recent philosophical realm has been exploring whether the reality of
experimental effects can be established without recourse to large-scale theory, however.
Given these failings, science philosophers began to consider what Sir Karl Popper
called the problem of demarcation (Popper, 1963). The problem of demarcation rested in
the idea that certain characteristics should be able to differentiate science from nonscience. As Popper (1963) saw it, evidence could be twisted out of counter-evidence
with ad-hoc interpretations to confirm theories, such as Freudian psychoanalysis and
Alderian psychology, so that nothing distinguished one as better able to explain human
behavior than the other. As a result, he tried to draw a line “between statements, or
systems of statements, of the empirical sciences, and all other statements – whether they
are of a religious or of a metaphysical character, or simply pseudo-scientific” (p. 38).
Popper claimed the criterion of falsifiability was the solution – statements or statement
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systems must be capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable observations; that is,
in order to be scientific, a theory must take risks by predicting testable outcomes (Popper,
1963).
Interestingly, Popper claimed that parts of the principle of natural selection, for
example, were pseudo-science – that they failed to satisfy his falsifiability criterion (Curd
& Cover, 1998). In fact, Popper first claimed that “the survival of the fittest” was
tautological (an idea picked up upon by the creation scientist, Henry Morris, that all of
evolutionary theory is neither predictable nor testable). Indeed, Popper changed his
mind, but as he did, he himself illustrated how difficult his ideas could be to interpret.
Popper had never condemned all of Darwin’s theory, even when he judged an important
part could be falsified (Curd & Cover, 1998). Thus, one problem was that observation
might not lead to straightforward conclusive falsification of theories because of the
possibility that some part of the complex test situation was responsible for an erroneous
prediction (the Duhem-Quine thesis; Chalmers, 1999). Moreover, history has shown that
science does not “progress” based on this line of thinking; many important theories were
not rejected after falsification (e.g., Newton’s gravitational theory and the Copernican
Revolution; Curd & Cover, 1998, Chalmers, 1999). Testable consequences also were a
very weak requirement – although they perhaps are a necessary condition for science
(Curd & Cover, 1998). As a result, the weakness of the unqualified demarcation criteria
was that many pseudo-sciences and non-sciences could make falsifiable claims, such as
any literal interpretation of the bible would. Creation science made empirical assertions
fully capable of falsification (Laudan, 1982).
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Ontology
Scientific knowledge claims depend on the kinds of things there are in the world
and what scientists can know about those things. One aspect of the truth in scientific
knowledge deals with the extent to which a scientist prescribes to realism. Realists
assume that scientific knowledge informs about the nature of the world beyond what
appears on the surface, even though it may not be directly observable. Furthermore, not
only does science give us knowledge of these unobservables, it has succeeded in doing so
(Chalmers, 1999). The line between supernatural and unobservable is razor thin,
especially when examining the history of science, however. Mayr (1997) argues that the
demarcation between science and theology is easy because scientists do not invoke the
supernatural to explain how the natural world works. In this light, supernatural seems
only to imply human-like deities, not imaginary concepts like “ether,” “factor,” or
“gemmule.” In point of fact, anti-realists counter that many of the entities postulated by
past theories are no longer believed to exist (e.g., ether, Newton’s corpuscles, phlogiston,
and Darwin’s gemmules; Chalmers, 1999). Similarly, Laudan (1981) provides examples
of theories that were successful and their central explanatory terms did not refer, e.g.
crystalline spheres of ancient astronomy, electromagnetic ether, and Mendel’s “genes”
(Mendel was referring to entities that did not actually exist – “factors,” and assigned
causal roles that have been divided up among other entities; Curd & Cover, 1998). Even
though these past theories were instrumental to the generation of current knowledge,
many have since been rejected as false. Therefore, the theoretical aspect of science is not
securely established (Chalmers, 1999). Many anti-realists argue that theories are merely
instruments necessary for correlating and predicting the results of observation and
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experiment; they are not appropriately interpreted as being true or false (Chalmers, 1999).
One motivation for this anti-realism stance seems to be restricting science to claims that
can be justified by scientific means (Chalmers, 1999).
Certainly, as a principle goal, scientists aim to accept true claims about the natural
world and reject false ones (Curd & Cover, 1998). Scientific value, however, relies on
more than just statements of truth. Curd and Cover (1998) provide the example of a
scientist counting the number of hairs on a dog; without the context of a theory of a
drug’s affect on the dog’s hair loss, simply knowing the hair count has no scientific
value. Scientists are interested in more than discovering mere truths about the world;
they are interested in discovering interesting truths. Consequently, the judgments about
what constitute interesting truths are based on criteria such as generality, predictive and
explanatory power, and simplicity (Curd & Cover, 1998). These constitutive values often
compete, compromising the objectivity of science and undermining its rationality for
theory choice (Longino, 1990). So, even though truth may be the primary cognitive
value, it is not independent of other cognitive values when deciding which theories are
true. Moreover, contextual values affect the way scientists do the science that drives
these cognitive values. Contextual values (norms, preferences, beliefs, and interests)
vary with time and across cultures. How scientists evaluate and judge evidence depends
on contextual values, and objectivity is a matter of degree that depends less on
methodological rules and more on the way the scientific community is organized
(Longino, 1990). Of particular importance is the way contextual values shape the
formation of hypotheses in the context of scientific discovery (Okruhlik, 1994). The
production of scientific knowledge is always within a social context and related to other

52

practices with other aims, such as personal and professional intentions of scientists, the
economic intentions of funding agencies, and the ideological intentions of religious
groups (Chalmers, 1999). In fact, Thomas Kuhn examined the history of science to claim
that contextual values shape scientific judgments about theories so much so that scientific
revolutions lack rationality and objective progress (Kuhn, 1970).
But progress is a hallmark by which many define the scientific enterprise. Indeed,
the Ultimate Argument (van Frassen, 1980) states that the success of science cannot be
explained unless these scientific theories have the virtues of verisimilitude (approximate
truth) and reference. According to van Fraasen, science can be explained without appeal
to approaching truth using Darwinism, however; the success of scientific theories is a
result of the survival of the fittest and not necessarily because of their verisimilitude. In
rebuttal, Brown (1985) outlines three features of successful scientific theories: their
empirical adequacy (they explain and unify), their increasing adequacy (temporal
increase in these abilities), and their novel predictions (predictions that turn out to be true
more often than guessing). Van Fraasen’s Darwinian analogy cannot account for novel
predictions (Brown, 1985).
Understanding the limits of scientific knowledge is vital to understanding the
controversy surrounding religion and science. Obviously, much uncertainty exists about
the scientific enterprise, what exactly science is, what are its goals, the knowledge it
produces, and what kind of certainty it can attach to its claims. Chalmers (1999) suggests
that comparing the kinds of knowledge claims that are sought, the kinds of methods
available for establishing those knowledge claims, and the success that has been achieved
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should distinguish a science, such as biology, from a non-science, such as creation
science.

The Science of Evolution
Given that no universal, ahistorical, definition of science is available (Chalmers,
1999; Clark et al., 2007), one has to ask about the history of evolutionary science; when
did evolution become science? Like so much of Western tradition, evolutionary thought
was rooted in Greek philosophy. Plato (ca. 427-347 BCE) argued that the gods created
the world (an idea appropriated in the Christian interpretation of the bible; Futuyma,
1998) and attend to it (Clark et al., 2007). In that world, everything had a transcendent
ideal form imperfectly imitated by its earthly counterpart (i.e., essentialism; Futuyma,
2005). Plato’s view of purposiveness resided in the gods (Ariew, 2007). Aristotle (384322 BCE) was a biologist, however; he believed in an inner principle of teleological
change – the cause responsible for reaching a preconceived ultimate goal came from
within the organism (Ariew, 2007; Lombrozo & Carey, 2006; Mayr, 1961).
The materialist foundations of modern evolutionary science appeared with
Epicurus (341-270 BCE). He insisted that empirical investigation was the means to the
best explanation, recognizing uncertainty and the limitations of observation (Clark et al.,
2007). The gods were not excluded from Epicurus’ worldview, they just were not related
to the material world (knowledge of the gods came through dreams; Clark et al., 2007).
It was Epicurus’ contribution to modern day science, in general, that is eschewed most by
anti-evolutionists (Clark et al., 2007).
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Early in the 19th century, however, evolutionary thought began to blossom.
Naturalists approached the world looking for proof of an obviously intelligent designer
(in that day they just admitted it was God), but the discovery of more and more fossils
indicated an earth that had undergone radical changes in the diversity and kinds of
organisms that existed (Larson, 2004). Georges Cuvier employed the idea of
“progressive catastrophism” to explain the sequence in the geologic record as suites of
animals were wiped out allowing new and fertile ground for God’s next plan (Larson,
2004). Other naturalists struggled with explanations for the history of life that did not
require omnipotent intervention. In 1802, Jean Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Monet,
Chevalier de Lamarck, published the first comprehensive theory of organic evolution
(Larson, 2004). He proposed the idea of transformationism – from spontaneous
generation of the lowest forms, life progressed to the highest by the inheritance of
acquired traits (Kampourakis & Zogza, 2007; Larson, 2004). In context, Lamarck’s
contribution was one of many ideas being offered at the time (Corsi, 2005), but it piqued
the interests of both believers and detractors. No longer were kinds static; Lamarck
offered a comprehensive theory to explain the history of animals, including man (Mayr,
1982). Whether scientists, naturalists, and the educated elite cared for the work or not,
Lamarck clearly infected Victorian society with ideas about a theory of evolution (Corsi,
2005). Catastrophists, like Cuvier, countered that creation had been progressive, but life
forms did not progress (Futuyma, 1998; Larson, 2004). Charles Lyell despised the
Lamarckian thought of human transformation, but he disagreed with progressive stances
like Cuvier’s (Larson, 2004). He argued for environmental change that was cyclical and
consistent throughout the geologic record (Larson, 2004). The absence of fossils to
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support this idea just meant they had yet to be found (Larson, 2004). Although he
believed in special creation, Lyell was unwilling to attribute the natural to the
supernatural (Larson, 2004). He proposed that currently observable forces were
responsible for shaping the earth’s features (Larson, 2004). This uniformitarian approach
to viewing the world was grounded in methodological naturalism, and methodological
naturalism would become the nucleus in enlightenment thinking.

The Enlightenment
As a signal of the new era of enlightenment thinking, during the 1830s the term
“scientist” was coined to distinguish methodological naturalism from idealistic
philosophies like romanticism (Futuyma, 1998; Larson, 2004). Methodological
naturalism was an epistemological belief (a belief about what knowledge is and how we
can obtain it) and a procedural protocol (Forrest, 2000; Pennock, 1996). It has often been
conflated with philosophical naturalism, which operates in the realm of ontology (truth
claims; Forrest, 2000; Pennock, 1996). Although some authors (e.g., Forrest, 2000) have
argued that philosophical naturalism is the logical extension of methodological
naturalism, others have urged that science need only be committed to methodological
naturalism, remaining neutral to philosophical naturalism and metaphysical beliefs
(Pennock, 2003). Charles Darwin also embraced methodological naturalism; in that light,
natural selection was a logical extension of Malthusian economics and Llyell’s
uniformitarianism (as well as utilitarianism, imperialism, and capitalism; Clark et al.,
2007; Larson, 2004).
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As the years past after Darwin’s legendary trip, relentless pursuit of evidentiary
support for his theory caught him in a professional trap; he needed to present his thesis.
Evolutionary ideas had been creeping into social acceptance, and a young naturalist,
Alfred Wallace, soon approached Darwin with his own theory (Larson, 2004). Where
Darwin’s theory of natural selection emphasized individual competition (from his
imperialist perspective), Wallace approached evolution as a result of the selective power
of ecological forces (Wallace had grown up poor; Hull, 2005; Larson, 2004). A year
after both theories were presented to the Linnean Society in London, Darwin published
On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured
Races in the Struggle for Life (Larson, 2004).
Although immensely successful, the Origin of Species was not universally
accepted and built into a unifying theory (Caton, 2007; Larson, 2004). With no
understanding of modern genetics, and therefore no mechanism for generating, let alone
maintaining variation, evolution became a hotly debated topic. Darwin had proposed the
ill-fated idea of “gemmules” – tiny, unobservable entities – to carry hereditary
information (Chalmers, 1999; Larson, 2004). In addition, a new calculation put the age
of the earth at only one hundred million years, too short a time frame for the slow process
of natural selection (Larson, 2004). Many scientists returned to idealist philosophies and
the belief in a harmonious, transcendent order in nature guided by some mystical
meaning or theological being (Futuyma, 1998). Theistic evolution, Lamarckism,
orthogenesis, and mutation theory eclipsed natural selection as viable pursuits in
evolutionary science (Futuyma, 1998; Larson, 2004). Even Darwin engaged Lamarckian
ideas to speed the process by which change occurred (Larson, 2004). In the early 1900s,
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selection theory had all but disappeared from the scientific landscape, but no sufficient
replacement had been found (Larson, 2004).
The discovery of Gregor Mendel’s important work in 1900 ushered in a new era
to evolutionary science. With genetics as a mechanism, Darwin’s ideas about natural
selection and adaptation were further marginalized for a time, however, even considered
non-scientific because of the lack of rigorous laboratory experiments (Futuyma, 1998).
Genetics disproved Lamarckian concepts of inheritance, but mutations, at the exclusion
of natural selection, were given the primary role (Futuyma, 1998). In the 1930s and
1940s, Ronald A. Fisher, John B.S. Haldane, and Sewall Wright developed a
mathematical theory that synthesized understanding of population genetics (Futuyma,
1998). Mutation was not an alternative to natural selection, but its raw material
(Futuyma, 1998). Darwin was vindicated. Sergei Chetverikov and Theodosius
Dobzhansky showed convincingly that populations were not uniform; genetic variation
was prevalent, and mutations added to that variation (Futuyma, 1998). Ernst Mayr in
Systematics and the Origin of Species (1942) clarified the relationship between genetics
and the evolution of species, and Julian Huxley (1942) used genetic principles to explain
the major patterns of evolution that had been described, in the process redefining
evolutionary “progress” as a contingent factor (as opposed to a mystical, guided factor).
In Tempo and Mode in Evolution (1944), George Gaylord Simpson resolved population
genetics and paleontological data (Futuyma, 1998). Methodological naturalism had
proven to be highly successful, and a massive body of knowledge was directly
attributable to its adoption (Forrest, 2000).
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The history of evolutionary science clearly indicated a path defined by context.
Early evolutionists struggled with epistemological claims, but adopting the methodology
of science permitted defensible pronouncements about what exists in the natural world
(Forrest, 2000). Indeed, with the establishment of methodological naturalism as a
philosophical commitment, science could be defined by the kinds of knowledge claims
being sought, and the uncertainty that came with that commitment (Pennock, 2003).
Although creation science has a history of knowledge claims, it offers no methods, and its
success has had more to do with power than an epistemological grounding (Forrest,
2000). Negative argumentation does not, as many creationists try to claim, count as
positive evidence (Pennock, 1996). Legal precedent has now defined evolutionary
science as: (1) guided by natural law, (2) explanatory by reference to natural law, (3)
testable against the empirical world, (4) reference to conclusions that are tentative, and
(5) falsifiable (McLean v. Arkansas, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1982; see also Ruse, 1982a).
Although this definition is highly tenable to those concerned with the constitutional issue,
not all philosophers of science agree (e.g., Laudan, 1983). Nevertheless, Ruse (1982b)
argues, the U.S. Constitution does not bar teaching weak science in public schools, only
religion.
Ultimately, however, concern lies with our current understanding of evolutionary
theory. The Modern Synthesis organized evolutionary theory and brought together a
diversity of disciplines. Indeed, Theodosius Dobzhansky contended that “nothing in
biology makes sense except in the light of evolution” (Dobzhansky, 1973).
Understanding this complex theory centers on several key concepts (D. L. Anderson,
Fisher, & Norman, 2002; Nehm & Schonfeld, 2007):
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1. Individuals within a population vary in their characteristics.
2. Genetic variation is heritable.
3. Mutation, recombination, and sexual reproduction are constant sources of
variation within a population.
4. Individuals have the capacity to reproduce at a very high rate.
5. Natural resources are limiting (or become limiting).
6. Limited resources bring about a struggle for existence.
7. Survival in the course of this struggle is not random but related to the
characteristics of the individual.
8. The population changes with respect to the proportion of individuals with certain
characteristics through the differential survival and reproduction of these
individuals.
As straightforward as these eight points may seem to educators and evolutionary
biologists, however, each entails understanding a number of ideas that vary significantly
in their conceptual abstractness. Individuals’ “alternative conceptions” may interfere
with understanding these points, and misconceptions must be overcome before
conceptualizations of this complex theory can be said to approach those of the scientific
community.

Evolution Misconception Research
Constructivism is the idea that knowledge is actively constructed and constantly
evolving over time (Driver, Asoko, Leach, Mortimer, & Scott, 1994). Human
constructivism focuses on learning as a process of making meaning (Mintzes,
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Wandersee, & Novak, 1997; Novak, 1993), and meaningful learning requires organized
webs of interrelated propositions (Ausubel 1963). Individuals come to learning situations
with pre-existing ideas about how the world works, however (Ausubel, 1968; Clough &
Wood-Robinson, 1985a; Driver & Easley, 1978; M. A. Johnson & Lawson, 1998; Wallin,
Hagman, & Olander, 2000; Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994). This prior knowledge
may or may not reflect current thinking – about scientific theories for example – and
when it does not, has been termed misconceptions, alternative conceptions, non-scientific
ideas, or limited or inappropriate propositional hierarchies, to name a few.
Misconceptions about evolutionary theory can be constructed from a variety of
sources (Committee on Undergraduate Science Education, 1997; Mintzes et al., 1997).
One common source relates to vernacular issues, where different connotations of
important scientific phrases are misapplied in scientific settings. For example, in
everyday language “adapt” may refer to the ability of individuals to alter their form or
behavior through their own efforts, and “fitness” may refer to physical strength (Bishop
& Anderson, 1990). “Theory” also is commonly thought of as a “guess” rather than a
well-supported explanation that generates testable predictions (National Academy of
Sciences, 1998). Everyday experiences are another source of misconceptions. The
inheritance of family characteristics, such as grandpa’s baldness or cousin Martha’s cleft
chin, may affect how individuals think about heritability, variation, and time. Other
important sources of misconceptions can be parents, television programs, news, websites,
fiction, and religious and myth-based stories. These informal sources can affect how
individuals think about dinosaurs and the age of the earth, where lightning is likely to
strike, or the possibility of obtaining warts from frogs. Of pressing concern are the
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misconceptions that arise in formal environments. If new information is taught without
confronting students’ preconceived notions and nonscientific beliefs, individuals may
simply accommodate the new knowledge into old frameworks (Alters & Nelson, 2002;
Committee on Undergraduate Science Education, 1997). For example, teaching genetics
does not necessarily teach students that genes are the mechanism by which populations
change over time (Clough & Wood-Robinson, 1985b). Without proper grounding,
students may continue to believe that within an evolutionary context, mutations are only
bad, yielding “hopeful monsters” that natural selection must “weed out” of the
population.
Conceptual change is a mechanism for addressing misconceptions. Traditional
conceptual change research emphasizes major conceptual restructuring that results from a
logical dissatisfaction with and abandoning of prior conceptions (Posner, Strike, Hewson,
& Gertzog, 1982; Nussbaum, 1989). As a result, meaningful learning can require the
reconstruction of a significant segment of the learner’s conceptual and propositional
framework to include more general and broadly inclusive concepts (Groves & Pugh,
2002; Nicholls, 1999; Songer & Mintzes, 1994). This kind of superordinate learning is
rare, however, more characteristic of experts than students (Mintzes et al., 1997; Novak,
1993; 2002). Misconceptions may not be barriers to learning but important components
of the learning process. Hamza and Wickman (2008) suggest that misconceptions can be
integral in the learning process as they are encountered and questioned (see also Lawson,
Alkhoury, Benford, Clark, & Falconer, 2000; Taber, 2001). In fact, students may hold
theory-like conceptual frameworks – structures of relatively coherent domain-specific
knowledge characterized by a distinct ontology and causality that give rise to prediction
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and explanation (Vosniadou & Ioannides, 1998). As a result, conceptual change may be
a much slower revision than Posner et al. envisioned, through the gradual incorporation
of elements of currently accepted scientific explanations (Vosniadou & Ioannides, 1998).
Restructuring these naïve theories requires addressing modes of learning and reasoning,
and the development of meta-conceptual awareness, intentionality, and epistemological
sophistication (Vosniadou, Vamvakoussi, & Skopeliti, 2008).
Alternatively, naïve theories may be highly fragmented, displaying limited
coherence. To understand conceptual change, “knowledge in pieces” approaches
generate questions about grain size of elements and their coherence and contextuality
(diSessa, 2008). In this view, conceptual change is a complex, multi-faceted process that
takes time, multiple contexts, approaches to meta-cognition that require understanding
personal epistemology, and assessments that address all the pieces (diSessa, 2008).
Because conceptual ecologies lack coherence, students may bring both alternative and
scientifically acceptable conceptions into play in response to different problem contexts
(Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008b). Some misconceptions may disappear on their own as
individuals learn more about a specific topic, such as natural history (Evans, 2000, 2001).
Evolution is a complex theory, involving disciplines from geology to ecology and
biology to behavior. These disciplines entail structural concepts that can be classified
according to different levels of abstraction, any of which can be stumbling blocks for
conceptual understanding. Lawson, Abraham, & Renner (1989) and Lawson et al. (2000)
describe four types of concepts, including apprehended, descriptive, theoretical, and
hypothetical. Apprehended concepts are concepts whose complete meaning can be
derived from the internal or external environment, such as blue or hunger. Descriptive
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concepts are mentally constructed from readily available exemplars, such as chair,
running, populations, and species. Theoretical concepts are the most abstract because
their defining attributes are not perceptible – their causal agents cannot be observed.
Osmosis, genes (Lawson et al., 2000) and, most likely, probabilities, are all theoretical
concepts. Hypothetical or intermediate concepts exist between descriptive and
theoretical concepts because they could derive meaning if not restricted to a normal
observational time frame. Natural selection, evolution, and convergent evolution, as well
as limiting factors, and even the process of fossilization, are hypothetical concepts
(Lawson et al., 2000). The level of abstraction of concepts may very well be linked to
ease of understanding. Descriptive concepts may be understood more readily especially
by individuals that have not developed reasoning skills; hypothetical and theoretical
concepts that require more abstract thinking may be more difficult to comprehend
(Lawson et al., 2000).
Ontological misclassification may operate at a similar grain size within
conceptual ecologies (Chi, 2008). Family-resemblance categories are defined by
correlations among features in sets of similar memorized exemplars and allow inferences
about the observable products of history, whereas classical categories of concepts are
defined by formal rules that allow inferences within idealized law-governed systems
(Pinker & Prince, 1996). Entities and processes can be thought of as family-resemblance
and classical categories, respectively, in mental models. Events are bounded and
sequential entities whereas equilibrations are ongoing, unbounded, and simultaneous
processes (Ferrari & Chi, 1998). If students misclassify the concept of evolution as an
event rather than an equilibration, overcoming that ontological misclassification requires
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creating the new process category or shifting concepts across categories. In other words,
evolution would be a theoretical concept (cf. Lawson et al., 2000) misclassified as a
descriptive concept.
Major efforts to overcome misconceptions have met with equivocal results (e.g.,
Chinsamy & Plagányi, 2007; Crawford, Zembal-Saul, Munford, & Friedrichsen, 2005;
Ingram & Nelson, 2006; Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008a; Nehm & Reilly, 2007; Nehm &
Schonfeld, 2007; Scharmann, Smith, James, & Jenson, 2005; Verhey, 2005/2006).
Research has shown that even after significant coursework students retain serious
misconceptions about the process of evolution (Brumby, 1984; Nehm & Reilly, 2007;
Wandersee et al. 1994). In general, students believe that the environment causes
individuals to change, all individuals change simultaneously, and traits gradually change
rather than changing proportions of individuals with those traits (Bishop & Anderson,
1990).
Several researchers have suggested that students’ explanations of natural
phenomena resemble theories offered by previous generations of scientists and natural
philosophers (Mintzes et al., 1997; Novak, 1993, Shtulman, 2006; but see Kampourakis
& Zogza, 2007). For example, Shtulman (2006) explored the possibility that modern
naïve theories paralleled early “transformational” theories of evolution. He argued that
because students embraced essentialist ideals (i.e., each biological kind has an underlying
essence that makes it what it is; see also Evans, 2008), they were predisposed to think
about evolution as a transformation of essences, just like early naturalists. Kampourakis
& Zogza (2007) argue that this type of characterization may be historically incorrect;
examination of Lamarck’s theory indicates student explanations are actually quite
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different. Therefore, although teaching the history of science may be a valuable tool for
overcoming some misconceptions (Wandersee, 1986), the similar patterns are more likely
related to the language of shared experiences with the natural world (Driver & Bell,
1986) and developmental constraints (Evans, 2008; Sinatra, Brem, & Evans, 2008).
Intuitive cognitive biases are part of a developmental framework and may act as
conceptual barriers to evolutionary thinking (Evans, 2008; Sinatra et al., 2008).
Essentialism, teleology, and intentionality are found in all age and cultures and result
from intuitive beliefs about the way the world works (Evans, 2008). Indeed, as
individuals grow and learn, thinking shifts from a naïve psychological world to a naïve
biological world (Evans, 2008). The shift to a richer, more coherent knowledge structure
that includes abstract concepts related to evolutionary theory may be age-related, but not
age-dependent (Evans, 2008). In fact, these developmental constraints may be an
underlying factor in studies where students differentially apply concepts among varying
problem contexts (see Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008b).
If developmental constraints are a factor in understanding evolution, innovative
techniques and strategies for teaching this important theory are necessary. Clearly,
educators need to consider new insight into the development of cognitive capabilities.
Recent evidence indicates that children may be quite capable of sophisticated thinking,
but most curricula do not reflect what is now known about younger children’s cognitive
capabilities (National Research Council, 2007). In fact, early instruction in science can
have lasting impacts on science concept learning (Novak & Musonda, 1991). Indeed,
Nussbaum (1989) suggests that if conceptual change is an evolutionary process,
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educators should start exposing students to scientific ideas, such as evolution, much
earlier than is customary to allow for the development process.

Overcoming Misconceptions Using the NOS Framework
Because of the complexities of evolutionary theory, conceptual change
approaches often incorporate the philosophical nature of science (NOS) as a conceptual
framework (National Academy of Sciences, 1998; Alters & Nelson, 2002). The NOS
framework emphasizes the process of science as inquiry by addressing the durable but
tentative character of scientific knowledge; that scientific knowledge relies heavily, but
not entirely, on observation, experimental evidence, rational arguments, and skepticism;
methods in science vary; science explains natural phenomena only; laws and theories
have different roles (hierarchy of terminology); diversity in science; the clear and open
reporting of new scientific knowledge; accurate record keeping, peer review, and
replicability; that observations are theory-laden; science is creative; the history of
science; science is a part of culture; the role of technology in society; and the social
implications of results (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1990;
National Academy of Sciences, 1998; Zeidler, Walker, Ackett, & Simmons, 2002),
although these criteria are not necessarily consistent among educators or within the
philosophical realm (Alters, 1997; Eflin, Glennan, & Reisch, 1999).
While this approach is appealing, the impact of incorporating NOS concepts on
learning is not straightforward. Socioscientific issues are public issues where both social
and scientific factors play central roles in the debate (Sadler, 2004). Ideally, these issues
are well-suited to examine the impacts NOS understanding has on individuals’ decision
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making. In addition, creationists have been quite successful in making teaching evolution
a socioscientific issue. In his review of the research, Sadler (2004) concludes that NOS
conceptualizations are indeed related to the decisions individuals make about
socioscientific issues, perhaps not directly, but related in some way to reasoning and
evaluation of evidence. The public may recognize the importance of scientific evidence,
but they also may rely more often on informal evidence (i.e., common sense,
circumstantial evidence, and personal experience) as a means to bridge scientific or
technical assertions with their own personal, political, and practical understandings
(Tytler, Duggan, & Gott, 2001). If individuals do not understand what constitutes
scientific data (Sadler et al., 2004), however, a tendency to rely on informal evidence, as
opposed to scientific evidence, may not be that surprising. One problem with
socioscientific issues as a metric of the influence of NOS understanding is the implicit
assumption that NOS should carry weight with all issues. For example, Bell & Lederman
(2003) show that the decision making of university professors with and without wellgrounded understandings of NOS is not necessarily related to NOS issues. A
socioscientific issue such as fetal tissue implantation does not, and should not, necessarily
elicit questions about science-related knowledge in decision-making (Bell & Lederman,
2003).
With regards to academic disciplines, however, NOS may be a very appropriate
means to helping students learn. NOS understanding is clearly related to accepting
evolution (R. L. Johnson & Peebles, 1987), as well as improvements in understanding
(Crawford et al., 2005; Scharmann, 1990; Scharmann & Harris, 1991). In fact, measures
of student acceptance of evolution also may be highly correlated with NOS
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understanding, even after the effects of general interest in science and past science
education are controlled (Lombrozo, Thanukos, & Weisberg, 2008). Courses designed to
teach evolution by including NOS can be very effective at helping teachers overcome
misconceptions and understand evolutionary principles (e.g., Nehm & Schonfeld, 2007;
Scharmann & Harris, 1992). Improved understanding of the NOS may not affect beliefs
about teaching alternatives to evolution, however (Nehm & Schonfeld, 2007).
Nevertheless, research indicates that both teachers and students hold a range of
conceptions about NOS (Lederman, 1992; Sadler et al., 2004; Zeidler et al., 2002). Like
conceptual ecologies of evolution, students may hold a variety of conceptions about NOS
and apply them in different contexts (Sandoval & Morrison, 2003). Overcoming these
misconceptions requires multiple contexts and approaches (diSessa, 2008). Teachers’
understanding of NOS likely affects students’ understanding, yet treatments designed to
affect teacher understanding typically range from a few hours to a few days (Abd-ElKhalick & Lederman, 2000). Given these approaches to teaching NOS, outcomes that
show little gains are perfectly understandable. In addition, NOS understanding is
difficult to measure. A number of instruments are available, but emphases vary and
questions exist about whether the instruments are actually addressing epistemological
NOS, methodological NOS, or simply attitudes and beliefs (Lederman, 2007).
Indeed, the NOS approach also is confounded by two questions, those related to
teaching the process of science as inquiry, and those related to teaching the epistemology
of science. Moreover, inquiry can be a pedagogical approach, a way of organizing the
classroom. How it is implemented can directly affect the epistemological ideas students
develop (Sandoval, 2005). Scientific inquiry involves the process of doing science (see

69

Barrow, 2006), but NOS refers to the epistemological underpinnings of the activities of
science and the characteristics of the resulting knowledge (Lederman, 2006, 2007).
Delineating the process of science and the resulting body of knowledge is important,
especially when considering the relationships between understanding NOS and evolution.
Scientific inquiry alone does not necessarily enhance conceptions of NOS (Schwartz,
Lederman, & Crawford, 2004). Several authors emphasize that explicit teaching
strategies, rather than “doing” science, are necessary to change NOS views (Abd-ElKhalick & Lederman, 2000; Akerson, Abd-El-Khalick, & Lederman, 2000; Bell,
Lederman, & Abd-El-Khalick, 2000; A. R. Irwin, 2000; Khishfe & Lederman, 2006;
Sandoval & Reiser, 2004; Scharmann et al., 2005; Schwartz et al., 2004). Although
epistemology is one part of the NOS framework, it more accurately reflects the goals of
science education (Sandoval, 2005). Indeed, the purpose of science education should be
to get students to question the nature of science, understand the kind of questions science
can and cannot answer, and the kinds of evidence that can and cannot be used to support
propositions – the primary goal should be effective citizens, not scientists (Smith &
Scharmann, 1999).

Understanding Knowledge – Personal Epistemology
If NOS understanding is the goal, personal epistemology may be a valuable
metric for examining how well people understand tenets such as the weight of evidence,
the tentative nature of scientific conclusions, and the context and credibility of scientific
claims. Personal epistemology is a branch of psychology that examines the beliefs and
theories that individuals come to hold about knowledge and knowing (Hofer, 2004).
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Numerous models are available that address the relationships among beliefs about the
nature of knowledge and learning (Duell & Schommer-Atkins, 2001). These models
examine a variety of overlapping dimensions that can be grouped into two broad
categories related to epistemology (Hofer, 2004):
1. the nature of knowledge (what one believes knowledge is), including dimensions
of certainty of knowledge and simplicity of knowledge; and
2. the nature or process of knowing (how one comes to know), including dimensions
such as source of knowledge and justification for knowing (a dimension specific
to the Reflective Judgment Model that describes how individuals evaluate
knowledge; King & Kitchener, 1994).
An important distinction among models, however, is the approach to the
developmental relationship among the dimensions included. Multi-dimensional models
assume dimensions develop independently of one another (Duell & Schommer-Atkins,
2001). For example, in their multi-dimensional models, Schommer (1990) and Schraw et
al. (2002) characterize personal epistemology along five axes: (1) the stability of
knowledge, ranging from unchanging knowledge to tentative knowledge; (2) the source
of knowledge, ranging from omniscient authority to reason and empirical evidence; (3)
the structure of knowledge, ranging from isolated bits and pieces to integrated concepts;
(4) the speed of learning, ranging from quick to not-at-all; and (5) the ability to learn,
ranging from fixed at birth to improvable. As a result, education can predict beliefs about
the structure and stability of knowledge, whereas age can predict beliefs about the ability
to learn (Schommer, 1998).
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In contrast, uni-dimensional models assume the various epistemological
dimensions develop concurrently (Duell & Schommer-Atkins, 2001). The Reflective
Judgment Model is a stage model that describes epistemological growth as people
become better able to evaluate knowledge claims and to explain and defend views on
controversial issues (King & Kitchener, 1994; King & Kitchener, 2004). King &
Kitchener outline seven stages grouped into three levels: pre-reflective, quasi-reflective,
and reflective thinking. The earliest stage is pre-reflective thinking, characterized by
judgments that knowledge is certain and single correct answers exist that usually come
from authority figures. Later, individuals develop quasi-reflective thinking,
understanding that knowledge is an abstraction and that it is constructed – not simply
accepted from others. Individuals recognize different types and rules of evidence and
that uncertainty is part of the process of knowing. Their judgments, however, indicate a
tenuous relationship between gathering evidence and drawing conclusions, resulting in
idiosyncratic views of knowledge claims. The transition to reflective thinking is marked
by a clear understanding of the role of evidence across contexts and that evaluated
opinions of reputable others can be known and compared to one’s own thinking.
Reflective thinkers consistently use evidence and reason. The model clearly stresses the
relationship between development and cognition; people’s ways of making meaning
changes predictably over time (King & Kitchener, 1994).
Regardless of the model used to assess personal epistemology, researchers
generally agree that these beliefs play an important role in learning. For example, if
people believe knowledge is certain and passed down by authority figures, they are less
likely to question authority in the classroom (Schommer-Aikins, 2004). This can be

72

particularly worrisome with regards to controversial or socioscientific issues (issues that
require consideration of societal interest, effect, and consequent; Sadler, 2004) because,
like many ecological issues, these are issues that cannot be solved with a high degree of
certainty (i.e., “ill-structured” cf. King & Kitchener, 1994). For example,
epistemological beliefs may be important in the interpretation of evidence regarding
controversial topics, such as the relationship between human immunodeficiency virus and
the syndrome (Kardash and Scholes 1996), animals used in research (Zeidler et al. 2002),
global climate change (Sadler et al. 2004), and evolution (Sinatra, Southerland,
McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003).
In the U.S., public acceptance of evolution is clearly an ill-structured problem.
King & Kitchener (1994) report the results of international comparisons of stages
achieved by individuals of different ages. One question based on evolution and used
successfully in interviews with people in the U.S. could not be used in Germany,
however, because Germans do not perceive evolution to be ill-structured. Miller et al.
(2006) indicate a similar trend with their survey of public acceptance of evolution; the
U.S. is ranked near last in the proportion of people accepting evolution and Germany
ranked much higher. The public debate in the U.S. centers around the consequences of
evolutionary processes, especially in relation to the special position of humans,
confounded by a persuasion campaign to create uncertainty and dissonance toward the
science. In fact, research conducted by Sinatra et al. (2003) relates students’
epistemological beliefs to human evolution only, and not to the general acceptance of
animal evolution or even photosynthesis.
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Sadly, these results may reflect the state of an education system that does not
adequately address complex thinking, presentation of arguments, and critically analyzing
claims. Indeed, results from extensive assessment of U.S. college students using the
Reflective Judgment Model indicates that Freshman operate at a stage level ranging from
3 to 4, and Seniors operate at a stage level ranging from 3 to 5 (King & Kitchener, 1994).
Although the consistent progression in scores across class levels provides encouraging
evidence for the benefits of college education, few Seniors demonstrate an understanding
of the role of evidence in making interpretations (stage 5) or critical evaluation of
judgments (stages 6-7). Indeed, one could argue that the misconception “I don’t believe
in evolution because I don’t believe that people came from apes” is indicative of a stage 3
thinker, one who still believes knowledge is absolutely certain or only temporarily
uncertain. Clearly then, by the time adults finish college, they are unable to evaluate
scientific uncertainty and the ill-structured problems at the center of the creationevolution controversy. The fact that evolution is not an ill-structured issue in Germany
(King & Kitchener, 1994) supports the need for explicit teaching about the nature of
scientific knowledge and reasoning (see also Hofer, 2000).
Learning to think about evolution, the nature of science, and the nature of
knowledge occurs within a broader context than just formal education, however.
Preparing students to become citizens capable of participation in a democratic society is
one of the founding principles of our education system. When average citizens cannot
comprehend the bodies governing society, public affairs will no longer be under lay
control and cease to be public (Prewitt, 1983). Within this broader public understanding
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of science is a complex relationship between knowing science and knowing about
science-related situations in a democratic society (Roberts, 2007).

Public Understanding of Science
The importance of science in our society has garnered interest from science
educators, public opinion researchers, sociologists, and informal science educators
(Laugksch, 2000). The resulting body of research generally falls into three broad realms:
basic literacy, public understanding of science, and science and society (Bauer, Allum, &
Miller, 2007). Early research addressed basic literacy issues – what do people know
about science and the scientific process and why (Ziman, 1992). Whether it be strictly
fact-based understanding, as in some recent papers about climate change (e.g., Spellman,
Field, & Sinclair, 2003; Unger 2000; Wilson K. M. Wilson, 2000a, 2000b), or a focus on
the misunderstanding of “how science works” (e.g., Durant, Evans, & Thomas, 1989;
Miller, 1983), this research examined the knowledge gap between current expert’s and
the public’s understanding.
Focusing on a knowledge deficit, however, raises questions about the breadth of
knowledge expected from the public, let alone the certainty of scientific knowledge, and
the nature of the scientific endeavor (Ziman, 1992). In fact, to distinguish science as a
way of knowing requires serious consideration of goals, methods, and knowledge claims
(Chalmers, 1999). Indeed, scientists are not particularly well equipped to discuss the
nature and status of science because they can’t articulate what scientific progress is
despite their own progress (Chalmers, 1999). Moreover, the production of scientific
knowledge is always within a social context and related to other practices with other
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aims, such as personal and professional intentions of scientists, the economic intentions
of funding agencies, and the ideological intentions of religious groups (Chalmers, 1999).
As a result of these boundary issues, research began to examine the “public
understanding of science”, focusing instead on attitudes and the relationship between
attitudes and knowledge (Bauer et al., 2007). Attitudes are either a product of
information processing with a positive relationship between knowledge and attitude
(normative-rationalist view), or value-loaded relations with the world confounded by the
complexities of values, emotions, cognition, and rationality (realist-empiricist view;
Bauer et al., 2007). Attitudes and knowledge are difficult to segregate, however.
Knowledge is clearly an important determinant of attitudes toward science, but the
relationship is not a straightforward linear main effect. Other domains of knowledge
“contextualize” attitudes adding to an already positive influence (Sturgis & Allum, 2004).
In fact, science is viewed more favorably when individuals understand the intricacies of
scientific knowledge development and the political landscape (Sturgis & Allum, 2004).
Indeed, recent models of the interface between science and society have
broadened the focus from an absolute assessment of science literacy to more social and
philosophical viewpoints, focusing instead on who is engaging with what (e.g., A. Irwin
& Wynne, 1996c). These models challenge the notion of science as an isolated body of
knowledge, recognizing its socially constructed nature (A. Irwin & Wynne, 1996b).
Members of society clearly do not place the same emphases on different ways of
knowing, and public understanding models should avoid any assumptions about defining
all knowledge based on the epistemological commitments of science (A. Irwin & Wynne,
1996a). Rational choice and contextual models incorporate utilitarian and affective
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approaches (Ziman, 1992; Sturgis & Allum, 2004; Wynne, 1992b). Rational choice
models ask what people need to know in order to be good citizens, and when the public
has to make practical decisions, what knowledge is relevant (Ziman, 1992). Prewitt
(1983) considers this approach scientific “savvy.”
Science educators have identified socioscientific issues as issues at the interface
of science and society, dilemmas where both social and scientific factors are crucial
(Bingle & Gaskell, 1994; Sadler, 2004). Although scientific literacy for citizenship is
often identified as an outcome, understanding and evaluating knowledge claims play a
central role in the discussion (Bingle & Gaskell, 1994; Kolstø, 2001; Sadler et al., 2004).
In fact, an important component of epistemological understanding with these dilemmas is
understanding the differences between ready-made science and science-in-the-making
(Latour 1987) and the gray area between them (Kolstø, 2001). At the extremes, readymade science – that of text books – are areas in science where consensus has been
broadly achieved (for example, that organisms share a common ancestry), and science-inthe-making are areas at the forefront of research where debatable claims are still subject
to revision (for example, whether anthropogenic changes in the environment are affecting
the natural selection of resistance in human pathogens; Eldredge, 2008; Martínez, 2008).
Contextual models argue that the public understanding of science must consider
more diverse, independent, and context-sensitive sources of scientific information than
just institutionalized science (Wynne, 1991). Social identity explains responses to
science (Wynne, 1996). Knowledge can become idiosyncratic in these democratic
contexts, however, with debates about what constitutes expertise and how local
knowledge held by diverse publics can be equally valid. For example, Davison, Barns, &
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Schibechi (1997) argue that some people with little specific knowledge of formal
biological concepts and processes often have a great deal of everyday knowledge.
Nevertheless, everyday knowledge of natural selection and evolution may be highly
essentialist, intentional, and teleological (Evans, 2008), thus representing a misconceptual barrier to consensus on issues related to this important theory. Likewise,
although the public understands some level of uncertainty and risk (A. Irwin & Wynne,
1996a; Wynne, 1992a), NOS research clearly indicates that the public does not
understand uncertainty in the philosophical sense. Uncertainty in the sense of risk is an
epistemological factor, whereas the tentative nature of conclusions is ontological. Thus,
contextual models of public understanding of science and science literacy focus on
models of the public and models of science from fundamentally different directions
(Locke, 1999).
Ultimately, models of the interaction of science in society vary depending on (1)
the absolute nature of the literacy component and (2) the extent of social consideration
(Laugksch, 2000). In essence, public understanding models segregate along axes that are
concerned with the role of knowledge and the role of “truth” in a democratic society.
Indeed, in a two-dimensional space, the literacy component can be thought of in terms of
epistemological considerations and the social component can be thought of in terms of
ontological considerations. The research areas can then be mapped onto the axes to
describe the extent of each of these considerations in the agenda (Figure 2.1). For
example, science and society models emphasize ontological considerations more than
epistemological considerations. Epistemology is certainly important, but these models
tend to weigh trust and credibility heavily. Citizen science programs that emphasize
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collective praxis are clearly more interested in coming to some social “truth” than
questions about methodological naturalism. Certainly, within the science literacy
program, emphasis is more often on the methodology of science and the kind of
knowledge that methodology generates specific to the scientific enterprise. In addition,
each of the three realms may include different literacy components, for example science
literacy, the literacy of democracy, or institutional knowledge (cf. Wynne, 1991).
Ideally, teaching for public understanding finds some intermediate in these positions,
grounded in an understanding that different sources of information have different
epistemological and ontological commitments that yield very different outcomes.

Marketplace of Ideas
Clearly, creationists have been extremely successful in bringing their antievolution campaign to the public arena. In fact, the irony of the First Amendment is that
it both restricts creationist ideas from entering the science classroom and defends their
rights to a forum. In the United States, that forum is broadly protected as the
“marketplace of ideas.” The concept of a marketplace where ideas compete is attributed
to Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissent of Abrams v. United States, (250 U.S. 616,
1919). He argued that “when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
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considerations
Figure 2.1. The relative importance of epistemological and ontological considerations in
public understanding of science (PUS) research programs. Where these programs
converge serves as an optimal goal for science educators concerned with developing
effective citizens.

out.” Two theoretical perspectives combine to idealize the marketplace as a source of
competitive, efficient, and unregulated ideas highly sensitive to consumer preferences
that yields informed decision-making and a well-functioning democracy (Napoli, 1999).
The economic perspective of this free-speech model focuses on maximizing consumer
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welfare and competition, whereas the democratic theory perspective focuses on the
marketplace as a source of maximum idea exchange in the context of effective selfgovernment (Napoli, 1999). Although the marketplace concept may be too broadly
applied in jurisprudence (Hopkins, 1996), the metaphor is useful in the context of
consumers’ and citizens’ rights to receive information (Sweeney, 1984 in Napoli, 1999).
More important criticisms of the marketplace of ideas metaphor focus on the issues of
ontology associated with the “truth” to which Judge Holmes refers, cognitive dissonance
(Ingber, 1984; Baker, 1989), and epistemology.
Within the marketplace, then, the truth claims of creationists can be weighed
equally with the truth claims of evolutionary science. Simply because public knowledge,
as a body of shared knowledge, by definition may not be democratic does not argue
against the democratic standing of all ways of knowing (e.g., Smith & Scharmann, 1999).
Stephen Jay Gould (Gould, 1997) enlists the ideas of non-overlapping magisteria, or
ways of knowing, to distinguish what can be known with science and what can be known
in other ways. For example, religion and science are two distinct ways of knowing with
very different approaches to truth and evidence. In public discourses, even scientists may
step away from methodological naturalism and frame their personal worldviews in terms
of different ways of knowing (Smith & Scharmann, 1999). Nevertheless, few but the
most highly educated experts can understand all of the intricacies of the various
disciplines that contribute to the modern synthesis of evolution. To complicate matters,
science proceeds by managing the uncertainty associated with the knowledge it generates.
These uncertainties are manifest in misconceptions about human evolution and
discomfort with regard to human’s place in the universe. Additional uncertainty develops
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when people confuse the science of evolution with the consequences of evolution, and
methodological naturalism with philosophical naturalism. Without basic understanding
of fundamentals of evolution, however, people have to have “faith” in evolution in a
manner that equates easily with “teaching the controversy” and alternative theories. It is
within this misconception framework that persuaders create cognitive imbalance and
dissonance in the marketplace to alter beliefs, attitudes, and intentions (Ilardo, 1981)
about evolutionary theory.

Rhetoric of the “Controversy”
Cognitive dissonance is a model of human behavior based on consistency theory
that describes how people behave when faced with new information that conflicts with
current beliefs or notions (Festinger, 1957). Humans act predictably when exposed to
dissonance-producing messages: they avoid the conflicting attitude or behavior, reduce
the importance, or acquire new beliefs that change the balance (Festinger, 1957). In fact,
substantial evidence indicates this model reasonably predicts the future outcomes of
messages. Purveyors of messages often use discrepant or inconsistent information with
the purpose of bringing about attitude change (Baker, 1989). Fleming and Goodall
(2002) suggest the goal of such communications is to produce true believers not true
skeptics and intellectual honesty.
Although evolutionary science is misused by anti-evolutionists, persuasion
science is not. Those with strongly held fundamentalist views want to persuade the
“uncertain” public to question the fundamentals of evolution, and even science as a
whole. Ultimately, the goal is to return our society to its fundamentalist roots starting
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with the removal of evolution education (and perhaps all of science education) from the
public schools. The Wedge Strategy is a carefully calculated strategy developed by the
Discovery Institute designed to “defeat scientific materialism and its destructive moral,
cultural and political legacies and to replace materialistic explanations with the theistic
understanding that nature and human beings are created by God” (Center for the Renewal
of Science & Culture, 1999; also see Forrest & Gross, 2004) through a deliberate attack
on the public opinion-making process in the marketplace of ideas.
The persuasive campaign targets the public’s attitudes toward evolution and
science. Inducements are both logical and non-logical (Ilardo, 1981). Logical
inducements include chains of reasoning (usually based on the misuse of evolutionary
science) refuting the evidence supporting evolution, and emotional proofs, such as the
need for morals and values in society. Anti-evolutionists want to maintain the public
misconception that people came from apes because it fits with their persuasive rhetoric;
because scientists agree that people did not come from apes, evolution must not be true.
They impart information that implies skepticism and fair treatment, elevating the
contestability of the discrepant information. Fear appeals, such as the misguided Social
Darwinist argument (see Figure 2.2 below), heighten dissonance through non-logical
inducement. The false dichotomies persuaders establish require choice on the part of the
public; choosing evolution means denying God (see also Marsden, 1991). Indeed, the
campaign purposively ignores any middle ground. For example, the American Scientific
Affiliation, founded prior to the Creation Research Society (Numbers, 2006), is a
Christian fellowship of “men and women of science and disciplines that can relate to
science who share a common fidelity to the Word of God and a commitment to integrity

83

in the practice of science” (http://www.asa3.org). Anti-evolutionists consider any notion
of theistic evolution an apostate affiliation (Numbers, 2006). Their position is clear: the
choice may be free, but the punishment will be great.
These tactics magnify dissonance and leave the public subject to the persuasive
messages championed by opponents of evolution, such as “teach the alternatives,”
“balanced treatment,” and “critical analyses” legislation. Those with strongly held
fundamentalist views want to persuade the “uncertain” public to question the
fundamentals of evolution and science as a whole (Clark et al., 2007; Scott & Matzke,
2007). Moreover, opponents of evolutionary biology cast doubt on the credibility of
scientists and the knowledge generated by such diverse disciplines as chemistry, geology,
biology, and social science (Clark et al., 2007). Although casting doubt on highcredibility sources reduces persuasive effects, people tend to disassociate sources and
their opinions over time, especially with low-credibility sources (see Severin & Tankard,
2001). One final part of the persuasion strategy includes the tactic of arguing for “equal
time” in the guise of “it’s only fair”. More than any other, this strategy appeals to
people’s sense of reciprocation (Cialdini, 1993). It also plays well with journalists trying
to meet some semblance of “balance”, and the appeal to “fairness” creates additional
uncertainty by casting doubt on the credibility of anyone who won’t “play by the rules”
(Taylor & Condit, 1988). As a result, dissonance purveyors with a message perceived as
strong by the uncertain public may be treated with the same respect as a scientist in time.
Ultimately, the anti-evolution persuasion campaign is designed to alter behavior.
Messages are intended to change public attitudes about teaching evolution, especially
those that influence behavior in terms of casting appropriate votes. The relationship
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between attitude change and behavioral intentions is complex, however; behavior is not a
simple function of attitude. In fact, Cialdini (1993) suggests that attitude is not even a
factor when social proof is operating. Social proof is a means for determining the correct
behavior based on other people’s behaviors; in the face of uncertainty, look to and accept
the actions of others as correct. Cialdini (1993) even suggests that social proof underlies
the strengthening of cultist beliefs after the inevitable failure of their prophecies: the
greater the number of people who find any idea correct, the more the idea will be correct.
If this tenet of social proof holds, the persuasive messages designed to generate
uncertainty about science, scientists, and evolution teaching could lead to a majority
acceptance of anti-evolutionism simply through the ever-increasing numbers of people
looking to others to determine the correct course of action. Indeed, the more people
intending to vote to include evolution “alternatives” in the science classroom, the more
likely the uncertain public will find a strong role model and model their behavior towards
that role model. Therefore, the small step of accepting the teaching of evolution
“alternatives” may be the first leading to serious consequences for the science classroom.
Past behavior is a strong predictor of future intentions to behave. Whether the
relationship is caused by behavioral consistency (Cialdini 1993) or increased cognitive
accessibility of behaviors (i.e., priming; Trafimow & Borrie, 1999), the implications for
the future of evolution education may rest on that first step.
The success of the anti-evolutionist campaign is apparent in surveys addressing
public acceptance of evolution. A recent survey of Louisiana residents indicates that
40% do not believe evolution is well-supported by evidence or generally accepted within
the scientific community (Baton Rouge Advocate, April 14, 2009). Similarly, Miller,

85

Scott, & Okamoto (2006) show that the proportion of adults accepting the idea of
evolution has declined over the past 20 years (from 45 to 40%), but the proportion of
rejecting evolution also decreased from 48% to 39% (see also Pew Research Center for
the People & the Press, 2009). Perhaps the persuasive campaign is creating a dissonance
“backlash” in fundamentalists. Indeed, acceptance of evolution may be directly related to
the proportion of anti-evolution and pro-evolution messages to which people are exposed
(Brem, Ranney, & Schindel, 2003). Nevertheless, the fact that the proportion of U.S.
adults accepting evolution is one of the lowest in the world does not bode well for the
future of evolution education and research without radical intervention by educators. If
uncertainty is the metric of imbalance in cognitive dissonance, the campaign waged by
the anti-evolutionists is clearly affecting the public arena.

Media Effects in the Marketplace
The media may play a powerful role in the delivery of messages in the
marketplace. Both the language and the visual images used add a sense of certainty to
evidence; the auditor/observer is experiencing the evidence “first hand” (Kirby, 2003). In
fact, the effects of these experiences may outlast the sources. Metaphors are one of the
more powerful language tools available; their ability to evoke concrete images can help
make complex issues understandable to the public and foster debate (Väliverronen &
Hellsten, 2002). Especially in television news environments, metaphors can add the
context needed by the audience in a fairly quick and precise manner (Rowan, 1992). In
addition, metaphors can be used to promote certain political interests or reinforcing
scientific and professional authority. For example, Väliverronen and Hellsten (2002)
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found that metaphors helped scientists define the biodiversity issue by likening it to a
“library of life”. These metaphors, if used as part of transformative explanations, can
help audiences recognize, test, and overcome lay theories (i.e., alternative conceptions;
Rowan, 1992). Stephen Jay Gould (1977) specifically enlisted the “bush metaphor” to
help the public discourse of evolution move beyond the search for “missing links”.
Visual representations also have a powerful communicative value because they
allow the viewer to “witness” the phenomena. Images evoke certainty, and can serve as
highly persuasive inducements. They can be very effective in persuasive campaigns
(Figure 2.2). In addition, visual elements, such as photographs and television images, can
help conceptualize abstract problems (Väliverronen & Hellsten, 2002). Indeed, images
enhanced viewer recall in television news through the “explanation” and “emotional
bond” they add (Graber, 1990; see also Zhou, 2005). In the History Channel’s From Ape
to Man, a documentary about human evolution, the producers used graphic representation
to effectively represent the generations involved in speciation. The camera whizzed by
thousands of individuals representing one branch of the evolutionary tree/bush. Another
visual aid had a scientist drawing out the branching tree along a long stretch of beach.
The camera stayed fixed as he moves farther and farther away from the common
ancestor. Both images leave the viewer with a concept of time that more closely matches
the scientific understanding. Even fictional images, such as those in movies, affect
acceptance of scientific concepts. Padian (1987) found that these images didn’t
necessarily correspond with reality, but they were plausible. In addition, popular images
can be powerful determinants of perceptions in science – by scientists – more so than
scientific evidence (Padian, 1987). According to Padian, “a picture is not only worth a
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Figure 2.2. Social Darwinism and the effects of imagery. The text uses irony to mock
the supposed consequences of accepting evolutionary theory and setting up a false
dichotomy (http:// www.answersingenesis.org).

thousand words; however inaccurate, it may be worth a wealth of well-documented
evidence to the contrary” (p. 76).
Audio and video can have unintended consequences with equally persistent
effects. Metaphors can create uncertainty if they are overused or vague, or establish false
dichotomies if they are apocalyptic, such as “the battle over nature” (Väliverronen &
Hellsten, 2002). Despite the “permanency” of images, they too can be misinterpreted.
Indeed, history has been manipulated by photographers both intentionally and
unintentionally. Pictures tell stories, and those stories are interpreted and re-interpreted
by viewers; without input from the author, they take on the story of the viewer whether it
was the author’s intent or not (Sandweiss, 2002). Indeed the depiction of different
hominid species was likely designed to show similarity (Figure 2.3). Its recent use has
been on creationist websites to discredit the notion that man descended from apes.
Because television includes both strong visual and audio messages, it is the
subject of much criticism and review. Television has a long history of viewing audiences
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Figure 2.3. Unintended consequences: images that may
have been developed to represent the character evolution
of Homo sapiens may instead encourage the “people
came from apes” misconception.

as passive receptacles of the medium’s account of the world (T. Wilson, 1993). In fact,
Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli (1986) suggest that as passive viewers, the more
people watch television, the more they think the real world is like the world portrayed on
television. First, persuasive processes may encourage or discourage people to believe
that television messages are an accurate reflection of the world, and second, the
availability heuristic posits that people infer the prevalence of a construct from the ease
with which an example is retrieved (i.e., its accessibility from memory; Shrum, 1999).
Television viewers are not necessarily passive vessels, however; activity is evident in
people’s utility, intention, selectivity, and involvement with the media (Blumler, 1979).
Still, cultivation may result as audiences actively compare the probability of events
through cognitive rationalizing (Potter, 1991; Potter, Pashupati, Pekurny, Hoffman, &
Davis, 2002). In fact, the elaboration likelihood model explains how people can fluctuate
in the extent to which they rationalize judgments through both passive and active
mechanisms (Schroeder, 2005). The likelihood of elaboration, “issue-relevant” thinking,
or critical evaluation of the messages being received depends on whether the messages
are processed through (1) a central route that entails extensive elaboration, or (2) a
peripheral route, where little elaboration occurs and viewers rely on heuristics (Petty &
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Cacioppo, 1986). Indeed, several social scientists suggest that the negative images of
science on television serve as heuristics that ultimately lead either to reservations about
the discipline (Gerbner, 1987; Nisbet et al., 2002) or the promise of science (Nisbet et al.,
2002).
Other models of media effects examine audiences as active communicators,
motivated, selective, and involved in their communication choices (Rubin & Perse,
1987). The models explore how people use media to gratify their needs, understanding
the motives for media behavior, and identifying the consequences that follow from these
needs, motives, and behaviors (Rubin, 2004). Media effects, such as perception of
scientists and science, may be heavily influenced by individual characteristics such as
social and psychological circumstances (Rubin & Rubin, 1982), science knowledge
(Nisbet et al., 2002), and motivation (Perse, 1990; Rubin, 1983; Rubin & Perse, 1987).
Indeed, cognitive motivation may facilitate information gain (Blumler, 1979). Learning,
therefore, is a clear, positive, outcome of uses and gratifications research.
Narrative likely plays an important role in the effect of television content as well.
Indeed, narratives can affect the public’s understanding of science both positively (e.g.,
Lowe et al., 2006) and negatively (e.g., Barnett et al., 2006). Narratives also are
powerful persuasive tools and can interact with ideology in discussions of controversial
public policies (Slater, Rouner, & Long, 2006), like teaching evolution. After all,
narratives positively affect memory (Graesser, Hauft-Smith, Cohen, & Pyles, 1980;
Shapiro & Fox, 2002) and can increase the plausibility and persuasiveness of information
presented (Voss, Wiley, & Sandak, 1999). Because the narrative is the predominant form
taught for teaching and reading, the “narrative experience” of our lives may make it
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easier to comprehend and recall content then expository texts much less related to life
experiences (Norris, Guilbert, Smith, Hakimelahi, & Phillips, 2005). We relate to
narratives. Indeed, “transportation into a narrative world” may be a key mechanism of
narrative impact (Green & Brock, 2000).
Audiences are actively making sense of narratives (Livingstone, 1998). As they
interact with different media, they process three types of realism: fictionality, external
realism (matching with external reality), and narrative realism (coherence within a story)
(Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008). External realism, however, is not necessarily the most
essential. Audiences make judgments about the consistency of narratives constructed
from a narrative experience (i.e., story world, character models, and situation models) in
relation to their own experiences (Busselle, Ryabovolova, & Wilson, 2004). The result is
that instead of being concerned with verisimilitude (i.e., the “truth”), audience members
are concerned with coherence and logic within a particular fictional context (Busselle &
Bilandzic, 2008; Busselle et al., 2004). Enjoyment is not dependent on how well a
television program, for example, reflects real-world truth (Green, Brock, & Kaufman,
2004). In fact, readers, and television viewers, that are “highly transported” maintain
beliefs that are consistent with the stories, regardless of their realism (Green, 2004).
Perceived realism is highly correlated with the perceived “typicality” of the narrative
event, however; audiences use some commonsense plausibility criterion (Busselle &
Bilandzic, 2008) and generate a relative realism (Shapiro & Fox, 2002). Unfortunately,
prior knowledge and experience affect transportation (Green, 2004) in a counter-intuitive
manner, at least with regards to science. More experience yields a greater likelihood of
transportation (Green, 2004) rather than any kind of skepticism. Engagement with a
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story may leave viewers with the sense that that story was authentic (Busselle &
Bilandzic, 2008), whether it accurately reflects the current understanding of science and
evolution or not.
Media effects models provide valuable insight to the influence of educational
television. One model of learning from television incorporates the theoretical construct
of “mental capacity” with three components: processing of the narrative, processing of
educational content, and distance (how integral the educational content is to the narrative;
Fisch, 2000). Indeed, comprehension of educational content is greater when the distance
between narrative and educational content is small than when it is large (Fisch et al. 1995
in Fisch 2000). Although prior knowledge, in this model, reduces the demands of
processing (Fisch, 2000), television producers have no metric of audiences’ general
understanding. Production ultimately yields to the least common denominator.
A number of studies support the notion that television is an environment for
learning. The Public Broadcasting Service (1987) examined the appeal, learning, and
emotional impact of television programs watched by a random sample of 2000 adults
using logging diaries similar to the Nielson ratings system. Science and nature programs
scored high on the appeal and learning scales. The “CSI effect” has resulted in a
significant increase in the numbers of students pursuing degrees in forensic sciences at
universities (Houck, 2005). Television programming that combined entertainment with
education also was used to direct social change (e.g., Comstock & Scharrer, 1999;
Singhal & Rogers, 1991). More specifically, research has shown that children do learn
scientific content information from television series designed to teach science and
mathematics (Chen, 1983; Johnston & Luker, 1983). In addition, adults learned about
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health and nutrition from watching a single program (Chew, Palmer, & Kim, 1995), and
Frey & Wolsky (2006) developed a television format that reinforced key lessons about
engineering and engaged audiences. Fortner (1985) found that watching nature programs
increased knowledge that was retained at a level equal to the same information presented
in lecture format, but attitude changes were apparent only in the television treated group.
Furthermore, exposure to science through films and other media outside of classroom
settings has had positive impacts on science learning by individuals in school (Bitgood,
Serrell, & Thompson, 1994; Chen, 1994; Dhingra, 2003; Wright et al., 2001). Other
research has shown that viewing educational television results in significant gains in
children’s general academic knowledge and skills (D. R. Anderson, 1998; Fisch, 2005;
Salomon, 1979; Southwell, 2005). Television learning was shown to extend into symbol
systems, teaching unique cognitive skills not taught in school (Salomon, 1979). Children
who watched educational programs tended to have better grades in high school than those
that watched strictly entertainment programs (Wright et al., 2001). And despite
innuendo, little evidence has been found to indicate that watching television has negative
effects on learning (including reading) except in extreme cases (Wartella, 1987). In this
light, television can be classified as a free-choice science education opportunity.

Free-choice Science Learning
Most commonly referred to as informal learning, free-choice science education
advocates that the process of learning is the same outside of the classroom as it is in the
classroom (Falk, 2001). As a lifelong learning process, however, free-choice learning is
typically characterized as being self-directed, voluntary, and motivated mainly by
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intrinsic interests, curiosity, exploration, and social interaction (Dierking, Falk, Rennie,
Anderson, & Ellenbogen, 2003; Falk & Dierking, 2000). Motivational factors (Falk,
2006), rather than testing drives learning in the free-choice world. The marketplace of
ideas is full of competing ideas all vying for some competitive grasp of the public’s idea
of “truth.” In the marketplace, the learning process may be the same as formal learning
environments, but marketplace influences, not standards-based influences, visibly
dominate. As a result, not all of the competing ideas are of equal “educational” value.
Individuals looking for educational opportunities in the marketplace of ideas are
faced with truly educational opportunities, as well as many opportunities unintentionally,
or even purposefully, masking themselves as opportunities to learn about science and
evolution. For example, All About Science (http://www.allaboutscience.org/) is a website
hosted by AllAboutGod.com. Although ostensibly describing Darwin’s Theory of
Evolution, the site quickly turns to “intelligent design” rhetoric outlining the “crisis” in
evolutionary understanding that irreducible complexity poses. The site comes complete
with a literature cited section, (including only Darwin, and Michael Behe and Michael
Denton [intelligent design proponents]).
The issue of educational content is not limited to the vast amount of material on
the internet, however; resources considered traditional sources for science education may
or may not promote standards-based (e.g., National Science Education Standards) content
in the marketplace. The Glendive Dinosaur and Fossil Museum is situated at the
highway exit for Makoshika State Park, a park devoted to the preservation of the
Montana Badlands and the Hell Creek Formation. The Hell Creek Formation dates back
65 million years and is the site of several important paleontological discoveries. The
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museum is operated by the Foundation Advancing Creation Truth and is not a sanctioned
member of the Montana Dinosaur Trail, a product of the Montana Tourism Advisory
Council (the Makoshika Dinosaur Museum in Glendive is). It offers similar fare,
however, including fossil digs used to promote the literal truth of the bible and an
interpretation of the fossil record from a creationist perspective
(http://www.ultimatemontana.com/businessdirectory/buspages/sec01/glendivedinomus.ht
ml). Unlike the transparent mission of the Creation Museum in Petersburg, Kentucky,
sponsored by Answers in Genesis (Slack, 2008), the mission of the Glendive Dinosaur
and Fossil Museum is hidden from unsuspecting consumers.
Less clear are free-choice opportunities often considered “educational” by
convention. Wildlife and nature programs have the potential to engage and teach large
audiences about the natural world in free-choice learning environments, but they also
may be implicit in the public’s misunderstanding of evolution. Both Mitman (1999) and
Bousé (2000) have clearly endorsed embracing a highly skeptical view of reality
presented in wildlife films, warning that this genre is driven by the need for compelling
story lines rather than scientific accuracy. More recently, Dingwall and Aldridge (2006)
suggest that nature film narratives implicitly endorse creationist accounts of life on earth,
especially in the “blue-chip” sub-genre, with their high production values and strong
visual appeal. Obviously, these programs tend to be designed and developed with the
producer’s best interests in mind, not necessarily the learner’s (Chen 1994). Wildlife and
nature films that present evolutionary science poorly may be particularly harmful if
audiences perceive the genre as educational because genre experiences are critical in
textual readings and interpretation (Livingston 1998). In fact, the narrative story of many
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wildlife films imply evolution is driven by some purpose, and watching may actually
increase the differences in understanding of evolution between the general public and
biological scientists (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006). Narration that incorporates teleology
as a mechanism may not directly promote alternative “theories” to evolution, such as
“intelligent design” (Dingwall and Aldridge 2006), but it promotes alternative
conceptions nonetheless.
In essence, learning from wildlife and nature films is a cultivation effect.
Cultivation theory posits that television portrayals systematically distort reality, and longterm viewing of these distortions is likely to have an effect on audiences (Gerbner et al.,
1986). Poor presentation of natural processes, like evolution, in these visually stunning
“virtual witnessing” events (Kirby, 2003) may affect evolution understanding through
both active and passive routes. Because the educational content is integral to the
narrative (i.e., explanations of evolution that include design and advancement that
individuals can relate to), the parallel mental processes responsible for comprehending
narrative and educational content complement each other (Fisch, 2000). Moreover,
individuals motivated to learn are most likely to elaborate and incorporate the broad
knowledge messages communicated through free-choice venues (Blumler, 1979; Falk,
Heimlich, & Bronnenkant, 2008; Maurer & Reinemann, 2006); motivated learners (i.e.,
those most likely to engage in science and society debates) may learn incorrect
conceptions about this key ecological processes. In addition, being transported into the
narrative world of nature programs may have considerable consequences related to
viewers’ emotional connections with characters (Green, Brock, & Kaufman, 2004).
Recalling the triumphant return of an orphaned lion cub to become head of the pride
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surpassing all odds does not represent an evolutionary process, but a teleological process.
These kinds of teleological misconceptions easily can lead to “intelligent design”
considerations (see also Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006), especially if the “witnessed” events
serve as heuristics when making civic decisions about teaching evolution and creationism
in the science classroom (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008; Shapiro & Fox, 2002; Shrum,
1999).
Because the learning process is the same as formal environments, science
educators in the free-choice marketplace should expect schema construction that is based
on prior knowledge and conceptual frameworks that may be coherent or in pieces.
Intuitive theories that act as developmental biases (Evans, 2008) combined with highly
abstract concepts (Lawson et al., 2000) make teaching for conceptual change in formal
environments difficult, let alone once individuals have left the classroom. A single
experience can change an individual’s understanding if it appeals to need or interest,
engages prior knowledge, and the conceptual relationship is evident (Stocklmayer &
Gilbert, 2002). In fact, images may be more memorable than a science course
(Aikenhead, 1988) or a lab experiment (Barnett et al., 2006). Moreover, interest in the
topic is an important factor related to recall of, and learning from, narrative texts
(Schiefele, 1998). Knowledge constructed from poor sources obtained in the marketplace
of ideas can lead to misconceptions that can be very difficult to alter (Wandersee et al.,
1994), especially in free-choice learning environments. The key is distinguishing
fictional science from non-fiction (Nowotny, 2005). Despite their largely fictional
content, nature programs are considered by many to be highly educational opportunities.
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Clearly, this disconnect can have profound effects on the public understanding of
evolution, especially given the current climate of rhetoric.

Conclusions
The science concepts held by individuals are the result of a combination of the
formal explanations learned in school, their personal experiences and observations, the
culture, and language (Wandersee et al., 1994). Understanding the theory of evolution is
complex, however, and misconceptions may be influenced by other ways of knowing
than just science understanding. Teaching about the epistemological commitments of the
NOS framework may help individuals grasp the kind of knowledge science generates and
ultimately influence how people think about the epistemological and ontological
underpinnings of the knowledge they use when engaging in civil discourses.
In the marketplace of ideas, formal and free-choice science learning interact to
affect public understanding of evolution. Scientists and creationists present different
versions of the world in rhetorical terms of competing logoi (the reasoning of an
argument); they use similar argumentative modes and techniques (Locke, 1999). The
messages may be different, but they are all designed to persuade. Persuasive messages
about evolution can interact with individuals and their personal epistemology through the
free-choice learning environment. Audience experiences with media may affect how
they approach different sources as well as their motivation to learn about science. They
may use descriptors such as “educational” to make their choices, unaware that the source
they believe is credible does not actually reflect current understanding of evolution at all.
Personal epistemology, or the beliefs an individual holds about knowledge and its
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production, may provide the theoretical grounding to predict media influences, and more
broadly, the learning outcomes about science in the marketplace of ideas. Specifically,
personal epistemology may be closely tied to the kind of knowledge viewers use when
understanding wildlife and nature programs. The result is a web of inter-related factors
that affects how the public understands evolution as a science and how the public
responds to decisions about evolution and creationism in civic decisions (Figure 2.4). In
this free-for-all marketplace, acceptance and rejection of messages depend on
individuals’ levels of understanding, their experiences, their culture, and the rhetorical
organization that influences their responses to authoritative knowledge (Locke, 1999).
In general, the knowledge individuals have is practically inadequate, incoherent,
inconsistent, and incredible (Ziman 1992). In other words, what evolution knowledge
individuals do use from their formal education in regards to important civic issues, such
as the N1H1 virus, antibiotics, and biodiversity, represents only one small element in a
complex and varied response; little of what they do retain from school is actually
supplemented by free-choice sources later on; contradictions are resolved using bits and
pieces of formal science within a system of different ways of knowing; and the credibility
of sources depends on their perceived interest in these situations (Ziman 1992). Clearly,
the literature strongly indicates a need for more insight into the complex relationships
among how people learn about evolutionary theory – what they learn, when they learn it,
and from where that knowledge comes. Evolution educators must be aware of the web of
knowledge contributing to citizen’s understanding and focus and enrich educational
opportunities that will help overcome misconceptions about this important theory.
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CHAPTER 3.
FATAL FLOWER FRAILTIES: USING NATURE FILMS TO HELP ADDRESS
MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

Abstract:
Evolution is a central underlying concept to a significant number of discourses in
civilized society, but the complexity of understanding basic tenets of this important
theory is just now coming to light. A number of misconceptions have been described,
including the process of developing new traits, the role of variation, and the
transformation of species. Research into strategies to overcome these misconceptions has
been equivocal, however. As part of a curriculum that used a nature program as a
surrogate to help students explicitly recognize their cognitive illusions, we developed
specific teaching tools that elicited the diversity of concepts held by individuals. One
tool required students respond to four incorrect prepared alternative statements about the
co-evolution of orchids and their pollinators. Students’ responses indicated they
simultaneously held a number of misconceptions, proximate conceptions, and
evolutionary conceptions. Indeed, students’ “conceptual ecologies” were highly diverse,
diversity that scaled with the abstract nature of the concepts associated with evolutionary
theory. Students with more evolutionary conceptions included fewer misconceptions in
their responses than students with few or no evolutionary conceptions. The composition
of conceptual ecologies suggested that students may shift to a conceptual ecology
dominated by proximate conceptions prior to incorporating evolutionary conceptions,
then return to an ecology that incorporates both misconceptions and proximate
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conceptions as they begin to grasp evolutionary concepts. As a result, the broad
misconceptions that confound pedagogical strategies may reflect the way students’
struggle as they incorporate new concepts into their pre-existing schema. Teaching
strategies that explicitly address misconceptions may be one effective approach to bring
forth conceptual change.

Keywords: evolution misconceptions, nature programs, conceptual change

Over the past two decades, science educators have been struggling with how to
improve evolution education. Misconceptions (also known as alternative conceptions,
non-scientific ideas, or limited or inappropriate propositional hierarchies [LIPH’s cf.
Novak, 2002]), persist despite research and innovative teaching practices. Indeed,
specific interventions designed to help teachers and students overcome misconceptions
about the theory of evolution have shown encouraging, but equivocal results (e.g.,
Chinsamy & Plagányi, 2007; Crawford, Zembal-Saul, Munford, & Friedrichsen, 2005;
Ingram & Nelson, 2006; Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008a; Nehm & Reilly, 2007; Nehm &
Schonfeld, 2007; Scharmann, Smith, James, & Jenson, 2005; Verhey, 2005/2006).
Part of the problem may stem from how we treat misconceptions.
Misconceptions may be a part of a coherent framework analogous, perhaps, to a scientific
theory (Vosniadou, Vamvakoussi, & Skopeliti, 2008), or they may be fragments that exist
among other fragments of knowledge that are combined based on the context of the
situation (J. P. Smith, III, DiSessa, & Roschelle, 1993; diSessa, 2008). Traditional
conceptual change research emphasizes major conceptual restructuring that results from a
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logical dissatisfaction with and abandoning of prior conceptions (Posner, Strike, Hewson,
& Gertzog, 1982; Nussbaum, 1989). New concepts are linked to concepts already
present in the learner’s cognitive structure through progressive differentiation and
integrative reconciliation as learners delineate similarities and differences among existing
concepts, ultimately resulting in a more cohesive and integrated framework (Ausubel,
1963, 1968, 2000; Ausubel, Novak, & Hanesian, 1978). In this view, misconceptions can
be a barrier that must be overcome to attain scientific understanding (Groves & Pugh,
2002; Hamza & Wickman, 2008; Nicholls, 1999; J. P. Smith, III et al., 1993; Songer &
Mintzes, 1994). Unfortunately, this kind of superordinate learning is rare, more
characteristic of experts than students (Mintzes, Wandersee, & Novak, 1997; Novak,
1993; Novak, 2002).
The conceptual ecologies of students may be much less theory-like, however,
gradually evolving to include more scientific understanding as new pieces of knowledge
are added and assimilated in different contexts (J. P. Smith, III et al., 1993). For
example, integrated within a learner’s conceptual ecology (intellectual ecology; cf.
Toulmin, 1972) are epistemological commitments, anomalies, metaphors, analogies,
metaphysical beliefs, alternative conceptions, knowledge from outside of the field
(Demastes, Good, & Peebles, 1995), and heuristics (Schroeder, 2005). Indeed, in a very
Darwinian approach, Toulmin (1972) argues that variation and selection exist at all these
levels of concept use. So if the conceptual ecologies learners are building are not
coherent, theory-like frameworks, then examining the structural elements and the context
of their use (grain size) may provide valuable insight to construction and reconstruction
of knowledge (diSessa, 2008).
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Whether conceptual change is thought of as a revision of a conceptual system as
elements of the currently accepted scientific explanations are gradually included
(Nussbaum, 1989; Taber, 2001; Vosniadou & Ioannides, 1998), or as pieces of
knowledge invoked contextually (diSessa, 2008), misconceptions may be commonly
included in conceptual ecologies (Clough & Driver, 1986; Demastes, Good, & Peebles,
1996; Hamza & Wickman, 2008; Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008b; Lawson, Alkhoury,
Benford, Clark, & Falconer, 2000; Metz, 1991; D. H. Palmer, 1999).
Depending on the context of the problem, students may use misconceptions or
scientifically acceptable conceptions when queried (diSessa, 2008; Kampourakis &
Zogza, 2008b; Tytler, 1998; Welzel & Roth, 1998). In fact, Hamza and Wickman (2008)
suggest that misconceptions can be integral in the learning process as they are
encountered and questioned (see also Lawson et al., 2000; Taber, 2001). Clearly,
individuals vary in their employment of different aspects of their conceptual ecologies, as
well as the logical and affective considerations for doing so (Demastes et al., 1995;
Tytler, 1998). Some elements of misconceptions may disappear on their own, as
individuals learn more natural history, for example (Evans, 2000, 2001). Therefore, what
we expect at the end of instruction may either be (1) complete adoption of a new and,
hopefully, more evolutionary perspective if misconceptions are cohesive frameworks; or
(2) a mixed assemblage of scientifically sound concepts and misconceptions that exist in
different frequencies than prior to instruction if the misconceptions are transitional,
contextual frameworks.
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Identifying Misconceptions in Evolution
Exploring elements of coherence and grain size requires a methodological
approach that is sensitive to both sub-conceptual structure and integration (diSessa,
2008). Evolutionary theory is complex and includes a variety of disciplines, each of
which may interact in a complex way with prior knowledge to produce the conceptions
individuals hold. In their influential work, Bishop and Anderson (1990) describe three
ways that student conceptions about evolution differ from scientific conceptions: (1)
students fail to distinguish between appearance of traits and survival over time (the
environment causes traits to change over time); (2) students do not consider the role of
variation (evolution is seen as a process that changes the entire species simultaneously);
and (3) students do not see evolution as the changing proportions of individuals with
traits (they see gradual changes in the traits themselves). Considering misconceptions in
this broad classification may mask any understanding of smaller, more discrete, less
abstract concepts that students may hold and use to build their understanding. Indeed,
misconception research often has focused on discrete issues, such as adaptation (D.
Palmer, 1996; Renner, Brumby, & Shepherd, 1981) and genetics (Clough & WoodRobinson, 1985; Demastes in Good et al., 1992; Halldén, 1988), that may influence
overall interpretations of student understanding. Integrating scales of interpretation that
include broad and discrete, topic-oriented conceptions may permit a snapshot of
conceptual change from a transformational perspective, however.
Darwinian evolution has been characterized by a number of authors (e.g.,
Anderson, Fisher, & Norman, 2002; Nehm & Schonfeld, 2008) as incorporating several
different levels of abstraction. For example, evolution can be broadly summarized as
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follows: random variation exists within species, certain traits are heritable, individuals
differ in survival rates, individuals differ in reproductive rates, and changes accumulate
over many generations (from Ferrari & Chi, 1998). The structural concepts that form the
building blocks of these principles can serve as major stumbling blocks for conceptual
understanding and, indeed, within each of these principles are concepts that can be
classified according to different levels of abstraction. Lawson, Abraham, & Renner
(1989) describe a general classification of concepts into apprehended, descriptive, and
theoretical. Apprehended concepts are those whose complete meaning can be derived
from the internal or external environment, such as blue or hunger. Descriptive concepts
can be mentally constructed when readily available exemplars exist, such as a chair or
running. Theoretical concepts are those whose defining attributes are not perceptible –
their causal agents cannot be observed directly (osmosis and time, for example). Within
this framework, concepts related to evolution understanding such as population and
species can be considered descriptive; genes (Lawson et al., 2000), time (Dodick &
Orion, 2003), and probabilities (Slovic, 1987; Nicholls, 1999) can be considered
theoretical concepts. Lawson et al. (2000) suggest that evolution, natural selection, and
convergent evolution, as well as limiting factors, and even the process of fossilization,
should be considered hypothetical concepts – intermediate between descriptive and
theoretical – because these concepts could derive meaning if not restricted to a normal
observational time frame. Whether theoretical or hypothetical, however, evolution
clearly represents an abstract conceptual understanding that is beyond a descriptive
framework.
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Similarly, Ferrari & Chi (1998) suggest that evolution can be considered one of
two types of process categories: events and equilibrations. Events are bounded and
sequential (like a baseball game; Ferrari & Chi, 1998), and may be analogous to
descriptive concepts with readily available exemplars (cf. Lawson et al., 2000).
Equilibrations are ongoing, unbounded, and simultaneous (Ferrari & Chi, 1998), and as
such, are more abstract hypothetical or theoretical concepts (cf. Lawson et al., 2000).
Indeed, students often consider evolution as an event rather than an equilibration (Ferrari
& Chi, 1998), employing a descriptive conceptual understanding as opposed to a more
abstract process.
Vernacular issues common to many misconceptions and interpretations, such as
how individuals define “adapt,” “theory,” and “fitness” (Bishop & Anderson, 1990;
Bizzo, 1994), also can be considered in terms of their level of abstraction. Outside of
their scientific application, “adaptations” frequently are considered responses to changing
environmental conditions, i.e., individuals alter their form, function, or behavior by their
own efforts. This conception is descriptive; for example as a verb “adapting,” like
running, is a mental construction derived from experience. In the scientific form, the
concept is hypothetical and abstract; as a noun, an adaptation is a concept only indirectly
testable. Similarly, “fitness” in reference to an individual’s health, strength, or
intelligence (Bishop & Anderson, 1990) is descriptive, but the scientific application is
abstract and theoretical.
Causal explanations also can be classified along different levels of abstraction.
Biological philosophers maintain that two types of causal explanation in evolution exist.
Ernst Mayr distinguishes proximate- from ultimate-cause explanations based on the
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differentiation of immediately versus historically derived functions (Mayr, 1961). Ariew
(2003) argues that Mayr’s proximate causes are more precisely individual-level causal
explanations and are very different from statistical evolutionary explanations. In fact,
ultimate causes are concretely evolutionary, requiring sophisticated knowledge of
probabilities (Ariew, 2003). The distinction is important in that it translates directly into
classification of conceptual explanations of evolution offered by students. Concepts that
address individual-level phenomena are not necessarily misconceptions. These
proximate, individual-based concepts may be less abstract than evolutionary populationbased concepts, however.
Clearly, understanding evolution as a broad theory and offering evolutionary
explanations involves conceptually deep levels of abstraction. Individuals may have an
easier time understanding concepts that are descriptive, especially if they have not
developed reasoning skills; hypothetical and theoretical concepts that require more
abstract thinking may be more difficult to comprehend (Lawson et al., 2000). In addition,
most people have considerable difficulty understanding uncertainty and probabilistic
properties (Slovic, 1987; Nicholls, 1999). In fact, cognitive illusions develop from
difficulties in quantifying and dealing with probabilities, uncertainty, and risk (Nicholls,
1999). Like optical illusions, misperceptions at such an abstract scale can lead to errors
in judgment, for example, about climate predictions (Nicholls, 1999) and ozone depletion
(Groves & Pugh, 2002). It follows that cognitive illusions may interfere with developing
evolutionary causal explanations. Deeply abstract concepts may interact with less
abstract, descriptive concepts within an individual’s conceptual ecology, resulting in the
complex patterns of conceptual change that have been observed (e.g., Demastes et al.,
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1996). If a student is struggling with misconceptions about mutations (for example,
mutations can only be beneficial), the net effect may be an overall misconception of
directed evolution rather than differential survival and reproduction. (Of course,
mutations in and of themselves may be considered abstract, theoretical concepts if they
are defined as cascading effects of sequence alteration.) Kampourakis & Zogza (2008b)
consider three types of causal explanations that differ based on a philosophical approach
to answering “how” and “why” questions: (a) evolutionary explanations include the
historical development of species, (b) proximate explanations relate the current
characteristics of individuals to evolution, and (c) final cause explanations suggest
predestined outcomes. Because the focus is broad – how students explain evolution –
this system does not allow examination of the specific conceptual structure (the “grain
size”) within students’ explanations, however. Using a continuum that characterizes
concepts from descriptive to abstract within a similar system may function in classifying
many of the issues surrounding evolution misconceptions. Indeed, this descriptiveabstract continuum may be a valuable framework for describing student conceptions and
exploring conceptual grain size (Figure 3.1).

Teaching for Conceptual Change
Several teaching approaches have been developed that help students overcome
some of their misconceptions about evolution, including historically rich presentations
and paired problem-solving instructional strategies (Jensen & Finley, 1996), emphasizing
the Nature of Science (Johnson & Peebles, 1987; Scharmann, 1990; Scharmann & Harris,
1991, 1992; Farber, 2003; Khishfe & Lederman, 2006; Sandoval & Morrison, 2003),
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TYPES OF CONCEPTS
descriptive

abstract
misconceptions
proximate
conceptions
evolutionary
conceptions

Figure 3.1. The descriptive-abstract continuum for describing conceptions about
evolution. Misconceptions can be related to any kind of concept, whereas concepts
related to evolution can be proximate (incorporating relatively descriptive concepts) or
evolutionary (incorporating relatively more abstract concepts).

incorporating technology and inquiry-based tasks (Crawford et al., 2005), using the
learning cycle and developing reasoning skills (Lawson et al., 1989), active learning
courses (Nehm & Reilly, 2007), and teaching sequences (Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008a).
Broad misconceptions are tenacious, however, and often persist even after coursework
(Nehm & Reilly, 2007; Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994). Traditional conceptual
change research has suggested that changing conceptual ecologies requires that learners
recognize where their concept/propositional frameworks are limited, inappropriate, or
poorly organized into hierarchies (Novak, 2002), and as discussed above, this logical
approach is not the only pathway to learning a concept (Demastes et al., 1996).
Conceptual change strategies require educators consider the knowledge students bring to
the classroom and design instruction that helps students begin down some pathway of
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cognitive restructuring (National Research Council, 2007; Nelson, 2007). Directly
engaging prior conceptions can be very effective (Verhey, 2005). If, as Sinatra et al.
(2008) suggest, students are reluctant to alter their misconceptions because those
misconceptions fit their understanding of the world, then activities that help students see
those misconceptions as errors may be one approach to initiating conceptual change.
Clearly, calling attention to students’ personal understanding is inappropriate, but finding
an appropriate surrogate that employs equivalent errors may function to highlight errors
indirectly. We developed a curriculum plan using a nature program as a surrogate for
individuals to identify with commonly held misconceptions to help students deal with
their own misconceptions and recognize the errors.

Nature Programs and Misconceptions
Nature programs provide an incredible opportunity to share the wonders and awe
of the natural world with students. In fact, nature films may be an important source of
free-choice learning outside of school. For example, a single viewing of a nature
program featuring Jacques Cousteau can affect knowledge gains and attitudes about
marine mammals at least as well as comparable material presented in a science classroom
(Fortner, 1985). Unfortunately, few definitive studies address how and when learning
evolutionary concepts from television occurs, and attitude studies about perceptions of
the environment after viewing nature programs do not examine the resulting scientific
understanding necessary for environmental, ecological, or scientific literacy. In fact,
recent analyses of nature program content reveal a serious problem explaining
evolutionary processes. Narratives are often filled with “design” rhetoric, emphasizing

139

the perfect fit of an organism to its environment (Aldridge & Dingwall, 2003; Dingwall
& Aldridge, 2006), as well as need-based and purposive misconceptions (Dissertation
Appendix 1). Indeed, Dingwall & Aldrich (2006) contend that the manner in which
scientific issues are portrayed in wildlife and nature programs may actually enhance,
rather than diminish, the differences in understanding between biologists and the rest of
society. Moreover, video images designed to enhance these narratives may serve as a
powerful “virtual witnessing” events for viewers (Kirby, 2003; see also Graber, 1990),
resulting in an epistemological impact difficult to overcome, especially with socially
controversial topics such as evolution.
Fatal Flower (Natural World, BBC), is a visually stunning nature program about
the co-evolution of orchids and their pollinators replete with misconceptions about
evolution. For example, the narrator explains:
“The crucifix orchid also tries to be something that it is not; it copies other plants
nearby which have clusters of yellow and red flowers. The color guides the
butterflies to the nectar, which is produced in the yellow parts of the flower heads.
The crucifix orchid seems to know this, and its flower heads have the same color
pattern, too. Some of the flowers are dark red, while the freshest are orange and
yellow. But there, the similarity ends, as this orchid is a cheat. It may look like
the others, but its flowers are empty. There is no nectar reward at all, so the
butterflies are fooled into pollinating it for free. Orchids really are the femme
fatale of the natural world. They’ve made cheating an art form, using it get
exactly what they need from the creatures that fall for their many and varied
charms” (emphases added).
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Although this passage may appear as simple story telling, it builds on the narration for the
entire program, potentially leaving the viewer with the understanding that evolution is an
individual-based phenomena (versus population-based) that occurs because an organism
needs to change, and that changes an individual makes (like changing the color of one’s
hair) will be passed to offspring. The imagery in the program is spectacular and may
offer the kind of natural history experiences to viewers that resonate with prior
knowledge and add to misconceptions.
Fatal Flower served as an ideal proxy for students in an introductory biology
course to recognize their own conceptions about evolution as they critically scrutinized
the narration for incorrect conceptions, and by reflection as they were prompted to
compare their own conceptions with the misconceptions they identified as errors in the
program. Although the goal of the curriculum was to help students overcome
misconceptions about evolution, the format of one of the tools developed also provided a
unique approach to framing evolution understanding. As a result, this research represents
a shift from a traditional pedagogical approach to a “knowledge in pieces” approach (cf.
diSessa, 2008; Figure 3.2).
By assessing student responses to four very similar prepared statements that
included alternative conceptions, I was able to examine whether students conceptions
were logically related (Greene, 1990). In particular, the exercise permitted examining the
multiple levels of misconceptions students may hold at one time as they transferred their
reasoning to new situations. Therefore, I was able to examine the following questions:
(1) Can a curriculum of explicit conceptual teaching help students overcome
misconceptions about evolution?
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(2) Do students hold a diversity of misconceptions about the theory of evolution that
includes both scientifically sound concepts and misconceptions and apply them in
different contexts?
(3) If student’s concepts are logically related, then are misconceptions related to
evolutionary explanations in a predictable fashion?

prior
knowledge

prior
knowledge

curriculum

evolution
understanding

new
knowledge

Traditional Approach

Knowledge in “Pieces”

Figure 3.2. The shift in the approach to conceptual change using the Fatal Flower
curricula. The flow diagram on the left signifies how students’ prior knowledge is
confronted, proved unsatisfactory, and altered to reflect evolution understanding. The
flow diagram on the right represents an approach that predicts misconceptions are part of
a conceptual ecology but they shift in number and importance as a result of instruction.
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Methods
The curriculum was developed to help students overcome misconceptions about
evolution using a poorly crafted nature program about the co-evolution of orchids and
their pollinators as a surrogate for their thinking. Fatal Flower was a striking example of
excellent footage of orchids and their pollinators with a script that was fraught with
misconceptions about the evolutionary process. Indeed, its science content scored a mere
18% using the Science and Nature Program Assessment Tool (Dissertation Appendix 1).
This approach allowed students to criticize the narrative without targeting students’
personal beliefs directly. In each of two introductory biology courses, students watched
the program and were directed through a series of exercises that included group and
individual work, lectures, and reading.
The curriculum was implemented in two different semesters of introductory
biology at The University of Montana. Implementation differed in the application of
these exercises in the curriculum to examine how the role of time spent on the material
and individual versus group work affected student understanding (Figure 3.3). The goal
was to compel students to confront their personal misconceptions about evolution
through the surrogate narrator of Fatal Flower. Student conceptions were identified in
the first step of the Full Curriculum. After viewing the program, students were asked to
describe how Darwin would have explained the evolution of this relationship using
examples from the program. The second step required students to recognize
misconceptions they held personally. Using “someone else’s” explanations (i.e.,
explanations that mirrored their own naïve conceptions) allowed the students to be
critical without forcing them to publicly acknowledge their own naïve personal beliefs.
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Full Curriculum

Abridged Curriculum

View Fatal Flower Film

Step 1:

Individuals propose explanation for a Scenario developed from
the film:
As you have seen in the film, The Fatal Flower, there are many
species of orchids that have adaptations that enable them to be
pollinated by specific pollinators (insects and birds). These
pollinators in turn have adaptations that allow them to extract
the nectar from specific orchids that they are dependent on for
food. How would Darwin explain this example of co-evolution
between orchids and pollinators from a natural selection point
of view? (Give specific examples based on the film.)

Step 2:

Step 3:

Groups review four explanations
for Scenario that all have a
misconception and critique each
from point of view of an
evolutionary biologist.

Instructor lectures about evolutionary theory, and provides scientifically
accurate critiques for explanations provided in Step 2.

Step 4:

Groups compare explanations for
the Scenario; new group
consensus explanation proposed.

Step 5:

Individuals re-examine their
explanations from Scenario in
Step 1 and refine their response.

Step 6:

Individuals review four explanations
for Scenario that all have a
misconception and critique each
from point of view of an
evolutionary biologist.

Groups propose explanation for
observation described in Scenario.

Understanding tested with the following exam question:
Fossil evidence suggests that the ancestor of the modern-day bat resembled a
shrew or mouse and could not fly. How can the evolution of bat wings from the
paws of shrew-like ancestors be explained?

Figure 3.3. Instructional models used to help students confront their misconceptions
about evolution.
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After recognition and deconstruction of students’ misconceptions, lectures and discussion
groups were used to help students incorporate accurate information into their conceptions
of evolution. This step was reinforced by having students either re-examine their original
explanation of the co-evolution problem (Full Curriculum) or using group dynamics to
critique the written explanations they been critiquing as individuals (Abridged
Curriculum). A question on the final exam (weeks after the curriculum) served as a
longitudinal measure of the effect of the curriculum on students’ understanding.
A major component of the curriculum involved having students respond to four
prepared statements that answered the initial question and were purposely crafted to
include specific misconceptions about the evolutionary process. One alternative included
need-based purpose to evolution, a second included environmental cause for evolution, a
third addressed complexity arguments common to intelligent design rhetoric, and a fourth
included Lamarckian misconceptions (Table 3.1). Students were asked whether an
evolutionary biologist would agree or disagree with the alternative, and why they
believed as they did. These crafted alternatives provided a unique opportunity to
examine the diversity of conceptions held simultaneously by individual students.
Because the misconceptions written into the alternative statements served to prompt
student thinking, I predicted that comparing student responses across all four alternatives
should elicit responses that reflected the total diversity of concepts held by individuals.
For example, students with a good command of the theory of evolution would be
expected to respond with consistently scientifically accepted conceptualizations of
evolutionary theory. Responses of those with a poor command of the theory should
reflect the misconceptions elicited in the four alternatives, and most importantly, the
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Table 3.1
Alternative explanations provided to students to draw out their understanding of
evolutionary theory. Students were asked whether an evolutionary biologist would agree
or disagree with each alternative and why.
Alternative 1 – Need based:
Orchids would be better adapted if they had a means to ensure that their pollen
would be carried to other plants of the same species, so they gradually developed
complex structures that would trap or attract insects and attach the pollen to the insect as
it came into contact with the flower. The orchids in each generation had better and more
effective means of attracting or trapping the insects than their parents did. In turn, insects
needed to extract the nectar from the flowers so they became adept at getting the nectar
from specific flowers.
Alternative 2 – Environment caused:
Because the environment of tropical birds favored species that could sip nectar
from deep within the flowers of abundant orchids, mutant individuals arose that had long
beaks. Natural selection favored these individuals (hummingbird-like ancestors) and
eventually there were many birds that had these adaptations. Repeating this process led
ultimately to modern day hummingbirds. Orchids that were successfully pollinated by
these birds were also favored by the environment.
Alternative 3 – Intelligent design:
The existence of structures as complex as orchids and their relationship to animal
pollinators cannot be explained by traditional evolutionary theory because structures and
relationships like these are too complex to arise by chance.
Alternative 4 – Lamarckian:
Birds in search of nectar needed to reach the nectar deep within the petals of
flowering orchids. Their beaks grew longer as they needed to reach deeper and deeper
pockets to obtain the nectar. The next generation of birds had even longer beaks. This
eventually led to modern day hummingbirds. The “lips” or petals of orchids that acted as
landing pads or contact places for pollinators became elongated and shaped differently
from so much contact by pollinators. The next generation had larger and more complex
lip petals. Eventually they evolved into the intricate and complex orchid structures we
see today.
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diversity of scientifically sound concepts and misconceptions held simultaneously by an
individual.
The analyses were designed to investigate understanding, and student responses
were examined using a combination of qualitative analysis techniques. Content analysis
identified and classified the use of concepts related to language, such as “adapt”, but it
did not function to investigate the breadth of student conceptions well. As a result,
responses were classified using microanalysis techniques to address the understanding
inherent in student responses (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Initially, I developed a pool of
concepts from all responses to the four alternatives looking for words and phrases that
identified the concepts students addressed. I identified and classified broader concepts
based on in-depth analysis of the conceptual understanding students employed when
including the concepts (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). This broader coding scheme was
rooted in the results of previous analyses of student conceptions, such as Bishop and
Anderson (1990). I categorized concepts to reflect misconceptions that were prompted,
misconceptions particular to student explanations, level of abstraction of those
misconceptions, and correct conceptions. Sub-categories within each category could then
be further refined based on the level of abstraction of the concepts employed.
Following Kampourakis & Zogza (2008b), I organized the concepts into
proximate and evolutionary conceptions, however I based the distinction specifically on
students’ less abstract, individual-level, causal reference and more abstract, statisticallevel, evolutionary reference (Ariew, 2003; also see Figure 3.1). Each category was
counted only once per response even though a student may have employed the concept
several times in that response. I explored the effects of the curriculum and the impact of
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the narrative surrogate using responses from the Full Curriculum. Only the Abridged
Curriculum included individual student responses to the four alternatives, so that
curriculum served as the primary source of data for analyses. However, group responses
were included as points of comparison where appropriate.
The goal of both curricula was to help students recognize and overcome
misconceptions about evolution using the nature program as a surrogate that could be
criticized with less personal ramifications. Exploring specific student conceptions was
not part of the curriculum development, and the two curricula took different approaches
to group and individual work. As a result, different phases of the two curricula were used
to examine different effects. The effect of the curriculum itself was examined using the
Full Curriculum model; 41 students completed both an initial assessment (response to the
Scenario) and a final assessment (final exam question). The Abridged Curriculum did
not ask for individual responses to the original Scenario, only group responses, but their
responses to the final assessment provided valuable insight to the generality of
conclusions (Figure 3.3). The Abridged Curriculum was used to examine student
conceptions for cohesion, however, because only the Abridged Curriculum included
individual responses to the four alternatives used to examine the contextual application of
concepts (n = 42 per alternative). Clearly, the group responses in the Full Curriculum did
not accurately reflect individual students’ conceptual diversity, but the 13 group
responses provided interesting points of comparison.
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Results
Concept Analyses
The most difficult aspect of this analysis was that not all students used all
concepts; there was no “right” answer that included all concepts. The coding scheme that
developed included categories that represented both scientific conceptions and
misconceptions that could be grouped into various levels of abstraction. Time, for
example, was considered abstract when considering the millions of years necessary for
some evolutionary changes to occur. “Generations” was a much less abstract conception
of time, as most students know grandparents and even great grandparents (see also
Renner et al., 1981). Students’ conceptions of the effects of time frame of “generations”
ranged from the development of traits to the development of species. Two examples of
student responses illustrated the nature of their thinking related to time frame:
Student #1d: “The whole idea of natural selection is that certain favorable traits
that are necessary for survival get passed on and change over generations, not just
over one generation. Some changes may occur during a short period of time, but
most of the major ones that involve natural selection occur over many
generations;”
Group #29b: “It went through years and years of changes and many generations
before it became the hummingbird that we know today.”
Moreover, these responses showed variation in the thinking from abstract to descriptive;
Student #1d separated the trait from the whole being, whereas Group #29b apparently
considered evolution affecting the entire being.
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Other categories that included different levels of abstract thinking were organized
around heredity, favor, and variation. Heredity was evident in concepts in student
responses related to the passing of traits from parent to offspring. Genes were often
identified as the currency of heredity, especially in response to Alternative #4 (Table 3.1),
but not necessarily in relation to the genetic underpinnings of traits. As a result, genetic
concepts may or may not have been discussed in relation to heredity and were included in
a separate category. For example, one student wrote:
Student #33d: “they pass on their genetics,”
in response to Alternative #4 (Lamarckian misconception), indicating a conception of
heredity and the mechanism of genetics (as opposed to phenotypic changes) representing
two different concepts. Genes, as a concept, were quite abstract. Lawson et al. (2000)
described the concept of genes as “theoretical,” that is a concept that functions as an
explanation for an event that needs a cause but for which there are no observable
exemplars. Knowing that genes are the root of heredity may have been less abstract than
the differential concept of understanding the consequences of meiosis and the
relationship to traits, however. Subcategories of concepts classified under heredity
included the wholesale passing of traits to the next generation, wholesale passing of traits
to an individual’s offspring, or the differential production and variable genetic
contributions to offspring.
“Favor” was an in vivo concept suggesting the influence of the trait – how
individuals fared in the world because they possessed the attribute. Subcategories
focused on influence as an outcome; possession of a “favorable” trait either enhanced the
ability to survive and/or reproduce, or it was perceived in the abstract as a statistical
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effect of natural selection. Some individuals were simply “better” because of the trait
(“the orchids that had the best adaptive traits would survive...” [Student #54p]), implying
that evolution was progressing or moving along some trajectory toward perfect
adaptation. Categorization of these concepts was often, but not necessarily, based on the
use of the word “favored,” especially in responses to Alternatives #1 and #2. For
example:
Student #48a: “An evolutionary biologist would argue that orchids with more
complex pollinating systems were favored more, and therefore passed on these
traits to their offspring, and so on.”
Student #23a: “The environment favors the genetic mutation and those individuals
with the mutations are better able to survive and produce offspring.”
Student #24b: “The orchids that were most successful at attracting pollinators
were able to pass on their traits to future generations.”
Stochasticity was specifically addressed in Alternative #3, but the idea of
variation among individuals and random processes was worth considering in all
responses because of the important role it plays in evolutionary theory (Clough & WoodRobinson, 1985). As a result, variation became a category with two subcategories
addressing different levels of abstraction: the variation among individuals within a
population (1) within a specific time frame and (2) across generations (“Transformation”
as discussed above). Understanding the variation associated within the population that
led to differential survival and reproduction was an abstract concept.
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Student #8c: “With a greater number of offspring, an organism would be able to
have a better chance to evolve because there is a possibility of more genetic
mutations, which are a random occurrence after all.”
The evolutionary concept of variation was more common in responses to the original
scenario of the Full Curriculum (see below) than in response to the four alternatives in
the Abridged Curriculum, however.
Misconceptions were classified based on purpose. Subcategories included those
concepts that (1) fulfilled some life requirement specific to that individual, (2) those that
were strategic, gaining relative access to those resources or life requirements, (3)
“symbiotic” becoming a better fit to each other, and (4) catastrophic – adapt or die.
Natural selection and the role of the environment were initially distinct categories with
two levels of abstraction, proximate and evolutionary. Responses indicated that students
often believed natural selection was an actor, a cause of the outcome, rather than a
process, so the causal concept was re-classified as a misconception.
Student #61p: “The more extreme the orchid mutations became, the more
extremely the pollenators [sic] were selected.”
Other well-defined conceptualizations of natural selection in student responses were
covered by other proximate and evolutionary categories. Likewise, if students indicated
that the environment caused the animal to change as opposed to being the context for the
process, then that conception was considered non-scientific – a misconception.
Two conceptual classifications were more related to how students thought in
general than to evolution understanding in particular. The “reason” for both sides of the
co-evolutionary relationship was often an important factor students used to assess the
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quality of the four alternatives. If the alternative did not explain enough of why the
relationship formed, including both sides of the co-evolution event (e.g., both the orchid
and the insect), the explanation was deemed inappropriate. A subcategory addressed
whether the alternative adequately explained why the organism “evolved.” Clearly, many
individuals believed that adequate answers foremost had to address all sides of the
relationship; the conceptual underpinning of the explanation was secondary.
“Completeness” was especially important for Alternatives #1 and #2.
The definition of evolution also was a frequent concept given in student
responses, especially in response to the prepared alternatives. The absoluteness of this
definition was consistent:
Student #36p: “The orchids have change through time.”
Student #21a: “I think an evolutionary biologist would agree to this answer
because it states the fact of change through time.”
Student #40a: “Evolutionary biologists believe in evolution, which is defined as
change through time.”
“Change through Time” is a common characterization of evolution in educational
contexts, but as a metaphor, it may not fit well with complex conceptual ecologies where
simultaneous misconceptions and proximate conceptions may affect overall conceptual
understanding. For example, the metaphor does not exclude need-based misconceptions
or even some elements of design. Some students indicated a dominant position for this
concept in their understanding, however, especially when defending the stochasticity of
the evolutionary process.
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Student #35c: “I disagree with this answer. I do believe that the existence of the
complex structures of the orchid species can be explained by the definition of
evolution, which is change over time. Though it would be a lengthy and complex
explanation that you would have to derive, it is still explainable.”
Most of the categories that developed were not mutually exclusive, nor were they
additive; they could not be summed across categories or subcategories. For example,
“generations,” “universal,” and “transformation” all referred to wholesale adoption of
traits in the next timeframe. “Generations” was a time-centered concept and implied
wholesale adoption of a trait in the next generation, whereas “universal” was a statement
about heredity, not time, that involved wholesale adoption (the trait was passed on to
everyone), and “transformation” referred to a general, slow transformation of a species
across generations. Although these concepts appear similar, separating them into distinct
categories accounted for the context of their use. “Generations” could be compared to
longer (“Eons”) or shorter timeframes (“Personal” the time it takes for an individual to
change). “Universal” could be compared to concepts that accounted for differences in
reproductive effort. “Transformation” could be compared to population variation.
“Genetics” and “Heredity” represent another example of non-additive response
categories.
A variety of studies have examined the use of the word “adapt” and noted
significant differences in how students and scientists apply the term (Brumby, 1984;
Halldén, 1988; Renner et al., 1981). “Adapt” was flagged wherever it was used in
responses and categorized as either an active use of the word (i.e., the verb “to adapt”), a
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description of a characteristic (i.e., a “trait”), or a broader, more abstract concept
implying the outcome of natural selection (i.e., an adaptation”).

The Effect of the Curriculum
Initial Conceptions. The Full Curriculum included an initial assessment of
students’ conceptual ecologies; students were asked to explain the co-evolution of
orchids and their pollinators seen in Fatal Flower the way they believed Darwin would
explain it. Need-based misconceptions were common in students’ responses to the coevolution scenario. In fact, nearly half (48%) included a concept related to “Life
Requirements,” that is the individual needed food (nectar) to be pollinated to survive:
Student #56p: “Birds need the nectar in the flowers to survive, so birds with
characteristics that make it easier to reach nectar are favored (i.e., long beaks) by
natural selection.”
Similarly, the co-evolution was often addressed as a “symbiotic” relationship where each
species was ensuring the survival of the other; 23% of students included this concept in
their response. For example:
Student #33p: “Without one another, the bees and the orchids would be unable to
reproduce and survive.”
As with all concepts, the inclusion of these two categories was not mutually exclusive.
Many students argued that the “Life Requirements” enabled the “Symbiosis.” About a
fifth (18%) of students included concepts that referenced Lamarckian development as the
individual changed within its lifespan. In addition, the conception that individuals that
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did not adapt would die off was common in student responses to the scenario. This
concept also was linked quite often to concepts of need, as in this example:
Student #8p: “The flower will die if it is not pollinated the insect or bird will die if
it is not fed. An example is how the humming bird adapted to the specific flower
but the fly got out of pollinating the same flower by eating through the ovum. In
this case the flower adapted to the bird but not the insect. So therefore the flower
may go extinct if it cannot evolve to meet the needs of both the humming bird and
the fly or find a means of repelling the fly.”
Natural selection was frequently (28% of responses) considered the actor in the
relationship between organism and environment, actively weeding out or favoring certain
individuals. Likewise, the environment caused individuals to change; 23% of responses
included concepts related to environment-caused misconceptions. Although evolutionary
concepts were far less common than misconceptions, the concept that individuals differ
from each other within a population appeared in one fourth of these initial responses.
Proximate concepts, such as better ability as a result of the trait and wholesale passing of
traits to offspring also were relatively common (>20%).
Student # 57p: “This genetic trait is selected for and more individuals that have it
are present in the population.”
One third of individuals’ responses to the original scenario in the Full Curriculum
included the use of “adapt” as a verb; only two individuals referred to “traits” as
“adaptations.” Of these, every single student response that used “adapt” to imply an
individual changes in response to the environment also was classified as including a
need-based or environment-caused misconception, not surprising considering the
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frequency of misconceptions in student responses. Over a third of the responses were
classified as incorporating Lamarckian elements. Evolutionary concepts were not
completely absent in responses from students using the verb form of “adapt;” three
responses (6%) included concepts of time that extended beyond “Generations.”

The Effect of the Surrogate. Based on the examples students included, the
narration in Fatal Flower appeared to have been an adequate surrogate for student
conceptions. Not all students included examples, nor did they include the same
examples. Three examples were popular, however; the bucket orchid and its euglossine
bee pollinator, Hexisia and its hummingbird pollinator, and the bee-mimicking orchids
were included in 10 or more responses (approximately 25%; other examples were
included in only one or two responses). This frequency permitted cursory exploratory
comparisons of the kinds of conceptual ecologies associated with each example.
In the program, Fatal Flower, the narration regarding the bucket orchid includes
several references to need-based evolution. The orchid excretes a scented oil that attracts
male bees. According to the narration, “the males need this strange oil to make a
perfume to attract their own females.” In addition, the segment emphasizes the flower’s
devious trap and its need to be pollinated.
The narration surrounding Hexisia and its hummingbird pollinator emphasizes the
perfect design of the flower:
“This little orchid is called Hexisia, and each of its flowers is designed to be
operated by the tip of a hummingbird’s beak. A dark splotch shows the bird
where the nectar tube is.”
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The narrator goes on to say that the lip serves as a place for the hummingbird to rest its
bill while it feeds.
The narration used to describe the bee-mimicking orchids does not include
explicit need-based references. The male bee is simply fooled by the flower’s imitation
of virgin female bees with whom to mate.
Use of the bucket orchid example was associated with need-based misconceptions
more so than the other two examples; 85% of students using this example employed
need-based misconceptions (versus 42% of students including the hummingbird as an
example and 50% of students including the bee mimic). In addition, students often
referred to how “fit” a bee had to be to get through that trap, enlisting a somewhat
Lamarckian element in their response.
Student # 14p: “At the same time the bee was evolving to where it could still get
what it came for as well as surviving the trap and retain its desire for nectar
again.”
Not surprisingly, the misconception that individuals “adapt or die” also was more
common in responses where students included the bucket orchid example (62% versus
10% with the bee mimic and 42% with the hummingbird). A frequent use of the “adapt
or die” concept associated with the hummingbird example reflected students beliefs that
hummingbirds needed the food supplied by the nectar. On the other hand, students
incorporating the bucket orchid example included concepts of “symbiosis” less frequently
(23%) than students including the bee-mimic example (33%) or the hummingbird
example (50%), this approach likely reflected an incongruity between the harmony of
“symbiosis” and the difficulties through which male euglossine bees must go once they
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have become trapped in the bucket of slimy goop (bees end up squeezing through a
tunnel formed from the throat of the flower where the pollen sacs come in contact with
the bees thorax). Although few in number, more proximate and evolutionary concepts
were associated with students response that included the bee mimic example:
Student #2p: “In those instances, the flower that had evolved the most to look like
the insect they needed would have the best luck being pollinated and would
therefore survive the longest.”
Although this response included a need-based concept, it also incorporated some
understanding of the variation among individuals and the relative frequency of
pollination and survival associated with having the trait. Apparently, the “need” to have
sex did not fit with “Adapt or Die” and “Symbiosis” concepts. Clearly, the use of
examples in students’ responses was likely more correlative with their prior conceptions
than causative, and the narration cannot be completely blamed for the outcome.
However, the fact that these examples did resonate with students indicates that narration
from these types of programs in combination with exquisite visual imagery may affect
their conceptual ecologies resulting in a poor understanding of evolution.

Outcomes of the Curriculum. A question designed to assess the overall impact of
the curricula was included on the final exam for both the Full Curriculum and the
Abridged Curriculum (Figure 3.3). The question was shorter, included less explanation,
and students had less time to respond. Nevertheless, 65% and 71% of students in the Full
and Abridged curricula, respectively, recognized the central misconception in the
question’s statement. In fact, some students read more than one misconception in the
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statement, usually a combination of recognizing need-based and goal-based
misconceptions.
In addition, most students in the Full Curriculum (82%) included relatively fewer
misconceptions in their response to the question on the final exam than in their original
response to the Scenario. (The Abridged Curriculum did not include individual responses
to the Scenario.) Similarly, 78% of students included more evolutionary concepts in their
response to the final question than they included in their original response to the
Scenario. Proximate concepts also decreased relative to the Scenario responses; only
36% of students included a greater proportion of proximate concepts in their final
response than in their original response to the Scenario.
The use of the term “adapt” was relatively absent from responses to the final in
both curricular approaches: 16% in the Full Curriculum versus 5% in the Abridged
Curriculum. Both curricular approaches seem to have been effective at assisting students
in beginning the transition from misconception-laden ecologies to ecologies that include
more scientifically acceptable concepts. The Abridged Curriculum seemed to be equally
effective; 87% of students disagreed with the statement provided in the final exam
question and 71% noted the inclusion of a misconception. Students may not have
developed a full command of the complexity of evolutionary theory, but they knew how
to recognize incorrect arguments.

Drawing out the Pieces of Conceptual Ecologies
The most basic way to determine contextual use of concepts and the application
of reasoning patterns was to compare students’ outright agreement or disagreement with
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the four misconception-laden alternatives. I predicted that students with an
understanding of evolution should have at least recognized the misconception in the
alternative statement. The details of both the need-based and environment-caused
explanations in Alternative #1 and Alternative #2 (Table 3.1) were often overlooked by
both individuals (Figure 3.4) and groups (Figure 3.5) however, and the majority of
students agreed with both alternatives in both curricula. Lamarckian references in
Alternative #4 were detected a bit more often than other misconceptions, and more often
in the Abridged Curriculum than in the Full Curriculum. A strong majority of students
completing the curriculum (regardless of version) disagreed with the intelligent design
explanation in Alternative #3.
This analysis illustrated that students did indeed hold misconceptions about
evolution but suggested that their conceptual understanding was not uni-dimensional.
Quite often students included an assortment of proximate and evolutionary concepts as
they re-interpreted an alternative with which they stated an evolutionary biologist would
agree. Similarly, students often identified the misconception and then repeated, rather
than refuted, the concepts. This exercise allowed analysis of the diversity of concepts
held simultaneously by individuals, however. In their responses, students included
different arrays of concepts as they transferred their knowledge from one situation to the
next. Responses were grouped first by alternative, and then by individual.
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Figure 3.4 Proportion of students in the Abridged Curriculum indicating that they agreed
with the need-based, environment-caused, intelligent-design, or Lamarckian alternative.
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Figure 3.5. Proportion of groups in the Full Curriculum indicating that they agreed with
the need-based, environment-caused, intelligent-design, or Lamarckian alternative.
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Alternative #1 – Need-based Explanation: As would be expected from the
previous analysis, only 17% of individuals in the Abridged Curriculum included some
recognition of the need-based misconception; over half of individuals actively included
or reiterated a need-based misconception in their response. In the Full Curriculum,
however, 54% of groups recognized the inclusion, and 54% of groups included some
need-based explanation in their response. Again, these categorizations are not mutually
exclusive; individual students or groups could have included recognition of the needbased misconception but then included a need-based explanation at some other point in
their response:
Student #34a: “Although the statements are correct about the flower and the
insects adapting to each organisms specific needs, I think that the statement is not
totally true about how the adaptations came about. I don’t think that the
organisms could purposely adapt themselves to the environment...”
The need-based conceptions tended to focus on the life requirements (need for food or to
reproduce; “Life Requirement”) of individuals or their need to ensure their survival or
reproduction (“Strategy”). “Life requirement” needs were more common than “Strategy”
needs in the Abridged Curriculum whereas strategies to ensure survival and reproduction
were more common in the Full Curriculum (Table 3.2). These two types of needs were
often represented as a single concept of “symbiosis” – the relationship between the orchid
and the pollinator arose because each needed the other and to ensure survival.
“Symbiosis” appeared slightly more often in groups in the Full Curriculum than in the
Abridged Curriculum. Apparently, the idea of the co-evolution of two species elicits
some need-based relationship between them.
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Table 3.2.
The proportion of concepts enlisted by individuals and groups experiencing the Abridged and Full curricula, respectively.
Alternative #1
Concept

Alternative #2

Alternative #3

Alternative #4

Abridgeda

Fullb

Abridged

Full

Abridged

Full

Abridged

Full

Life Requirement

24%

8%

17%

0%

15%

8%

10%

15%

Strategy

15%

31%

12%

23%

5%

8%

2%

15%

Selfish

0%

0%

0%

8%

0%

0%

0%

0%

Symbiosis

12%

15%

12%

23%

5%

8%

17%

31%

Adapt or Die

2%

0%

0%

8%

0%

0%

0%

8%

Actor

15%

15%

24%

23%

5%

23%

20%

23%

Cause

27%

23%

5%

38%

5%

0%

12%

8%

Lamarckian

10%

8%

2%

0%

0%

0%

7%

0%

Better

17%

15%

10%

8%

2%

0%

7%

8%

Opportunity

17%

15%

17%

15%

2%

0%

0%

23%

Misconceptions

Proximate Conceptions
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Alternative #1
Concept

Alternative #2

Alternative #3

Alternative #4

Abridgeda

Fullb

Abridged

Full

Abridged

Full

Abridged

Full

Universal

5%

8%

5%

23%

12%

0%

12%

31%

Offspring

20%

8%

7%

8%

0%

0%

2%

8%

Generations

29%

15%

10%

23%

7%

15%

27%

31%

Transformation

12%

8%

7%

8%

5%

0%

10%

15%

Mutation

7%

15%

7%

15%

17%

0%

2%

0%

Variation

12%

0%

10%

8%

7%

8%

10%

8%

Weighting

10%

8%

15%

8%

10%

8%

5%

8%

Differential

7%

0%

0%

0%

2%

8%

0%

8%

Eons

10%

0%

2%

0%

7%

8%

0%

0%

Adapt

59%

77%

24%

38%

22%

23%

32%

8%

Completeness

22%

31%

27%

15%

0%

0%

10%

15%

Evolutionary Conceptions

Other Concepts

a

n = 41.

b

n = 13.
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Alternative #1 also included subtle wording that could have affected student
responses, wording such as “the orchids in each generation” and “better and more
effective means.” These two statements consisted of three non- evolutionary concepts:
generation as a timeframe, the transformation of species, and evolution progressing to
something better. So, the responses should have reflected these non-evolutionary
concepts if students were incorporating these words from the alternative. Almost a
quarter of students’ responses included time in terms of generations, and “Generations”
as a concept was identified more often than any other concept for this alternative (Table
3.2). “Transformation” was not as commonly included in responses though, but the
similar hereditary concept of wholesale passing of traits to offspring (“Offspring”) was
slightly more common. Likewise, the idea that organisms get “better” over time was
included frequently in responses to Alternative #1.
Other unprompted misconceptions common in responses to Alternative #1
focused on the process of evolution. Natural selection often took an active role in
weeding out or favoring certain individuals; 15% of responses in both curricula included
natural selection as an “Actor” in the process (Table 3.2). Similarly, the environment
“Caused” individuals to change in 27% of responses in the Abridged Curriculum and
23% of responses in the Full Curriculum. For example:
Group #9a: “Yes, the biologists would probably agree with this answer because
the orchids and the insects coevolved and so if one changes the other will
probably change to adapt to the new environmental circumstances.”
“Completeness” was an important classification element for Alternative #1. Two
examples illustrate how important this apparent rule of thumb for explanations was to
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students. Some students were satisfied that the alternative adequately discussed both
sides of the co-evolutionary relationship, whereas others were not:
Student #10a: “I think an evolutionary biologist would agree to this statement
because it shows both causes for the evolution to take place...”
Student #2a: “This explanation would be agreeable in general to an evolutionary
biologist’s way of thinking, but it does not necessarily answer the question 1 –
gives some explanation on the orchids side of the coevolution, but not much
elaboration on the side of the insects.”
Alternative #1 specifically used the word “adapted” but the context was
intentionally vague: “Orchids would be better adapted...” could have referred to
individuals or populations (in spite of the implication that evolution progresses toward
something better). Clearly, the use of the word elicited similar responses from students
(Table 3.2). In the Abridged Curriculum, all of the individuals’ responses that used
“adapt” as a verb (that is to indicate an organism responded to the environment) were
recorded as need-based or caused by the environment, and none recognized the needbased misconception included in the alternative. In addition, 20% included a Lamarckian
element. Nearly 40%, however, interpreted the concept as a trait or an adaptation in their
responses; two thirds of these students recognized the misconception in the alternative,
but half used another misconception in their re-interpretation. The verb “adapt” appeared
in 46% of the group responses in the Full Curriculum, but only half of those responses
were classified as including need-based misconceptions. The other 50% recognized the
misconception in the alternative. Nearly a third of the groups interpreted the concept as
an “adaptation” or a “trait.” “Generations” as the concept of time, and even Lamarckian,
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elements also were common classifications associated with the use of “adapt” as a verb.
One individual included the evolutionary concept of genetic variation, however.

Alternative #2 – Environment-caused Explanation: Alternative #2 included the
misconception that the environment caused the organism to change, indicating that the
environment “favored” certain traits of species. The alternative also included the phrase
“natural selection favored” – a subtle difference in terms of classifying short student
responses and separating conceptual understanding from misunderstanding. In addition,
the use of the word “mutant” likely had consequences in terms of students’ responses.
Not surprisingly, only 7% of responses included some recognition of the
environment-caused misconception in this alternative. Nevertheless, “Cause” was not
nearly as common in individual responses as in response to Alternative #1 (Table 3.2).
Groups apparently responded differently to the alternative; over a third of groups
included the idea that the environment caused the individuals to change. Natural
selection as the actor, rather than the process, however, appeared in about one quarter of
both individual and group responses. The word “favored,” on the other hand, appeared
often in student responses, but the concept was applied with some proximate level of
understanding of the evolutionary process. Students reframed the concept to refer to the
enhanced opportunity the trait provided in terms of survival and/or reproduction in the
environment. This “Opportunity” was the most common concept included in the
individual responses in the Abridged Curriculum (Table 3.2). In addition, nearly as many
individuals recognized that the ability to survive or reproduce relative to other individuals
was an important factor. In the Full Curriculum, 15% of group responses included the
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enhanced ability to survive or reproduce as a result of the trait, but few groups recognized
any kind of differential success.
As expected, the word “mutant” affected how students incorporated concepts
about mutations. Nearly one third of individuals (n = 13), and over one third of groups (n
= 5) included the concept in their responses. As a result, the concept was split in the
analyses to explore how students viewed mutations: as only harmful or beneficial, as
potentially harmful or beneficial, or with no reference to harm or benefits. Despite the
potential negative connotation of the word “mutant,” only one individual and one group
indicated that mutations were harmful, however. Rather, students incorporating the
concept of mutation gave no indication of benefit or harm (54% of individuals in the
Abridged Curriculum) or indicated some sense of random occurrence of both potentially
beneficial and harmful mutations (60% of groups in the Full Curriculum). For example:
Student #28b: “I agree with this statement, because it shows evolution as a
process resulting from genetic mutations and natural selection.”
Group #42b: “Mutations are random, and don’t necessarily benefit the species.”
Clearly, this alternative, with all of its good points, elicited more proximate and
evolutionary concepts from students and groups than the more misconception-laden
Alternative #1 (Table 3.2). However, many individuals and groups were concerned about
the adequacy of the alternative at explaining the evolution of the orchids. Indeed, many
indicated want of a more complete explanation (“Completeness”; Table 3.2):
Student #13b: “This answer does not really explain how the orchids evolved in
tune with the hummingbirds. This answer basically shows that the hummingbirds
evolved while the orchids stayed the same.”
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Alternative #2 used the word “adaptation” (a noun form) rather than the verb form
as in Alternative #1. In their reinterpretations of the alternatives, however, only 15% (n =
6 students) used the word “adapt” as a verb, and only one of those included an
environment-caused misconception. Instead, half of these students were classified as
using natural selection as an actor that weeded out the less fortunate organisms.
Interestingly, two of the four students that incorporated “adaptation” into their responses
also enlisted natural selection as an actor.
Alternative #3 – Intelligent Design: Alternative #3 was targeted directly at
student understanding of the limits of science. The alternative used the intelligent design
movement’s argument of irreducible complexity. As a result, the alternative should have
elicited comments about stochasticity or chance. Indeed, a relatively large proportion of
individuals in the Abridged Curriculum included the concept that mutations represented
chance occurrences (Table 3.2). Although this concept was the most common concept
identified in the individual responses, it was non-existent in the group responses of the
Full Curriculum. The diversity of concepts groups included in response to this alternative
was low, however; only eight different concepts were included in responses.
Nevertheless, of the concepts identified, groups included the time in which this
relationship could develop, whether that was the more proximate concept of generations
or the more evolutionary concept of eons. Groups also included concepts associated with
differential survival and reproductive success more than responses to any other
alternative.
The “complexity of the relationship” was addressed directly; both individuals and
groups argued that the relationship was not too complex to arise by chance (Table 3.2).
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Despite these encouraging results, approximately one quarter of responses included a
need-based misconception in their re-interpretation of the development of the
relationship. For example:
Student #8c: “While the relationship between orchids and animals is complex, it
started out simplistically and kept evolving in order to achieve a greater
reproductive success.”

Alternative #4 – Lamarckian: The Lamarckian element in Alternative #4 was
quite obvious. The focus of the alternative was on the individual bird’s ability to grow a
longer beak to reach deep into the flower. As noted above, however, just over half of
individuals and groups disagreed with the alternative. The students’ misunderstanding
about the evolutionary process was evident as they re-interpreted the alternative in their
responses. In the Abridged Curriculum, 37% of individuals recognized the Lamarckian
element, but three of these individuals still included the concept of individual changes
being heritable in their responses. In the Full Curriculum, 54% of groups recognized the
Lamarckian conception of evolution. Moreover, the alternative elicited references to
genes as the mechanism for heritability, as would be expected given this alternative
(Table 3.2):
Student # 12d: “It is true that the landing pads of the orchid could have changed
shape through so much use but the change would be environmental not genetic
and so would not be passed on to its offspring.”
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Group #46d: “As for the petals of orchids getting stretched out and elongated, this
could happen, but if it did this stretching is not a genetic trait and so the longer
petals would not be passed on to the next generation.”
Indeed, group work may have been influential with responses to this alternative.
Besides identifying the Lamarckian element, groups in the Full Curriculum more often
included concepts related to the influence of the trait on reproduction, heredity, and time
(although usually in terms of generations) than individuals in the Abridged Curriculum.
Interestingly, though, groups included references to need-based misconceptions more
often than individuals (Table 3.2). The idea that the two species needed each other and
were becoming more adapted to each other to ensure each of their survival (“Symbiosis”)
also was appealing to students, especially to the groups in the Full Curriculum:
Group #42d: “This is a form of natural selection where these two organisms coevolved to better each other and ensure their own survival at the same time.”
Although this alternative did not include concepts about adaptation, over one
fourth of individuals in the Abridged Curriculum incorporated the verb form of “adapt”
into their re-interpretations. Of those, half included a need-based misconception, and
another third included an environment-caused misconception. One student’s use
provided especially valuable insight to how the vernacular use could be interpreted:
Student #18d: “The growing of beaks to reach the nector [sic] is adapting, but that
doesn’t mean they will pass this trait on.”
Adapting, by definition, is changing, but phenotypic change is not synonymous with
genotypic change. Only one group in the Full Curriculum used “adapt” as a verb, and
they incorporated a need-based misconception in their response.
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Diversity of Concepts Held by Individuals
Examining the diversity of responses across all alternatives for each individual
and group indicated that students indeed held a variety of scientific, proximate, and
incorrect conceptions simultaneously. Two examples illustrate this diversity, one with
few evolutionary concepts and one with many evolutionary concepts. In response to the
four alternatives, Student #28 includes one evolutionary concept along with two instances
of misconceptions and four proximate concepts. Student #28 disagrees with the needbased statement in Alternative #1 but includes need-based statements in response to
Alternatives #2 and #3. Cleary, the student understands genes as the mechanism of
inheritance and the stochastic nature of mutations (an evolutionary concept).
Nevertheless, Student #28 misses the Lamarckian element in Alternative #4, the
alternative that specifically elicited responses that included genetics more than any other
alternative.
Alternative 1 – Need-based Explanation (agrees): “An evolutionary biologist
would not agree with this statement for one huge reason. The statement makes it
sound like these advantages were developed because of the benefits they create,
yet, in reality, these advantages came from a random mutation....”
Alternative 2 – Environment-caused Explanation (agrees): “...These long beaks
probably did develop over time in order to help the birds drink nectar....”
Alternative 3 – Intelligent Design Explanation (disagrees): “...Organisms adapt
and change in order to benefit from these relationships. Evolution definitely
explains how orchids developed into their current form in order to better assist
itself in pollination....”

173

Alternative #4 – Lamarckian Explanation (disagrees): “...Genetic mutation leads
to changes over generations, and this statement exemplifies this....”
Clearly, this student’s developing conceptual ecology is inconsistent, at one point arguing
against need-based mechanisms, and at another, arguing for them.
Similarly, Student #30 includes multiple evolutionary concepts in the responses to
the four alternatives, such as variation among members of a population, differential
survival, and time as a concept that extends beyond generations. In addition, a few
proximate concepts are apparent, including enhanced survival and reproduction of
individuals as a result of the trait, and natural selection as a process. The appearance of a
need-based conception with a design element in response to Alternative #3 is surprising,
however:
Alternative 1 – Need-based Explanation (agrees): “...Adaptations occur as
mutations and through some genetic recombination. The offspring might possibly
have a productive mutation that would enable them to reproduce more effectively
allowing them to spread more of their genes until they dominate the landscape.
These genetic mutations, however, occur over long periods of time and it would
be hard to see a huge change from parent to daughter organisms.”
Alternative 2 – Environment-caused Explanation (agrees): “An evolutionary
biologist would agree with this answer because it explains how the mutation
might have come about, how long it might have taken, and a reason for its
dominance in the environment being favored by natural selection....”
Alternative 3 – Intelligent Design Explanation (disagrees): “...It seemed as if the
orchids and the animals were complexly suited for each organism’s specific
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needs. The pollination methods, for example, are almost perfectly adapted for
both the flower and the insect. This could be explained only through adaptation
and natural selection and not by pure chance.”
Alternative #4 – Lamarckian Explanation (disagrees): “An evolutionary biologist
would disagree with this statement because it is not probable that physical
changes caused by the environment could be passed down to the next generation
simply because they are not part of the genetic code of that organism....”
The relative blend of misconceptions and proximate and evolutionary conceptions
within individual and group conceptual ecologies is apparent in plots of evolutionary
versus proximate conceptions and misconceptions (Figures 3.4 and 3.5). As responses
transition to conceptual understanding of evolution more in line with scientific thinking,
the presence of misconceptions included in responses appears to decrease. Indeed, both
need-based and process-based misconceptions are incorporated into student responses
less often as the use of evolutionary concepts increases, at least in the Abridged
Curriculum (Figure 3.6). The relationships are not as clear in the Full Curriculum (Figure
3.7), however, likely a result of the group dynamic. Obviously, the group responses in
the Full Curriculum are influenced by a variety of individuals, some more dominant in
the conversation than others, which likely masks effects. In both curricula, proximate
conceptions seem to remain relatively stable and may reflect students’ incomplete grasp
of concepts as they attempt to elaborate in their responses.
Similarly, when the proportion of evolutionary, proximate, and mis- conceptions
per individual were examined, an interesting trend appeared. Individuals offering a
greater proportion of evolutionary conceptions across the four alternatives included fewer
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misconceptions (Figure 3.8). The proportion of proximate conceptions peaked, however,
in the transition between misconceptions and evolutionary concepts. Again, responses
from the Full Curriculum were masked by the difficulties examining group work creates,
but this relationship is evident in the distributions of concepts across groups as well
(Figure 3.9).

Discussion
Effects of the Curriculum
Students enrolling in an introductory biology course pursue one of two paths in
their college careers: they continue on in the life sciences or they do not. If they continue
on in the life sciences curricula, they enroll in additional courses that broaden their
understanding of evolution, such as genetics and evolution courses. If they do not pursue
a life sciences degree, an introductory biology course may be the only exposure to
evolutionary science in their adult life. Therefore, it is imperative that science educators
across levels (pre-college and college) help students develop a conceptual framework that
allows them to assess future information in terms of correct application and interpretation
of evolutionary theory. Our results suggest that a curriculum designed to explicitly
address misconceptions may help students begin to deal with the complexities of
evolutionary theory and construct more accurate conceptual understanding.
A vast majority of students that experienced this curricular approach were able to
recognize major misconceptions about evolution at the end of the semester. Indeed, the
curriculum may have altered the diversity of the conceptual ecologies held by individuals
toward a more evolutionary perspective than they had early in the course. Jensen &

176

Number of Other Concepts

9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

proximate conceptions
misconceptions

0

1

2

3

4

5

Number of Evolutionary Concepts
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concepts held across all four alternatives for a single group.
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Finley (1996) also found that students justified responses by indicating that a statement
would be considered incorrect by biologists. In our analysis, however, students had to
single out their problem with the alternative in addition to agreeing or disagreeing that an
evolutionary biologist would find the statement acceptable.
Nevertheless, recognizing and understanding misconceptions are entirely different
issues. Understanding evolution requires a thorough grasp of some very complex and
abstract topics, topics that may comprise an entire discipline. Most introductory biology
courses only treat evolution as one unit among a number of other topics (Farber, 2003),
although more and more faculty are embracing evolution as a unifying theme in their
instructional design (e.g., Flammer, 2006; Nickels, Nelson, & Beard, 1996; Wilson,
2005). Moreover, there may be some logical progression of the influence of
misconceptions, proximate conceptions, and evolutionary conceptions in students’
conceptual ecologies (cf. Greene, 1990). That shift may be influenced by cognitive
maturation. Indeed, several evolutionary psychologists have suggested that
developmental constraints (essentialist, teleological, and intentionality) may lead to
intuitive cognitive biases that affect sub-concepts differentially depending on the abstract
nature of the concept being employed (Sinatra, Brem, & Evans, 2008). Similarly, the
correlated issues of scientific reasoning ability and development may affect the
conceptual understanding of evolution (Kwon & Lawson, 2000). The curricula employed
in the introductory biology courses at The University of Montana actively and explicitly
compelled students to recognize misconceptions, which may be a valuable first step in a
cascade of developmental and educational sequences leading to broader understanding of
evolution.
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I discovered several distinct concepts that warranted specific attention. For
example, the use of the verb “adapt” was significant in student responses to the original
scenario. Like other studies, these students used the word as part of their environmentcaused misconceptions (Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Clough & Wood-Robinson, 1985;
Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008b; D. Palmer, 1996; Renner et al., 1981). Specific language
in our curriculum influenced student use of the concept, however. A large portion of
students included “adapt” in response to Alternative #1, the one alternative that included
the word adapt (as well as the word “adept”, which was distasteful to some students).
Language in Alternative #4, the alternative including the Lamarckian-laden
misconception, also apparently elicited the use of the verb form of “adapt”, but
Alternative #2 (the environment-caused misconception) did not. Alternative #2 was a
fairly acceptable explanation of evolution (except for the environment-caused
misconception), but it included the word “adaptation”. Perhaps students in their reinterpretation did not use the word “adapt” because the language used in this alternative
adequately explained the co-evolution of orchids and pollinators to them. Similarly, time
was an issue for most students. Rarely was the concept of time longer than generations,
even hundreds of generations. Clearly, most were missing major conceptual
understanding of the abstract, random appearance of traits, their survival within the
population, and the quantity of time necessary for those changes to take place.

Diversity of Students’ Conceptual Ecologies
Teasing apart what students “know” and how they express what they know is
difficult from interview data, let alone short answer questions. The responses to four
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alternative explanations of a particular phenomena allowed us to examine how students
transferred their thinking to different, but highly similar, situations and, in effect, to
examine the grain size of working conceptual ecologies. Several recent studies highlight
that students provide different types of explanations for the same evolutionary processes
when asked to respond to different tasks with different content (Kampourakis & Zogza,
2008b; Nehm & Reilly, 2007; D. H. Palmer, 1999). Because our approach required
students to respond to four alternative explanations of the same evolutionary event, we
were able to examine the contextual application of concepts at a grain size that reflected
understanding and coherence (diSessa, 2008). Our results indicate that students’
conceptual ecologies are diverse, and they include both a variety of non-scientific and
scientific conceptions. These pieces of knowledge can be applied differently in different
contexts, even when they are very small transfer events. Nevertheless, this curriculum
may produce new insights to how students progress in their conceptual understanding;
students with at least a grasp of some of the more abstract evolutionary concepts
associated with evolutionary theory were less likely to include misconceptions in their
responses. Indeed, students’ conceptual ecologies may experience a fundamental shift in
the relative frequency of misconceptions and proximate explanations as they begin to
grasp evolutionary explanations.
Demastes et al. (1996) describe four patterns of conceptual change within a
cohesive framework approach (cascade, wholesale, incremental, and dual constructions),
each of which could be an outcome given the relationships we found. In fact, dual
constructions are an obvious possibility in our approach. The nature program served as a
surrogate, and students were asked specifically to respond in terms of what they believed
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an evolutionary biologist would think of explanations for phenomena depicted in the
program. Considering conceptual ecologies as fluid bodies engaging different pieces of
knowledge in different contexts also may explain the conceptual diversity of students’
response to highly similar explanations for natural phenomena, however. Therefore,
based on our results and evidence in the literature, a transitional, contextual framework
may be the most applicable approach to teaching for conceptual change.

Using Nature Films as a Tool
A number of science educators have developed curricula using nature programs to
help students understand the biological sciences, recognizing the poor representation of
the science. Their approaches have involved addressing the plausibility of the narrative
(Rose, 2003) or deconstructing the video (B. K. Smith & Resier, 1997). Our approach
was to embrace the narrative as a surrogate for poor quality explanations of evolutionary
processes. Not only are evolutionary concepts abstract, the language used to represent
them is distinct. For example, explaining differential survival requires language that
refers to rates (which are inherently population characteristics), and not just to
opportunity (increased survival of an individual). In addition, terms such as “adaptation”
and “fitness” have an everyday and a scientific meaning (Bishop & Anderson, 1990), and
their casual use by evolutionary biologists or nature program narratives may confound
understanding (Sinatra et al., 2008). Just as it is important that students understand what
a theory in science is (versus its everyday use), so it also is important to understand how
the language we use about evolution can lead to misconceptions about the theory, how
evolution functions, and its role in understanding many of the problems our societies face
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(e.g., antibiotic resistance). This conceptual change may begin simply by promoting an
understanding of the various meanings associated with words such as “need,” “adapt,”
and “theory.”
Narrative stories fit well with personal motivations, and as such, they may be easy
to retain (especially if they come with incredible imagery). Although
anthropomorphizing evolution may arouse student interest, it also may push students
toward attributing the similarities of organisms to some sense of kinship among them
(Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008b). It is not surprising that students often give purposeful
explanations to animals and plants, whereas humans become more selfish, racist, less
spiritual, and with less purpose as a result of evolution (Brem, Ranney, & Schindel,
2003). Fatal Flower is not unique in its poor treatment of evolutionary concepts
(Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006; Dissertation Appendix 1). Nature programs can provide
opportunities for students to recognize misconceptions without feeling attacked for their
personal understanding. After all, the goal is to help students dispel cognitive illusions
by recognizing the inherent errors of their current understanding.
When students leave academic institutions they are exposed to a variety of
messages about evolution, some that are purposefully misleading, but some that may
indirectly affect understanding by reinforcing misconceptions. As John Ziman so
eloquently wrote “the public receives and uses scientific knowledge that is incoherent,
practically inadequate, incredible, and inconsistent” (Ziman, 1992). If, as science
educators, we do not address the language used to represent evolution and how it fits with
lay theories, we may not be preparing students to adequately navigate these experiences.
As adults grapple with creationist and evolutionist ideas, they rely on mental
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representations that result from both interpreting and internalizing public or cultural
representations and those that result from inferential reasoning (Evans, 2001). As
knowledge is constructed and reconstructed in the free-choice learning environment,
partially constructed ecologies may “revert” or be re-constructed when constantly
exposed to the poor-quality messages delivered in nature programs and other free-choice
science education resources.

Implications
Today, evolution may be considered a socio-scientific issue (Sadler, 2004), but
understanding evolution is vital for citizens to navigate the complex biological world they
encounter in democratic societies. There are differences between understanding and
accepting evolution, however. Misconceptions arise from several sources: (1) those
rooted in experience, (2) those that are taught and learned through informal sources
(including religious and myth-based sources), (3) those that result from vernacular issues
(e.g., definitions of “theory” and “adaptation”), and (4) those that are constructed by
accommodating new knowledge into prior misconceptions (Committee on Undergraduate
Science Education, 1997). This classification represents different levels of abstraction
that may exist simultaneously in a learner’s mind. These sources can be addressed
through practices that consider the different levels of abstraction using nature programs in
the classroom. For example, vernacular issues can be dealt with in a straightforward way
by exploring word denotations and connotations used in the narrative. Likewise, students
can be taught that the virtual experiences we have with media are not always a basis on
which to judge evidence. Indeed, broadening the curriculum to include explicit
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instruction related to the Nature of Science (e.g., Scharmann et al., 2005) could be a
valuable complement to examining nature program narratives. The complexities of
dealing with informal sources and conceptual change strategies require that students
develop abstract levels of thinking, such as an understanding of deep time and
probability. These abstract concepts are the basis of ultimate causes of evolution (cf.
Mayr, 1997), but vernacular issues can easily derail evolutionary thinking (cf. Ariew,
2003) resulting in teleological (purposeful) explanations. Nevertheless, conceptual
change takes time, learning experiences in many contexts, and assessments that addresses
the diversity of conceptions each individual may hold and apply in different contexts
(diSessa, 2008). Explicit discussion of and reflection on common misconceptions may be
a useful tool for helping students recognize their own errors as errors and reveal some
cognitive illusions.
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CHAPTER 4.
SEEING IS BELIEVING: THE IMPACTS OF NATURE FILM NARRATIVES ON
STUDENT UNDERSTANDING OF EVOLUTION

Abstract:
Informal, or free-choice, science education resources may contribute to
individuals’ understanding of evolution, but direct effects are rarely examined. Despite
the incredible appeal of wildlife and nature programs, evolutionary theory is often treated
poorly, promoting creationist accounts of ecological relationships such as “intelligent
design”. The combination of spectacular footage and poor quality narratives may be
particularly damaging to evolution understanding as viewers “witness” individual
organisms overcoming all odds to survive and reproduce. I examined the effects of
imagery and narrative by revising the narrative of one nature program to more accurately
reflect current scientific understanding. The footage, including incredible close-ups of a
euglossine bee squeezing through the throat of a bucket orchid during pollination, was
replaced by still images and by repeating some of the more generalized scenery from the
original version. I used standardized metrics to assess attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge,
and I revised one measure to reflect the organisms from the nature program for use in the
post-assessment. Generally, evolution understanding scores decreased between preassessment and post-assessment, the version of the nature program had very little effect,
and the relationships between attitudes, beliefs, and understanding were complex. When
students with a moderate understanding of evolution were examined alone, the effects of
different versions of the nature program reflected predictions, but the effects were not
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significant. Responses to short-answer questions indicated that students believed the
imagery was important to their understanding, and broadly characterizing students
according to this factor contributed to understanding outcomes. These results indicated
that nature programs may be contributing to the poor public understanding of evolution.

Keywords: evolution education, narrative impact, attitudes toward evolution, nature of
science understanding

Basic understanding of evolution is critical to civic and social decisions (Antolin
& Herbers, 2001). Antibiotic resistance, gene therapy, disease, food production,
environmental quality, and biotechnology are all areas of active biological research where
evolution is a fundamental process. Yet many Americans hold serious misconceptions
about evolution and the process of science. Indeed, the majority of the public (61%) may
accept that humans and other living organism have evolved over time, but only 32%
believe this evolution was due to natural processes (Pew Research Center for the People
& the Press, 2009). The issue of whether and how evolution is taught in public schools is
highly contentious (National Science Foundation, 2006). “Balanced treatment” and
“strengths and weakness” legislation are invading public school systems across the
country. Both Louisiana and Texas have passed laws that not only erode science
teaching, they provide loopholes to advance creationist teaching in the science classroom
(National Center for Science Education, http://ncseweb.org/). Under the guise of
increasing critical thinking, these bills challenge the kinds of knowledge science
generates and the methodological naturalism so important to its epistemology. Science
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classes taught without evolution will not only impact future citizenship but a future
workforce in biological research as well. Ironically, at the same time legislation is
eroding the very principles that have permitted the success we all enjoy, the proportion of
science-related discourses in our society is likely to increase (American Association for
the Advancement of Science, 1990).
The theory of evolution is highly complex encompassing disciplines from
anthropology to zoology. Understanding each of these disciplines entails understanding a
host of concepts that can be fairly descriptive (e.g., conceptualizing a population or a
species) or highly abstract (e.g., conceptualizing genes or probabilities; Lawson,
Alkhoury, Benford, Clark, & Falconer, 2000). When these conceptions do not match
scientific conceptions about evolution, for example, they are referred to as
misconceptions, alternative conceptions, non-scientific ideas, or limited or inappropriate
propositional hierarchies (cf. Novak, 2002). Students may hold highly systematic
misconceptions about evolution (Cummins, Demastes, & Hafner, 1994), but whether this
knowledge exists as a coherent framework (Vosniadou, Vamvakoussi, & Skopeliti, 2008)
or as pieces that can be switched in and out of conceptual ecologies (diSessa, 2008) is
unclear. Nevertheless, three broad trends in student thinking about evolution exist: (1)
students tend to believe the environment causes traits to change over time (students fail to
distinguish between appearance of traits and survival over time); (2) students see
evolution as a process that changes the entire species simultaneously (students do not
consider the role of variation); and (3) students see gradual changes in the traits
themselves (students do not see evolution as the changing proportions of individuals with
traits; Bishop & Anderson, 1990). These misconceptions can be tenacious, remaining
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part of students’ conceptual ecologies even after significant coursework (Brumby, 1984;
Nehm & Reilly, 2007; Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994).
Informal resources for learning science outside of school, including museums,
science centers, newspapers, magazines, the internet, and television, also may be
important to evolution understanding. Certainly, these resources affect the knowledge
students bring into the science classroom (Alters & Nelson, 2002), but they may be
important in shaping conceptual ecologies once students have left formal schooling as
well. Although the learning process is the same outside of the classroom, the social
context and underlying motivation of the learner are important factors (Dierking, Falk,
Rennie, Anderson, & Ellenbogen, 2003; J. H. Falk, 2001; J. H. Falk & Dierking, 2000;
Rennie, 2007). Indeed, “free-choice” may be a more appropriate term than “informal” to
describe the unique, intrinsic needs and interests of the learner outside of formal settings
(J. H. Falk, 2001).
The role of informal sources in the construction of misconceptions about
evolution is unclear. Even with museums, one of the most well-studied free-choice
learning environments, relatively little is known about how resources influence
conceptual change (Diamond & Evans, 2007). For example, science museums may base
exhibits on the National Science Education Standards, employ scientists and science
educators, and consider exhibit design and flow to provide an experience close to the
scientific explanation of human evolution (see Diamond & Scotchmoor, 2006). Prior
knowledge (Mintzes, Wandersee, & Novak, 1997) and intuitive biases (Evans, 2008) that
visitors bring to the exhibit affect their interpretation and the learning outcome, however.
Moreover, visitors are choosing what they want to learn about, perhaps bypassing
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anything that does not fit into their conceptual framework or requires more cognitive
resources than they are willing to expend at that moment (J. Falk & Storksdieck, 2005; J.
H. Falk, Moussouri, & Coulson, 1998; Rennie & Johnston, 2004). Learning from
museums, and other informal science education resources, also may be vulnerable to the
effect of other individuals within a social group (Gleason & Schauble, 1999). To be sure,
some misconceptions have been categorized as “taught and learned” – these types of
misconceptions are the unscientific “facts” that may be taught informally by parents and
others (Alters & Nelson, 2002). Nevertheless, individuals have different identity-related
motivations for their free-choice learning opportunities, and these motivations can predict
learning outcomes (J. H. Falk, Heimlich, & Bronnenkant, 2008). If viewers distinguish
between educational and entertainment value, they may approach the knowledge
presented differently, being more open to learning from programs that are considered
“educational.”
Nature and wildlife programs are considered “educational” by convention, and
must be considered a source of free-choice science understanding. Whether these
television programs contribute to evolution understanding or misunderstanding is
unknown, however. Because the genre is driven by the need for compelling story lines
rather than scientific accuracy, several authors suggest embracing a highly skeptical view
of the reality presented in wildlife films as well (Bousé, 2000; Mitman, 1999). For
example, the nature programs on the Discovery Channel may provide factual information
about animals, but they present the information in moral and normative terms that engage
viewers on a dramatic and emotional level (Pierson, 2005). Narratives individualize the
“struggle for existence” and humanize the dramas (the orphan that struggles to survive
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and returns victorious to breed), misleading viewers to teleological and Lamarckian
conceptions about evolution. Indeed, references to evolution in nature programs are often
teleological – they imply evolution is driven by some purpose (Aldridge & Dingwall,
2003; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006). The result is that nature programs may implicitly
endorse creationist accounts of life on earth, especially the “blue-chip” sub-genre (a subgenre with high production values and strong visual appeal, often without a host – the
narration is voiced over the production; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).
Nature film narratives, therefore, may have a dramatic effect on the public
understanding of evolution. Narratives affect memory (Graesser, Hauft-Smith, Cohen, &
Pyles, 1980; Shapiro & Fox, 2002), and they can increase the plausibility and
persuasiveness of information presented (Voss, Wiley, & Sandak, 1999). We relate to
narratives. Because the narrative is the predominant form taught for teaching and
reading, the “narrative” experience of our lives may make it easier to comprehend and
recall content then expository texts much less related to life experiences (Norris, Guilbert,
Smith, Hakimelahi, & Phillips, 2005). Indeed, “transportation into a narrative world”
may be a key mechanism of narrative impact (Green & Brock, 2000).
Although audiences process fictionality, external realism (matching with external
reality), and narrative realism (coherence within a story) (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008),
external realism may not be essential. Audiences make judgments about the consistency
of narratives constructed from a narrative experience (i.e., story world, character models,
and situation models) in relation to their own experiences (Busselle, Ryabovolova, &
Wilson, 2004). The result is that instead of being concerned with verisimilitude (i.e., the
“truth”), audience members are concerned with coherence and logic within a particular
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fictional context (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008; Busselle et al., 2004). Enjoyment is not
dependent on how well a television program, for example, reflects real-world truth
(Green, Brock, & Kaufman, 2004). In fact, readers, and television viewers, that are
“highly transported” maintain beliefs that are consistent with the stories, regardless of
their realism (Green, 2004). Prior knowledge and experience affect transportation
(Green, 2004) in a counter-intuitive manner, with regards to science. Experience with the
relevant themes within the narrative results in a greater likelihood of transportation
(Green, 2004) rather than any kind of skepticism. So people with some experience
overcoming obstacles, perhaps a sibling that has survived a devastating disease, may be
more transported into nature film narratives that portray evolution as an individual
struggle. Moreover, “perceived realism” is highly correlated with how typical the event
is perceived to be, leading to a “relative” realism (Shapiro & Fox, 2002). Unfortunately,
engagement with a story may leave viewers with the sense that that story was authentic
(Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008), whether it accurately reflects the current understanding of
evolution , or not.
Likewise, video images designed to enhance nature programs may serve as
powerful “virtual witnessing” events for viewers (Kirby 2003, see also Graber, 1990),
resulting in an epistemological impact difficult to overcome, especially with socially
controversial topics such as evolution. The imagery not only alters concepts of time,
specific imagery is used to enhance the relationship with the viewer, such as including
scenes with eye-contact (Bousé, 2000). Even scientists fall prey to the power of the
moving image. Padian (1987) suggests that scientific reconstructions of bat-winged
pterosaurs were influenced by “plausibility” of pictorial images. He notes, “a picture is
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not only worth a thousand words; however inaccurate, it may be worth a wealth of welldocumented evidence to the contrary” (p. 76). Indeed, research into the effects on
learning from one beautifully crafted nature film suggests that the misconceptions
presented in the narration affect undergraduate students’ understanding of evolution
(Bright et al., abstract; Chapter 3; Dissertation Appendix 1).
Therefore, despite their standing as “educational” programming, nature films
actually may enhance the differences in understanding of evolution between biological
scientists and the general public (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006). Because the educational
content is integral to the narrative (i.e., explanations of evolution that include design and
advancement that individuals can relate to), the parallel mental processes responsible for
comprehending narrative and educational content complement each other (Fisch, 2000),
enhancing the likelihood of developing misconceptions about evolution. The spectacular
footage, so often associated with series like The Blue Planet and Planet Earth, may add a
level of synergism to the effect. Dingwall and Aldridge (2006) note “it is highly
questionable whether wildlife and nature programming is making an appropriate
contribution to the preparedness of civil society to deal with key issues in biological and
environmental sciences.”
Nevertheless, the relationship between viewing a nature program and evolution
understanding is complex, so I designed an experiment that specifically addressed the
factors related to knowledge about this important theory (Figure 4.1). In this large-scale
design, I examined the effects of nature program narrative and imagery to directly assess
the influence of these programs on evolution understanding. I also attempted to control
for characteristics of the students related to attitudes toward science, attitude toward
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evolution, understanding the nature of the scientific endeavor, and beliefs about
knowledge. I predicted that misconceptions in nature film narratives were a source of
viewer misconceptions. Viewer characteristics, such as positive attitudes toward
evolution and science, beliefs about knowledge (personal epistemology) as well as
understanding the nature of science, should alter that relationship, however. In addition,
narrative alone should have the greatest impact on understanding; imagery should only
serve to enhance the effect.

Methods
Manipulating a Movie
Fatal Flower (BBC’s Natural World series 1998) uses beautiful imagery in a
traditional natural history film that explores the adaptations of different species of orchids
that lure insect and bird pollinators. These pollinators in turn have adaptations that allow
them to extract the nectar from specific orchids that they are dependent on for resources.
Thus, from an educational perspective, the film appears to be an excellent example of coevolution and natural selection. Unfortunately, the film is full of misconceptions (both
intentional and inadvertent) about the evolutionary process and is a poor example of
science in nature films (Dissertation Appendix 1). Indeed, other work suggests that the
misconceptions in the narration may affect students’ understanding of evolution.
Misconceptions about the goals of evolution and transmission of adaptive traits appeared
frequently in students’ written responses to questions after watching the program (see
Chapter 3). Therefore, I revised the narration to explain the co-evolutionary relationship
more accurately than the misconception-laden original. I enlisted the assistance of a local
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Figure 4.1. Determining the impact of nature program narratives and imagery on students’ understanding of evolution. Heavy lines
indicate the proposed factors addressed within the experimental design.
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television personality to narrate the revised version and re-voice the original version to
avoid confounding the effects of the narration with the differences in narrators. Because
visual experiences may affect evolution understanding through the combined effects of
narrative and imagery, I wanted to separate the visual effects on understanding from the
narrative effects. I reduced the films visual imagery to still images and/or repeated video
segments that did not include the stunning close-ups of actual pollination events. As a
result, the experiment had the following treatments:
 original version of the video (re-voiced)
 revised narration to enhance the presentation of evolutionary theory
 original version with revised imagery
 revised narration with revised imagery.

Assessment Instruments
I developed pre- and post-assessments from previously published tools addressing
Attitudes toward Science, Personal Epistemology, Attitude toward Evolution, Nature of
Science (NOS) Understanding, and evolution knowledge (Chapter Appendix 1). I was
looking to explore changes in evolution knowledge as the result of watching one version
of Fatal Flower and how these changes were influenced by these variables.
Attitude has always been a difficult concept to assess; its presence can only be
detected through the behaviors it manifests (Mueller, 1986). Indeed, Thurstone’s first
formulation of the concept was “the sum total of a man’s inclination and feelings,
prejudice and bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats, and convictions about any
specified topic” (Thurstone, 1928). Because attitudes toward evolution may carry more
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emotional weight than attitudes toward science, a combination of tools was necessary to
address this variable.
The Test of Science Related Attitudes (TOSRA) was developed by Fraser (1981)
and modified and refined by Adolphe (2002). The multi-dimensional scale measured
seven science-related attitudes, including Attitude to Scientific Inquiry, Adoption of
Scientific Attitudes, and Social Implication of Science using a number of paired negative
and positive statements. Adolphe (2002) recorded moderately high to high reliability
among students in two different countries for three of the sub-scales (Career Interest in
Science: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74-0.77; Attitude toward Scientific Inquiry: Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.71-0.75; Normality of Scientists: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.59-0.66), as did Joyce
& Farenga (1999; Adoption of Scientific Attitudes: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.61; Career
Interest in Science: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90; Enjoyment of Science Lessons: Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.93; Attitude toward Scientific Inquiry: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78; Leisure
Interest in Science: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89; Social Implications of Science; Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.83; and Normality of Scientists: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.72). Responses to all 47
items were recoded prior to analyses to reflect similar directions.
Personal epistemology (PE), or students’ underlying beliefs about knowledge and
knowing, was operationalized using a modified version of Schommer’s Beliefs about
Knowledge and Learning Test, a test with both high validity and reliability (0.74 testretest and 0.63-0.85 inter-item correlations for items within each belief factor; Duell &
Schommer-Atkins, 2001). The test was modified by Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle (2002)
to create a more efficient instrument that reflected Schommer’s five sub-scales (Innate
Ability, Omniscient Authority, Quick Learning, Certain Knowledge, and Simple
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Knowledge). The Epistemic Belief Inventory, as it came to be called, had higher testretest reliability than the original and better predictive ability when correlated with
reading comprehension (Schraw et al., 2002). In addition, the five sub-scales reflected
the original dimensions of personal epistemology hypothesized by Schommer (1990).
Responses to all items were recoded prior to analyses to reflect similar directions.
Attitudes toward evolution suffer from similar difficulties, especially given the
perceived threat evolution poses toward religion. Several similar surveys have been
developed to evaluate evolution attitudes. Most recently, Ingram & Nelson (2006)
modified Brian Alter’s survey measuring student acceptance of evolution and used that
scale to assess attitudes toward creationism and evolution. The 12-item scale was highly
reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87-0.88) and used very similar statements to the
Measurement of Acceptance of the Theory of Evolution (MATE). MATE also was a
particularly reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.98) but included 20 items (Rutledge &
Warden, 1999). Because of the high correlation between the two scales (Ingram &
Nelson, 2006), I used the scale finalized by Ingram & Nelson (2006) to assess students’
acceptance of evolution. Items from this survey included both positive and negative
Likert-scale statements such as “over billions of years all plants and animals on Earth
(including humans) descended (evolved) from a common ancestor (e.g., a one-celled
organism)” (a positive statement) and “there is no real evidence that humans evolved
from other animals” (a negative statement). Responses to all items were recoded prior to
analyses to reflect similar directions.
NOS Understanding was conceptualized as the level of understanding about the
process of science, including the role of evidence, terminology, certainty, and tentative
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nature of results. Assessing students’ views of the NOS has been difficult, especially
using standardized tests with closed questions (Aikenhead, 1988; Lederman, Wade, &
Bell, 1998). Nevertheless, open-ended questions, such as those developed by Lederman,
Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, & Schwartz (2002), were not logistically feasible for this research.
As a result, I used the Views of Science-Technology-Society (VOSTS) developed by
Aikenhead & Ryan (1992). VOSTS is a series of closed questions, the validity of which
arises from development of options grounded in student views (Aikenhead & Ryan,
1992). VOSTS, therefore, was a multiple-choice assessment that presented a variety of
different viewpoints that likely included most students’ conceptualizations without
resorting to written explanations. The original VOSTS questionnaire was quite long,
however, and included topics not necessarily appropriate in this research. Therefore, I
reduced the 114 questions from the original test to 15 questions I believed addressed the
kind of NOS knowledge that may influence evolution understanding and media literacy.
None of these variables was expected to change between pre- and postassessments. For example, although personal epistemology has been found to change
over time (King & Kitchener, 1994), these changes take years. Furthermore, change
requires formidable effort (Schommer, 1990). Understanding NOS also was unlikely to
change in such a short timeframe; it too, requires explicit instruction to change
conceptions (Akerson, Morrison, & McDuffie, 2006).
Prior evolution understanding was determined using the Conceptual Inventory of
Natural Selection (CINS; Anderson, Fisher, & Norman, 2002). CINS was a multiple
choice test designed with answers known as “distracters” intended to assess the
prevalence of misconceptions (Anderson et al., 2002). The assessment focused on 10 key
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concepts related to evolution, each with two questions: biotic potential, population
stability, natural resources, limited survival, variation within a population, variation
inheritable, differential survival, change in a population, origin of species, origin of
variation. Previous uses of CINS produced reliable results (Kuder-Richardson 20 = 0.580.64) and internal validity (Anderson et al., 2002).
Because the pre- and post-assessments were to be given in close proximity (within
two hours of each other originally), I did not want the test questions addressing evolution
understanding to be identical. CINS included two questions for each concept and could
have been split into pre- and post-assessments. I wanted to maintain maximum
reliability, however, because I was looking for as sensitive a tool as possible. In addition,
I wanted to use organisms with which students had just had a visual experience. If
students had personal experience with the subject, they may have been more interested in
answering the questions honestly in the face of testing fatigue during the post-assessment.
In addition, using subjects from Fatal Flower may have added sensitivity to the
experiment as students transferred knowledge about evolution to organisms they were
familiar with after watching the program. Therefore, I substituted organisms in the
original CINS questions using subjects similar to those addressed in the nature program
Fatal Flower. The wording of the questions in all cases was kept nearly identical to the
original CINS questions; only slight modifications were necessary to accommodate the
new organisms. The series of questions related to Canary Island Lizards was
reformulated around hummingbirds foraging in the Andes (where mountain tops can act
as islands), the Venezuelan Guppies questions were replaced with questions referring to
Costus plants (pollinated by hummingbirds or bees depending on the species), and the
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Galapagos Finch questions were replaced with questions relating to Miami Blue
Butterflies (whose populations have been so isolated by development in Florida that they
essentially exist on islands).
Open-ended questions were added to the online versions of the assessments to
examine some of the complexity associated with individual’s understanding. The preassessment included two questions. The first was a widely adopted question from an
instrument developed by Bishop & Anderson (1986):
“Cheetahs (large African cats) are able to run faster than 60 miles per hour when
chasing prey. How would a biologist explain how the ability to run fast evolved
in cheetahs, assuming their ancestors could run only 20 miles per hour?”
The second question came from an instrument developed by the Environmental Literacy
Project at Michigan State University (MSU) by C. W. Anderson and others:
“Squirrels have claws that they use to help them climb the bark of trees and jump
from branch to branch. They had ancestors that did not have good claws, so they
were not as good at climbing and jumping. Explain how modern day squirrels
have claws that are good for climbing and jumping even though their ancestors
did not.”
The post-assessment included a single open-ended question similarly designed but
using an example from Fatal Flower:
“The program showed how some orchids have structures that seem to mimic the
females of a species of wasp. Males are attracted to this structure and try to mate
with it, and they inadvertently pollinate the flower. How would an evolutionary
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biologist explain this type of mimicry, assuming that the orchids’ ancestors did
not have these structures?”
In addition, the post-assessment included three questions designed to elicit general
information about the interaction of the program with evolution understanding:
•

What did watching the video do for your understanding of evolution?

•

Was the story particularly important to your understanding? Give specific
examples.

•

Was the imagery particularly important to your understanding? Give specific
examples.

Questions used in the assessments are given in Chapter Appendices 1 and 2.

Implementation
Pre-assessments may sensitize participants and thereby influence how individuals
respond to treatments and/or post-assessments. For example, a pre-assessment that
focuses on evolution may alert students to cues in the nature program that focus their
attention and affect how they respond to the post-assessment follow-up questions
addressing evolution understanding. The Solomon four-group design is a quasiexperimental design that permits testing for the effects of the pre-assessment on postassessment outcomes (Table 4.1). The design can test for effects of the pre-assessment
and test for interaction effects between the pre-assessment and treatment that differ from
the treatment alone (assuming sensitization did not occur; Frey, Botan, & Kreps, 2000).
Indeed, the Solomon four-group design is one of the most powerful experimental designs
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in social research, but it clearly requires large sample sizes to isolate causal effects (Frey
et al., 2000).
The requisite large sample sizes were obtained by enlisting students from
introductory biology courses from several universities in the north and west. Initially, the
assessments were designed as paper-and-pencil tests accompanied by a DVD version of
the nature program (where applicable). I enlisted the assistance of the professor of the
designated non-majors biology course at The University of Montana (UM); 244 students
were ultimately enrolled in 12 laboratory sections associated with the lecture. During the
fall semester of 2008, I assigned lab sections randomly to one of the treatment groups
(two sections each were assigned to groups 1 and 2). Students completed the entire
exercise during the course of the 2-hour lab period for extra credit.
The time requirement to conduct the experiment in class was a barrier for many
other professors’ participation, however. In addition, logistics for dealing with the large
volume of paper required and the distances between universities necessitated a different
methodological approach. The assessments were converted to online surveys using
Survey Gizmo software (http://www.surveygizmo.com/), and the qualitative questions
were added. The four different versions of Fatal Flower also were made available
online, each with its own, unique web address. Because some of the treatments did not
require pre-assessments and the class sizes of interested professors were small, the plan
was to assign different universities treatments with pre/post-assessments or postassessments only. Unfortunately, the post-assessment only classes did not participate, but
students from introductory biology courses at Eastern Washington University (EWU; Fall
2008) and Michigan State University (MSU; Spring 2009) provided valuable additions to

213

Table 4.1.
Assignment of treatment groups according to the Solomon four-group design.
Group

Pre-assessment Treatment Post-assessment

1
2

X
X

X

3original
4original

X

5new images
6 new images

X

7 new narrative
8new narrative

X

9narration/images
10narration/images

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

the sample sizes within the pre/post-assessment cells (Table 4.2). In spring 2009,
students from the designated major’s introductory biology course at UM permitted
sampling within the remaining cells, however. I designed the survey to randomly assign
each student to one version of Fatal Flower and provide the appropriate web address
once the student had completed the pre-assessment or pre-assigned students by lab
section to a version for those in the post-assessment only cells.
Because I revised the CINS assessment, I also compared the two versions (the
original CINS questions versus the modified CINS questions) using students from the
Fall 2008 Introduction to Human Form & Function course at UM. Human Form &
Function was a beginning biology course, primarily for pre-medical students. As such,
these students had a clear interest in biology but were not addressing biological
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Table 4.2.
Realized fulfillment of the Solomon four-group design based on participating classes.
Preassessment

Postassessment

Participating classes

X

UM Non-majors, UM Majors

X

UM Non-majors, UM Majors

X

X

UM Non-majors, UM Majors

X

X

UM Non-majors, UM Majors, EWU, MSU

Treatmenta

X

X
a

Treatment includes watching one of four versions of Fatal Flower.

processes, such as evolution. Students were offered extra credit to complete one of the
two versions of the full assessment, including the personal epistemology, attitudes, and
NOS understanding questions.
All procedures were reviewed and certified by UM’s Institutional Review Board.
All participants were over 18 years of age. Paper and pencil tests followed standard
confidentiality procedures, and online participation was anonymous.

Analyses
Attitudes and Beliefs Scales
Two of the knowledge scales were complex, and the data derived from this
experiment did not necessarily reflect the published measures of constructs related to
attitudes and beliefs. Discarding items from scales that represented theoretical constructs
implied that the reliability was a characteristic of the scale rather than the sample (Helms,
Henze, Sass, & Mifsud, 2006), so I took two approaches to these problems. For the first
approach, I used all the items in previously identified sub-scales unless that set of items
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could not be reduced to a single factor with Principle Components Analysis (PCA). For
the second approach, I used Principle Axis Factoring (PAF) and the Promax oblique
rotation to examine the variance common to multiple variables and identify related items
(Kahn, 2006). The oblique rotation allowed assessment of factors that were correlated;
for uncorrelated factors, the rotation was equivalent to an orthogonal rotation (Kahn,
2006). My goal was to identify factors that may have predicted the effects of different
versions of the nature programs on understanding and not necessarily to devise new latent
constructs. Therefore, once I identified new combinations of variables, I used PCA with
Varimax rotation to maximize the information retained in the components describing
these new factors (Kahn, 2006).

Evolution Understanding
I examined the CINS scores in several forms: (1) total scores from either the Preassessment CINS or the Post-assessment CINS, (2) individual score differences between
post-assessment and pre-assessment (Differences), (3) the proportion of answers on items
that changed between pre-assessment and post-assessment for each individual (Changed
Answers), and (4) whether those changes moved in the direction toward more correct
answers on the post-assessment than on the pre-assessment (Correction Scale).
Correction Scale was calculated as a scale where 1 = correct answer on pre-assessment,
changed answer on post-assessment; 2 = incorrect answer on pre-assessment, changed
answer (but still incorrect) on post-assessment; 3 = incorrect answer on pre-assessment,
correct answer on post-assessment; and 4 = correct answer on pre-assessment, correct

216

answer on post-assessment. Responses were summed across individuals and
standardized based on the total possible.
Testing for the effects of the different versions of the nature program on evolution
understanding required several different analyses. I began analyses by examining the
descriptive statistics of variables, as well as their inter-correlations. I used t-tests to
examine the differences between scores on the two versions of the evolution
understanding tool (CINS). To test for the effects of the pre-assessment on the postassessment, I used two-way ANOVA to compare evolution understanding at the end of
the experiment among those taking the pre-assessment versus those not taking it and the
UM biology class (non-majors v. majors).
Using only individuals that experienced both the pre-assessment and the postassessment, I compared CINS scores among classes using two-way ANOVA. Because
the other CINS metrics related post-assessment to pre-assessment, I examined the
differences among classes using Welch’s variance-weighted ANOVA to account for
unequal error variances coupled with unequal sample sizes (Garson, 2009).
I examined the effects of the different treatments (versions of Fatal Flower) using
ANCOVA on the post-assessment scores with the pre-assessment scores as a covariate
control. I also used one-way ANCOVA to examine the effects of the covariates
describing attitudes and beliefs on the three differences metrics.

Results
Over 700 students participated in the experiment. The average age of students
was shy of 21 years old, but ages differed among the classes (Table 4.3). Generally,
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students at MSU were younger than students in other classes. The majority of students
were either freshmen or sophomores. In addition, the number of biology courses students
had taken prior to the current course ranged from none to more than six. This question
did not specify whether these courses were in college or elsewhere, however, and
students at EWU were not asked the question. Nevertheless, students in the consistency
test (Human Form & Function) and UM Non-majors Biology reported taking more
classes than UM Majors Biology students and students at MSU (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3.
Descriptive statistics for classes participating in the experimental examination of nature
films on evolution understanding.
Agea

Biology coursesb

Class

n

Mean

SE

Mean

SE

UM Human Form & Function

71

21.2

0.50

2.49

0.12

UM Non-majors Biology

210

20.7

0.24

2.00

0.06

UM Majors Biology

257

21.0

0.25

1.39

0.09

EWU

49

20.9

.75

---c

---

MSU

126

19.4

0.15

1.01

0.08

a

F = 252.42; 4, 708 df; p = 0.001.

b

F = 43.498; 5, 537 df; p < 0.001).

c

Students were not asked how many biology course they had taken.
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Attitudes toward Science. – Almost all of the seven sub-scales from the published
Attitudes toward Science multi-dimensional scale were reliable metrics. Items within
each sub-scale generally were reduced to a single linear combination with very little
modification. Three sub-scales proved highly reliable and were reduced easily to single
components: Career Interest in Science, Enjoyment of Science Lessons, and Leisure
Interest in Science (Table 4.4). The single component generated to represent Career
Interest in Science explained 59% of the variance of the original items (Table 4.5), the
component generated to represent Enjoyment of Science Lessons explained 62% of the
variance (Table 4.6), and the component generated to represent Leisure Interest in
Science explained 48% of the variance of the original items (Table 4.7).

Table 4.4.
Reliability metrics of the seven sub-scales measuring students’ Attitudes toward Science.
n

No. of
items

Cronbach’
s alpha

Mean

SD

Career Interest in Science

655

6

0.86

19.34

5.469

Enjoyment of Science Lessons

647

6

0.88

21.78

5.018

Leisure Interest in Science

648

7

0.82

22.33

5.773

Adoption of Scientific Attitudes

666

6

0.75

24.45

3.375

Attitude toward Scientific Inquiry

654

6

0.73

21.41

3.914

Social Implications of Science

541

10

0.81

38.76

5.444

Normality of Scientists

566

4

0.53

15.29

2.500

Sub-scale
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Table 4.5.
Factor coefficients for items in the Career Interest in Science sub-scale.
Items

Component 1

I would like to be a scientist when I leave school.

0.871

I would dislike being a scientist after I leave school.a

0.855

When I leave school, I would like to work with people who make
discoveries in science.

0.779

A career in science would be dull and boring.a

0.762

I would like to teach science when I leave school.

0.653

I would dislike becoming a scientist because it needs too much
education.a

0.646

Eigenvalue

3.520

Note. n = 655.
a

Reverse keyed.

Items within the Adoption of Scientific Attitudes sub-scale proved fairly reliable
measures of this construct (Table 4.4) but were slightly more difficult to reduce to a
single component. Originally, two components with Eigenvalues > 1.0 were defined, but
the second component explained a relatively small amount of the variation and was
highly correlated with the first (Table 4.8). Therefore, the second component was
eliminated, leaving a single Adoption of Scientific Attitudes component that explained
45% of the variance of the original items.
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Table 4.6.
Factor coefficients for items in the Enjoyment of Science Lessons sub-scale.
Items

Component 1

I dislike science lessons.a

0.854

Science is one of the most interesting school subjects.

0.821

Science lessons are fun.

0.812

I would enjoy school more if there were no science lessons.a

0.805

The material covered in science lessons is uninteresting.a

0.741

School should have more science lessons each week.

0.668

Eigenvalue

3.707

Note. n = 647.
a

Reverse keyed.

Two items were deleted from the Attitude toward Scientific Inquiry sub-scale
after the paper and pencil test because a number of students commented on the
redundancy of questions. All of the items refer to the value of conducting experiments
versus other forms of discovering information, so two items (one positive and one
negative) were deleted in the subsequent online assessments. The reduced sub-scale was
still a fairly reliable metric (Table 4.4), however, and a single linear combination
described 44% of the variation (Table 4.9).

221

Table 4.7.
Factor coefficients for items in the Leisure Interest in Science sub-scale.
Items

Component 1

Listening to talk about science on the radio would be boring.a

0.766

I dislike reading books about science during my vacations.a

0.740

I would enjoy visiting a science museum at the weekend.

0.717

I would like to belong to a science club.

0.708

I would like to be given a science book or a piece of scientific
equipment as a present.

0.679

I get bored when watching science programs on TV at home.a

0.613

I dislike reading newspaper articles about science.a

0.604

Eigenvalue

3.352

Note. n = 648.
a

Reverse keyed.

The Social Implications of Science sub-scale was highly reliable (Table 4.4) but
could not be reduced to a single component using PCA. The second component (Table
4.10) was primarily related to a single item (whether public funds for science have been
used wisely in the last few years). This item was removed from the scale, improving both
the reliability of the sub-scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81, mean = 35.89, SD = 5.159, 9
items) and the number of components that were generated. The resulting single
component explained 42% of the variation in the remaining nine items (Eigenvalue =
3.764).
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Table 4.8.
Rotated factor loadings for items in the Adoption of Scientific Attitudes sub-scale.
Component
Items

1

2

I find it boring to hear about new ideas.a

0.770

0.199

I dislike listening to other people’s opinions.a

0.708

-0.181

I like to listen to people whose opinions are different from mine.

0.701

-0.471

I am curious about the world in which we live.

0.617

0.424

Finding out about new things is unimportant.a

0.603

0.551

I enjoy reading about things that disagree with my previous ideas.

0.590

-0.490

2.68

1.02

1.874

1.822

Eigenvalue
Rotated loading
Note. n = 666.
a

Reverse keyed.

Lastly, the Normality of Scientists sub-scale was much less reliable than other
sub-scales (Table 4.4). In addition, PCA could not calculate a single component for the
set of items (Table 4.11). Because the second component explained only slightly more of
the variance than a single item, only the scores from the first component were saved.
The saved regression scores for the sub-scales describing Attitudes toward
Science were highly correlated (Table 4.12), indicating a high degree of overlap in the
underlying constructs within this sample. PAF also indicated significant correlations
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Table 4.9.
Factor coefficients for items in the Attitude toward Scientific Inquiry sub-scale.
Items

Component 1

I would rather agree with other people than do experiments and find out
for myself.a

0.750

It is better to ask the teacher the answer than to find out by doing
experiments.a

0.731

I would rather solve a problem by doing an experiment than be told the
answer.

0.715

I would rather find out about things by asking an expert than by doing an
experiment.a

0.654

I dislike repeating experiments to check that I get the same results.a

0.543

I would prefer to do experiments than to read about them.

0.542

Eigenvalue

2.63

Note. n = 654.
a

Reverse keyed.

among factors and items (Table 4.13). The high correlations between Career Interest in
Science, Enjoyment of Science Lessons, and Leisure Interest in Science were apparent in
Component 1 of the structure matrix. Items associated with the Social Implications of
Science, Attitudes toward Inquiry, and Adoption of Scientific Attitudes appeared to load
strongly on single components, whereas items describing the Normality of Scientists did
not. Therefore, I removed items with high inter-correlations, items that loaded heavily on
more than one factor, and items that did not load on any factor. The final structure matrix
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Table 4.10.
Rotated factor coefficients for items in the Social Implications of Science sub-scale.
Component
Items

1

2

Science is man’s worst enemy.a

0.680

0.040

Money used on scientific projects is wasted.a

0.643

0.322

Scientific discoveries are doing more harm than good.a

0.638

0.152

This country is spending too much money on science.a

0.612

0.458

Too many laboratories are being built at the expense of the rest of
education.a

0.583

0.045

Science helps to make life better.

0.450

0.506

Science can help to make the world a better place in the future.

0.426

0.559

Money spent on science is well worth spending.

0.342

0.701

The government should spend more money on scientific research.

0.193

0.700

Public money spent on science in the last few years has been used
wisely.

-0.165

0.675

Eigenvalue

3.826

1.083

Rotated loading

2.563

2.346

Note. n = 541.
a

Reverse keyed.
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Table 4.11.
Rotated factor coefficients for items in the Normality of Scientist sub-scale.
Component
Items

1

2

Scientists are about as fit and healthy as other people.

0.868

0.032

Scientists are just as interested in art and music as other people are.

0.806

0.143

Scientists are less friendly than other people.a

0.015

0.831

Scientists do not have enough time to spend with their families.a

0.139

0.694

Eigenvalue

1.586

1.032

Rotated loading

1.423

1.194

Note. n = 566.
a

Reverse keyed.

226

Table 4.12.
Pearson correlations for the saved regression scores for sub-scales describing Attitudes toward Science.

Sub-scale
Career Interest in
Science
Enjoyment of Science
Lessons

Career
Interest in
Science

Enjoyment
of Science
Lessons
0.776**

Social
Implications
of Science

Adoption of
Scientific
Attitudes

Attitude toward
Scientific
Inquiry

0.732**

0.317**

0.412**

0.443**

0.292**

0.738**

0.403**

0.424**

0.540**

0.339**

0.417**

0.393**

0.470**

0.310**

0.363**

0.520**

0.318**

0.339**

0.303**

Leisure
Interest in
Science

Leisure Interest in
Science
Adoption of Scientific
Attitudes
Attitude toward
Scientific Inquiry
Social Implications of
Science

Normality
of Scientists

0.454**

Normality of Scientists
** p < 0.001.

227

Table 4.13.
Factor structure matrix for coefficients of all items in the Attitudes toward Science scale and the sub-scale (SS) to which they had been
assigned in the literature.
Component
SSb

1

Science is one of the most interesting school subjects.

E

0.791

I dislike science lessons.b

E

0.784 0.502c

Science lessons are fun.

E

0.784

I would like to be a scientist when I leave school.

CI

0.779

A career in science would be dull and boring.b

CI

0.768 0.540c

I would like to belong to a science club.

LI

0.765

I would dislike being a scientist after I leave school.b

CI

0.741

I would enjoy school more if there were no science lessons.b

E

0.735 0.566c

When I leave school, I would like to work with people who
make discoveries in science.

CI

0.682

The material covered in science lessons is uninteresting.b

E

0.633 0.511c

School should have more science lessons each week.

E

0.620

I dislike reading books about science during my vacations.b

LI

0.619

Item
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2

3

4

0.430c
0.435c
0.502c

0.446c

5

6

7

8

Component
Item

SSb

1

Listening to talk about science on the radio would be boring.b

LI

0.619

I would enjoy visiting a science museum at the weekend.

LI

0.599

I would like to be given a science book or a piece of scientific
equipment as a present.

LI

0.592

I would like to teach science when I leave school.

CI

0.583

positive - I would dislike becoming a scientist because it needs
too much education.b

CI

0.528 0.458c

positive - I dislike reading newspaper articles about science.b

LI

0.510

This country is spending too much money on science.b

SI

0.421c

Money used on scientific projects is wasted.b

2

3

4

0.404c

0.651

0.566 0.513c

SI

0.599

0.503 0.573c

Science is man’s worst enemy.b

SI

0.536

Scientists are less friendly than other people.b

N

0.534

Too many laboratories are being built at the expense of the rest
of education.b

SI

0.485

Scientific discoveries are doing more harm than good.b

SI

0.406

Scientists do not have enough time to spend with their families.b

N

0.404
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5

6

7

8

Component
Item

SSb

1

Money spent on science is well worth spending.

SI

0.463c

0.662

The government should spend more money on scientific
research.

SI

0.452c

0.656

Science can help to make the world a better place in the future.

SI

0.648

Science helps to make life better.

SI

0.620 0.429c

Public money spent on science in the last few years has been
used wisely.

SI

I find it boring to hear about new ideas.b

A

I dislike listening to other people’s opinions.b

A

0.686

I like to listen to people whose opinions are different from mine.

A

0.637

A

0.452

I enjoy reading about things that disagree with my previous
ideas.
I would rather solve a problem by doing an experiment than be
told the answer.
It is better to ask the teacher the answer than to find out by
doing experiments.b
I would rather agree with other people than do experiments and
find out for myself.b
I would rather find out about things by asking an expert than by
doing an experiment.b
I would prefer to do experiments than to read about them.

2

0.528c

I

3

4

5

0.475

0.712

0.647

I

0.468c

0.645

I

0.511c

0.487c 0.623

I

0.568

I

0.482
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6

7

8

Component
Item

SSb

1

2

3

4

5

6

Scientists are about as fit and healthy as other people.

N

0.629

Scientists are just as interested in art and music as other people
are.

N

0.484

I am curious about the world in which we live.

A

I get bored when watching science programs on TV at home.b

LI

0.513c 0.454c

Finding out about new things is unimportant.b

A

0.438c

I dislike repeating experiments to check that I get the same
results.b

I

Eigenvalue

7

8

0.439c 0.528c

12.512

3.657

0.493c

2.151

1.759 1.563 1.354 1.313 1.109

Note. n = 451. Factor coefficients less than 0.400 are not shown.
a

SS: CI = Career Interest in Science, E = Enjoyment of Science Lessons, LI = Leisure Interest in Science, SI = Social Implications of

Science, I = Attitude toward Scientific Inquiry, A = Adoption of Scientific Attitudes.
b

Reverse keyed.

c

When the correlations among factors was controlled, relationship between item and factor close to 0.
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yielded five factors with high item correlations when the correlation among factors was
controlled.
I named the first factor General Interest because it included a combination of 12
items from Career Interest in Science, Enjoyment of Science Lessons, and Leisure
Interest in Science. The combination explained the majority of the variance in the
sample, and the 12 items were highly reliable (Table 4.14). The remaining factors
mirrored sub-scales from the original Attitudes toward Science scale (Social Implications
of Science, Adoption of Attitudes, and Attitudes toward Inquiry), each with fewer items.
Therefore, I gave the factors new names to reflect these relationships: Factor 2 = New
Implications, Factor 3 = New Attitudes, and Factor 4 = New Inquiry. The remaining two
factors were excluded from further analyses because they contributed little in terms of
explaining the variance or interpretation.

Personal Epistemology. – Students beliefs about knowledge also were difficult to
classify according to published sub-scales. Previous researchers had identified five
independent sub-scales (Schommer, 1990, Schommer-Aikins, 2004, and Schraw et al.,
2002), yet this sample yielded low reliability estimates. Three of the sub-scales (Innate
Ability, Omniscient Authority, and Quick Learning) had relatively minor issues to
overcome for this analysis. Using the published items, the reliability of the Innate Ability
sub-scale was lower than generally considered acceptable (Table 4.15). In addition,
describing the variation with this combination of items required more than one factor
(Table 4.16). One item seemed to negatively affect the sub-scale (whether individuals
are born with special gifts and talents). When this item was not included, reliability
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Table 4.14.
Coefficients and reliability for new factors describing Attitudes toward Science derived from the sample.

a

Factor

Eigenvalue

% variance

Rotated loading

% variance

n

Items

Cronbach’s alpha

Mean

SD

1

7.985

28.5

5.994

21.4

618

12

0.91

37.18

10.031

2

2.342

8.4

2.834

10.1

581

5

0.72

18.07

3.108

3

1.843

6.6

2.792

10.0

671

4

0.72

15.49

2.562

4

1.546

5.5

2.097

7.5

672

4

0.67

14.59

2.794

5

1.275

4.6

---a

6

1.142

4.1

---a

Factors excluded from further analyses.
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increased to an acceptable level (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71, mean = 17.82, SD = 3.689, 5
items), and the remaining five items combined to a single component that described 47%
of the variation (Eigenvalue = 2.331). Reliability of the Omniscient Authority sub-scale
with all four original items also was moderately unacceptable (Table 4.15). PCA
effectively reduced these items to a single component, however, that explained 50% of
the variation in the original items (Table 4.17). Similarly, when using all of the items
from the published sub-scale designed to describe Quick Learning, reliability was below
that considered acceptable for a construct (Table 4.15). Nevertheless, PCA was able to
extract a single component describing 39% of the variation in the five items (Table 4.18).

Table 4.15.
Reliability metrics for the five sub-scales measuring students’ beliefs about knowledge.
n

No. of
items

Cronbach’s
alpha

Mean

SD

Innate Ability

651

6

0.67

19.56

3.888

Omniscient Authority

661

4

0.65

12.47

3.071

Quick Learning

677

5

0.57

20.24

2.890

Certain Knowledge

553

6

-0.16

20.33

2.558

Simple Knowledge

610

7

0.48

24.63

3.332

Sub-scale
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Table 4.16.
Rotated factor coefficients for items in the Innate Ability sub-scale.
Component
Items

1

2

Smart people are born that way.a

0.763

0.161

People’s intellectual potential is fixed at birth.a

0.722

-0.195

How well you do in school depends on how smart you are.a

0.686

-0.073

Really smart students don’t have to work as hard to do well in
school.a

0.640

0.306

Some people just have a knack for learning and others don’t.a

0.543

0.378

-0.031

0.924

Eigenvalue

2.356

1.082

Rotated loading

2.279

1.159

Some people are born with special gifts and talents.a

Note. n = 651.
a

Reverse keyed.

Both the Certain Knowledge and Simple Knowledge sub-scales indicated more
complex relationships in this sample than had been published previously. The reliability
estimate for Certain Knowledge, based on items from the literature, was negative (Table
4.15), due specifically to negative correlations between the items (despite recoding so
that all items measured the same direction). Schraw et al. (2002) identified a sub-set of
three of the six original items to describe this construct using PAF, but isolating that subset with this sample did not improve reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.09). Nor did it
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Table 4.17.
Factor coefficients for items in the Omniscient Authority sub-scale.
Items

Component 1

People should always obey the law.a

0.798

When someone in authority tells me what to do, I usually do it.a

0.772

People shouldn’t question authority.a

0.770

Children should be allowed to question their parents’ authority.

0.429

Eigenvalue

2.011

Note. n = 661.
a

Reverse keyed.

Table 4.18.
Factor coefficients for items in the Quick Learning sub-scale.
Items

Component 1

If you don’t learn something quickly, you won’t ever learn it.a

0.752

Working on a problem with no quick solution is a waste of time.a

0.673

If you haven’t understood a chapter the first time through, going back
over it won’t help.a

0.663

If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most likely
end up being confused.a

0.528

Students who learn things quickly are the most successful.a

0.481

Eigenvalue

1.968

Note. n = 677.
a

Reverse keyed.
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yield a single principle component. In fact, this sub-set of three items resulted in two
components with relatively evenly distributed Eigenvalues (1.07, 1.01, 0.91,
respectively), each representing about a third of the variance found in the original three
items of the sub-set. PCA highlighted the complex nature of the sub-scale with this
sample; the original items represented three linear components that explained 61% of the
variation. The rotated matrix indicated that these components split the items into a
component that could be considered an idiosyncratic approach to knowledge certainty, a
component that isolated the negative relationship between two factors defining “truth”,
and a component that identified the role of parents (Table 4.19). Removing the two items
that yielded negative correlations and the item comprising the majority of the third
component resulted in a single component that described 45% of the variation in the
remaining items (Eigenvalue = 1.347). Not surprisingly, the reliability of these three
items was low (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.38, mean = 12.00, SD = 1.941, 3 items).
Simple Knowledge also was a poor characterization of students’ understanding
(Table 4.15). The complexity was clear when attempting to reduce the sub-scale to a
single linear combination of the items (Table 4.20). PCA identified three components in
this one sub-scale that explained 59% of the original variance: the first component
described the role of theories in science explanations, the second component described
the ease of science knowledge, and the third component described the complexity of
knowledge. Although the two items comprising the bulk of the third component were
both strong contributors (> 0.70), the component only described slightly more variation
than a single item. In addition, “the more you know about a topic, the more there is to
know” contributed positively and “the best ideas are often the most simple” contributed
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Table 4.19.
Rotated factor coefficients for items in the Certain Knowledge sub-scale.
Component
Items

1

2

3

What is true today will be true tomorrow.a

0.744

0.030

0.109

If two people are arguing about something, at least
one of them must be wrong.a

0.724

-0.008

-0.006

-0.236

0.665

0.182

0.381

0.546

-0.372

-0.118

-0.747

-0.006

Parents should teach their children all there is to
know about life.a

0.131

0.088

0.919

Eigenvalue

1.477

1.142

1.027

Rotated loading

1.310

1.307

1.028

Absolute moral truth does not exist.
Sometimes there are no right answers to life’s big
problems.
What is true is a matter of opinion.a

Note. n = 553.
a

Reverse keyed.

negatively (despite recoding). By removing these two items and the single item
negatively correlated with the first component, I was able to reduce the remaining items
to a single factor that described 49% of the variation in the remaining items (Eigenvalue
= 1.753). Reliability was relatively low, however (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.57, mean =
14.66, SD = 2.557, 4 items). Nevertheless, these four items encompassed the sub-set of
items identified by Schraw et al. (2002) (they did not include “things are simpler than
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Table 4.20.
Rotated factor coefficients for items in the Simple Knowledge sub-scale.
Component
Items

1

2

3

Too many theories just complicate things.a

0.772

0.053

0.089

Things are simpler than most professors would have
you believe.a

0.689

-0.094

-0.019

Instructors should focus on facts instead of theories.a

0.592

0.432

-0.074

Science is easy to understand because it contains so
many facts.a

-0.182

0.849

-0.141

Most things worth knowing are easy to understand.a

0.356

0.601

0.250

The more you know about a topic, the more there is
to know.

0.171

0.155

0.707

The best ideas are often the most simple.a

0.158

0.175

-0.748

Eigenvalue

1.874

1.211

1.041

Rotated loading

1.634

1.335

1.156

Note. n = 610.
a

Reverse keyed.

most professors would have you believe” in their sub-set), indicating some consistency
within this theoretical construct.
Because the Personal Epistemology sub-scales identified in the literature were
less than ideal for use with these data, I used PAF to explore the relationships among
items and to identify new related factors. Although seven factors were identified, the
final two contributed little to the overall analysis (Table 4.21). The first factor described
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Table 4.21.
Factor structure matrix for coefficients of all items in the Personal Epistemology scale and the sub-scale (SS) to which they had been
assigned in the literature.
Components
Item

SSb

1

Working on a problem with no quick solution is a waste of time.b

QL

0.674

Too many theories just complicate things.b

SK

0.639

If you don’t learn something quickly, you won’t ever learn it.b

QL

0.598 0.421c

Most things worth knowing are easy to understand.b

SK

0.583

If you haven’t understood a chapter the first time through, going back
over it won’t help.b

QL

0.577

Instructors should focus on facts instead of theories.b

SK

0.553

If two people are arguing about something, at least one of them must
be wrong.b

CK

0.474

Smart people are born that way.b

IA

0.699

Really smart students don’t have to work as hard to do well in school.b

IA

0.596

Students who learn things quickly are the most successful.b

QL

0.580
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2

3

4

5

6

7

-0.488

Components
Item

SSb

How well you do in school depends on how smart you are.b

IA

0.576

People’s intellectual potential is fixed at birth.b

IA

0.420c 0.544

Some people just have a knack for learning and others don’t.b

IA

0.487

People should always obey the law.b

OA

0.726

When someone in authority tells me what to do, I usually do it.b

OA

0.655

People shouldn’t question authority.b

OA

Sometimes there are no right answers to life’s big problems.

CK

0.560

The more you know about a topic, the more there is to know.

SK

0.404

What is true is a matter of opinion.b

CK

Things are simpler than most professors would have you believe.b

SK

Science is easy to understand because it contains so many facts.b

SK

Parents should teach their children all there is to know about life.b

CK
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1

0.441c

2

3

4

5

6

0.651

0.513

0.496

7

Components
Item

SSb

Some people are born with special gifts and talents.b

IA

Absolute moral truth does not exist.

CK

The best ideas are often the most simple.b

SK

Children should be allowed to question their parents’ authority.

OA

If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most
likely end up being confused.b

QL

What is true today will be true tomorrow.b

CK

Eigenvalue

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
0.489

4.986 2.294

1.901

1.626

1.428

1.113

1.041

Note. n = 476. Factor coefficients less than 0.400 are not shown.
a

SS: IA = Innate Ability, OA = Omniscient Authority, QL = Quick Learning, CK = Certain Knowledge, SK = Simple Knowledge.

b

Reverse keyed.

c

When the correlations among factors was controlled, relationship between item and factor close to 0.
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Table 4.22.
Coefficients and reliability for new factors describing Personal Epistemology derived from the sample.
Factor

a

Eigenvalue

% variance

Rotated loading

% variance

Items

Cronbach’s alpha

Mean

SD

1

4.986

17.807

3.452

12.330

7

0.75

28.30

3.911

2

2.294

8.194

2.889

10.319

6

0.74

21.32

4.352

3

1.901

6.789

2.127

7.597

3

0.72

9.32

2.628

4

1.626

5.809

1.652

5.900

2

0.34

7.66

1.538

5

1.428

5.102

1.526

5.449

2

0.31

6.75

1.645

6

1.113

3.977

1.431

5.110

---a

7

1.041

3.718

1.314

4.691

---a

Factors excluded from further analyses.
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Quick & Easy Knowledge. Factor 1 included seven items uncorrelated with other factors
with loadings > 0.4 that represented a combination of the original Quick Learning and the
Simple Knowledge sub-scales from the literature. The reliability of this new sub-scale
was relatively high (Table 4.22). Factors 2 and 3 were nearly identical to the two subscales describing Innate Ability and Omniscient Authority, respectively. Variable names,
New Innate and New Omniscient, were designated to reflect this similarity. The
reliability of items comprising these two factors also was acceptable. The fourth factor,
Complex Knowledge, included items that caused difficulties in the previous analyses, but
with only two items comprising the component, reliability was low. The last factor
considered was Idiosyncratic Knowledge, which also yielded fairly low reliability for the
two items. Scores from a PCA were saved for these five factors.

Attitudes toward Evolution. – The scale describing students’ acceptance of
evolution was highly reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90, 12 items, mean = 46.73, SD =
9.118, n = 474), but one item was problematic. One third of students did not answer the
item that stated “The Second Law of Thermodynamics shows that evolution could not
have happened.” On the paper and pencil version, many students commented that they
did not even know what the law was, so this item was excluded from analyses. The final
sub-scale was still highly reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89, 11 items; mean = 42.74, SD
= 8.587, n = 520) and reduced to a single component (Table 4.23) that explained 49% of
the variation in the original items.
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Table 4.23.
Factor coefficients for items in the Attitudes toward Evolution scale.
Items

Component 1

A supreme being (e.g., God) created humans pretty much in their present
form; humans did not evolve from other forms of life (e.g., fish and/or
reptiles).a

0.840

There is no real evidence that humans evolved from other animals.a

0.825

There is no fossil evidence supporting that humans and apes evolved
from a common ancestor.a

0.782

The Earth is not old enough for evolution to have taken place.a

0.762

Over billions of years all plants and animals on Earth (including humans)
descended (evolved) from a common ancestor (e.g., a one-celled
organism).

0.718

Scientists who believe in evolution do so mainly because they want to,
not because of any evidence.a

0.685

There is scientific evidence supporting that humans were supernaturally
created.a

0.621

Mutations are never beneficial to animals.*

0.477

It is statistically impossible that life arose by chance.a

0.467

Eigenvalue

5.41

Note: n = 520.
a

Reverse keyed.
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NOS Understanding. – NOS Understanding was measured with multiple choice
answers that reflected a variety of students’ ideas. Although a single choice could be
made for each question that reflected how most educators would view the NOS, several
questions had numerous choices that indicated partial understanding of the topic and not
necessarily a misunderstanding. I scored each “correct” answer with one point and each
partial answer with 0.5 points. I summed points across all 15 questions. The resulting
variable appeared relatively normally distributed (Figure 4.2), however Shapiro-Wilk
indicated it was not (W = 0.990; 713 df; p < 0.001). The difference was due to the right
skew (mean + SE: -0.194 + 0.092) and somewhat leptokurtotic distribution (mean + SE:

Number of students

0.019 + 0.183). Standard transformations failed to improve normality issues, however.
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Figure 4.2. Distribution of students’ NOS Understanding scores (n = 714).
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Consistency of the Two Versions of CINS
I examined the mean total scores for the two versions of CINS (the original and
the post-assessment version that had been modified with new organisms) to look for
consistency between the two measures of evolution understanding using students not
involved in the experimental manipulation. The distribution of scores indicated that the
two versions might not be comparable metrics (Figure 4.3). In fact, the mean score for
students taking the original CINS assessment was higher than the mean score for students
taking the modified CINS assessment (10.9 + 0.53 [mean + SE] v. 9.4 + 0.56; t = 1.985;
67 df; p = 0.05).

original

25%
Proportion of students

modified
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
CINS score

Figure 4.3. Distribution of CINS scores for the original version of the CINS tool and the
new, revised version used in the post-assessment (original: n = 36; modified: n = 33).
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Effects of the Pre-assessment
The Post-assessment CINS scores did not differ among individuals taking the preassessment and individuals taking the post-assessment only (Table 4.24). Scores of UM
Non-majors Biology students taking the post-assessment only were lower than those that
had taken both the pre-assessment and post-assessment, as would be predicted if the preassessment had a positive priming effect. Conversely, the scores of UM Majors Biology
students were opposite of that predicted given a positive priming effect. Although the
error variances were not equal among the groups (Levene’s statistic = 8.142; 3, 452 df; p
< 0.001), the ratio of the largest to smallest variance was less than 3:1 and two-way
ANOVA is less sensitive to issues of heterogeneity of variance than one-way ANOVA
(Garson, 2009).

Table 4.24.
Mean post-assessment Total Scores of evolution understanding for individuals
experiencing both the pre- and post-assessments versus the post-assessment only.
Post-Assessment only

Pre-/Post-Assessment
Class

n

Mean

SE

n

Mean

SE

UM Non-majors Biology

99

10.3

0.39

109

9.6

0.31

127

10.1

0.43

121

10.5

0.36

UM Majors Biology

Note. F = 0.983; 3, 452 df; p = 0.401.
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Effects of Fatal Flower on Evolution Understanding
Treatment Effects: With the Solomon four-group design, some students taking
both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment in classes at UM did not view any
version of Fatal Flower. ANCOVA using Pre-assessment CINS scores as the covariate
indicated that treatment did indeed have an effect (F = 2.444; 4, 420 df; p = 0.048; Table
4.25). Students not watching any version of Fatal Flower had higher Post-Assessment
CINS scores than those watching all versions of the nature program except for the New
Imagery version. Parameter estimates indicated that both No Treatment and New
Imagery had significant effects on the model, but the observed power was lower than the
0.80 considered acceptable to avoid a Type II error (0.714 and 0.615, respectively).
I also examined the three difference metrics using one-way ANOVA because preassessment and post-assessment scores were highly correlated (r = 0.904). Although
differences (post-assessment score - pre-assessment score) did not differ (Table 4.26), the
proportion of Changed Answers and the Correction Scale did vary among students
experiencing the different treatments of Fatal Flower. These differences were driven by
students watching the New Narrative/Imagery version who tended to change answers
more often and to less correct responses more often than students watching other versions
or none at all.

Differences among Classes: For students taking both the pre-assessment and the
post-assessment, Pre-assessment and Post-assessment CINS scores differed among
classes (assessment: F = 4.227; 1, 776; p = 0.040; class: F = 35.726; 3, 776; p < 0.001).
The differences were due to lower scores on the post-assessment than on the pre-
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Table 4.25.
Estimated marginal means of Post-Assessment CINS using Pre-Assessment CINS as a
covariate for each of the five treatments examining the effect of Fatal Flower on evolution
understanding.
95% confidence interval
Treatment

n

Mean

SE

Lower bound

Upper bound

No Treatment

37

11.12

0.532

10.07

12.17

Original

48

10.39

0.467

9.47

11.31

New Narrative

48

9.70

0.468

8.78

10.63

New Imagery

43

10.82

0.499

9.83

11.80

New Narrative/Imagery

50

9.28

0.458

8.38

10.18

assessment, and higher scores on both assessments for the class at MSU than other
classes (Figure 4.4). The effect of class also was significant when examining the
difference scores (Table 4.27). Likewise, the proportion of changed answers between
pre- and post-assessments differed among classes, as did the Correction Scale (Table
4.27). Students in UM Majors Biology tended to have a higher proportion of changed
answers between the pre- and post-assessment, and students in the MSU class a lower
proportion, than students in either UM Non-majors Biology or the EWU class. Despite
changing answers frequently, UM Majors Biology students generally did not change to
correct responses in the post-assessment; MSU students generally changed to correct
answers (Table 4.27).
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Table 4.26.
Mean Difference, Changed Answers, and Correction Scale for tests of evolution
understanding of students experiencing both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment
and different versions of Fatal Flower.
Differencea
Class

n

Mean

SE

Changed
Answersb
Mean

SE

Correction
Scalec
Mean

SE

No Treatment

37

0.27

0.440

0.35

0.029

0.72

0.018

Original

48

-0.38

0.494

0.45

0.034

0.68

0.020

New Narrative

48

-1.02

0.453

0.48

0.029

0.65

0.018

New Imagery

43

-0.26

0.580

0.39

0.037

0.72

0.022

New Narrative/Imagery

50

-1.52

0.467

0.51

0.032

0.64

0.018

a

F = 1.969; 4, 221; p = 0.100.

b

F = 3.617; 4, 221; p = 0.007.

c

F = 3.359; 4, 221; p = 0.011.
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Figure 4.4. Evolution understanding for each class as measured by CINS scores on the
pre-assessment and post-assessment.

Differences among Versions: No differences among versions were detected when
Post-assessment CINS scores were examined using ANCOVA and Pre-assessment
Scores as the covariate (F = 0.609; 3, 338 df; p = 0.610). Classes differed significantly,
however (F = 3.992; 3, 338 df; p = 0.008). Graphing the estimated marginal means
indicated that indeed evolution understanding may have been changing differently among
classes (Figure 4.5). MSU students scored better on the Post-assessment CINS after
watching the versions with new narrative and poorer after watching versions with the
original narrative. Students at UM, however, seemed to perform better on the Postassessment CINS after watching versions with the original narrative (Original and New
Imagery) and worse after watching versions with the revised narrative (New Narrative
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Table 4.27.
Mean Difference, Changed Answers, and Correction Scale for tests of evolution
understanding of students experiencing both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment.
Differencea

Changed
Answersb

Correction
Scalec

Class

n

Mean

SE

Mean

SE

Mean

SE

UM Non-majors Biology

99

-0.4

0.28

0.39

0.018

0.69

0.012

UM Majors Biology

127

-0.8

0.33

0.48

0.022

0.67

0.013

EWU

49

-1.2

0.37

0.43

0.029

0.69

0.018

MSU

117

-0.1

0.23

0.29

0.017

0.79

0.011

a

Welch’s statistic = 2.807; 3, 173.042; p > 0.041.

b

Welch’s statistic = 16.710; 3, 170.026; p > 0.001.

c

Welch’s statistic = 19.849; 3, 170.080; p > 0.001.

and New Narrative/Imagery). Students at EWU scored higher after watching any of the
revised versions of the program than the original version.
Using the difference metrics with two-way ANOVA supported the idea that class
was differentially affecting evolution understanding. Differences between the two
assessments for each individual did not vary among class or version (class: F = 2.033; 3,
339 df; p = 0.109; version: F = 0.486; 3, 339 df; p = 0.692), but the proportion of
Changed Answers was lower (F = 16.984; 3, 339 df; p < 0.001; Figure 4.6) and the
Correction Scale was higher (F = 19.535; 3, 339 df; p < 0.001; Figure 4.7) for students at
Michigan State than in other classes. Homogeneity of variances was an issue with these
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Figure 4.5. Estimated marginal means of Post-assessment CINS scores for each class
and version of Fatal Flower.
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Figure 4.6. Estimated marginal means of Changed Answer scores for each class and
version of Fatal Flower.
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Figure 4.7. Estimated marginal means of Correction Scale scores for each class and
version of Fatal Flower.

analyses, but the ratio of the largest to smallest variance was relatively small in all cases
(Garson, 2009).

Effects of Attitudes and Beliefs
The covariates addressing attitudes and beliefs affected outcomes of the
experimental treatments differently. The class at MSU was examined separately because
previous analyses indicated students may have been responding differently there than in
the other classes. Difference metrics for students from the class at MSU rarely were
influenced by any of the attitudes and beliefs scales, however.
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Attitudes toward Science: Neither the original Attitudes toward Science subscales (Table 4.28) nor the sub-scales derived from the data (Table 4.29) were significant
predictors of evolution understanding for students at MSU. For students in the other
classes, variation was evident. Career Interest was a significant predictor of Difference
scores between post-assessment and pre-assessment scores, and Adoption of Attitudes
was a significant predictor of both the proportion of Changed Answers and Correction
Scale (Table 4.30), as were General Interest, New Implications, and New Attitudes from
the sub-scales derived from the data (Table 4.31). In addition, these covariates affected
the outcomes of the different versions of the nature program. Difference scores became
more positive for students watching the New Imagery version and more negative for
students watching other versions, indicating a decrease in post-assessment scores from
pre-assessment scores (Table 4.32). The effect was similar when the sub-scales derived
from the data were used as covariates (Table 4.33). Correction Scale of students
watching the version New Narrative/Imagery version increased after adjustment for the
derived attitudes toward science sub-scales, whereas scores of students watching other
versions decreased (Table 4.34).
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Table 4.28.
Results of ANCOVA using the Attitudes toward Science sub-scales to predict difference metrics for evolution understanding for
students in the MSU class taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment.
Difference

Changed Answers

Sub-scale

r2

Career Interest

0.021

0.959

0.333

0.001

0.055

0.816

0.011

0.509

0.480

Enjoyment

0.065

3.075

0.086

0.002

0.079

0.780

0.040

1.843

0.182

Leisure Interest

0.002

0.073

0.788

0.034

1.535

0.222

0.007

0.308

0.582

Adoption of Attitudes

0.017

0.772

0.384

0.000

0.021

0.885

0.000

0.001

0.972

Attitudes toward Inquiry

0.012

0.514

0.477

0.006

0.251

0.619

0.005

0.200

0.657

Social Implications

0.008

0.341

0.562

0.070

3.332

0.075

0.034

1.557

0.219

Normality of Scientists

0.033

1.487

0.229

0.001

0.046

0.831

0.003

0.121

0.730

Version

0.088

1.409

0.253

0.067

1.048

0.381

0.054

0.832

0.484

F

r2

Correction Scale

p

Note. 1, 44 df.
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F

p

r2

F

p

Table 4.29.
Results of ANCOVA using the sub-scales derived from the data describing attitudes toward science to predict difference metrics for
evolution understanding for students in the MSU class taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment.
Difference

Changed Answers

Correction Scale

Sub-scale

r2

F

p

r2

F

p

r2

General Interest

0.000

0.023

0.880

0.002

0.119

0.731

0.010

0.572

0.453

New Implications

0.020

1.160

0.286

0.008

0.439

0.510

0.015

0.870

0.355

New Attitudes

0.001

0.037

0.849

0.017

0.950

0.334

0.052

3.081

0.085

New Inquiry

0.045

2.627

0.111

0.002

0.088

0.767

0.002

0.130

0.719

Version

0.055

1.090

0.361

0.017

0.315

0.815

0.062

1.224

0.310

Note. 1, 56 df.
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F

p

Table 4.30.
Results of ANCOVA using the Attitudes toward Science sub-scales to predict difference metrics for evolution understanding for
students at UM and EWU classes taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment.
Difference
Sub-scale

r2

F

Changed Answers
r2

p

Correction Scale

F

p

r2

F

p

Career Interest

0.043

5.728

0.018

0.016

2.142

0.146

0.027

3.507

0.063

Enjoyment

0.009

1.194

0.277

0.002

0.206

0.651

0.004

0.554

0.458

Leisure Interest

0.005

0.605

0.438

0.002

0.252

0.616

0.000

0.004

0.949

Adoption of Attitudes

0.000

0.001

0.970

0.103

14.682

<0.001

0.061

8.309

0.005

Attitudes toward Inquiry

0.000

0.025

0.876

0.001

0.090

0.764

0.000

0.063

0.802

Social Implications

0.006

0.819

0.367

0.001

0.137

0.712

0.001

0.154

0.696

Normality of Scientists

0.011

1.370

0.244

0.011

1.410

0.237

0.011

1.407

0.238

Version

0.075

3.469

0.018

0.042

1.873

0.137

0.048

2.129

0.100

Note. 1, 128 df.
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Table 4.31.
Results of ANCOVA using the sub-scales derived from the data describing attitudes toward science to predict difference metrics for
evolution understanding for students at UM and EWU classes taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment.
Difference

Changed Answers

Correction Scale

Sub-scale

r2

F

p

r2

F

p

r2

F

p

General Interest

0.008

1.046

0.308

0.038

5.462

0.021

0.063

9.311

0.003

New Implications

0.001

0.110

0.741

0.052

7.495

0.007

0.050

7.319

0.008

New Attitudes

0.002

0.278

0.599

0.090

13.687

<0.001

0.053

7.676

0.006

New Inquiry

0.000

0.042

0.838

0.002

0.256

0.614

0.002

0.261

0.610

Version

0.069

3.384

0.020

0.046

2.234

0.087

0.065

3.184

0.026

Note. 1, 138 df.
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Table 4.32.
Unadjusted and estimated marginal means adjusted by the Attitudes toward Science subscales for Difference scores for students in classes at UM and EWU.
Unadjusted

Adjusted

Version

n

Mean

SE

Mean

SE

Original

40

-0.750

0.619

-0.889

0.518

New Narrative

34

-1.029

0.507

-1.007

0.559

New Imagery

24

1.083

0.586

1.359

0.685

New Narrative/Imagery

41

-1.195

0.442

-1.240

0.505

Table 4.33.
Unadjusted and estimated marginal means adjusted by the sub-scales derived from the
data describing attitudes toward science for Difference scores for students in classes at
UM and EWU.
Unadjusted

Adjusted

Version

n

Mean

SE

Mean

SE

Original

40

-0.683

0.597

-0.720

0.503

New Narrative

34

-1.250

0.465

-1.244

0.536

New Imagery

24

0.962

0.556

0.985

0.630

New Narrative/Imagery

41

-1.395

0.447

-1.380

0.488

261

Table 4.34.
Unadjusted and estimated marginal means adjusted by the sub-scales derived from the
data describing attitudes toward science for Correction Scale for students in classes at
UM and EWU.
Unadjusted

Adjusted

Version

n

Mean

SE

Mean

SE

Original

40

0.664

0.020

0.662

0.018

New Narrative

34

0.669

0.018

0.667

0.019

New Imagery

24

0.746

0.023

0.745

0.023

New Narrative/Imagery

41

0.671

0.021

0.675

0.018

Personal Epistemology: The Personal Epistemology sub-scales derived from the
literature generally were not important predictors of evolution understanding for students
in the MSU class (Table 4.35). The Simple Knowledge sub-scale was related to
Correction Scale, however. Quick Learning affected Difference scores for students in the
classes at UM and EWU, and Simple Knowledge was an important predictor for Changed
Answers and Correction Scale (Table 4.36).
Moreover, several of the Personal Epistemology sub-scales interacted with the
factor Version. For example, Innate Authority had a steeper slope when examining
Correction Scale scores of students at UM and EWU watching the New Narrative version
than other versions. The difference was relatively small, however, and was likely not
reflected in the full factorial ANCOVA. This type of interaction was more common
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using the sub-scales for personal epistemology derived from the data, and several had to
be examined independently.
The sub-scales describing personal epistemology that were derived from the
sample data were not important predictors of Difference scores for students from MSU
(Table 4.37) nor UM and EWU (Table 4.38). Quick & Easy Knowledge was an
important predictor for both the proportion of Changed Answers and Correction Scale for
both the class at MSU and classes at UM and EWU, but with the MSU sample, this
covariate violated assumptions about the homogeneity of regression slopes among
versions of the nature program. Regression using the Quick & Easy Knowledge subscale indicated a more positive relationship with Changed Answers for students at MSU
watching the New Narrative/Imagery version than with other versions. Those students
changed answers more frequently than students watching other versions (Table 4.39),
indicating that the more they accepted that knowledge was not quickly and easily
obtained, the more likely they were to change answers given a correct presentation of
evolution. Correction Scale scores also were more positively related to the Quick & Easy
Knowledge sub-scale for versions including the new narrative, indicating more advanced
thinking about knowledge for both New Narrative and New Narrative/Imagery than
versions with the old narrative (Table 4.40). Although ANCOVA indicated New Innate,
New Omniscient, and Certain Knowledge interacted significantly with Version, they
were not important in the full factorial model and their slopes were not significant when
examined separately.
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Table 4.35.
Results of ANCOVA using the Personal Epistemology sub-scales to predict difference metrics for evolution understanding for students
at MSU classes taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment.
Difference

Changed Answers

Correction Scale

r2

F

p

r2

F

p

r2

F

p

Innate Ability

0.013

1.009

0.319

0.004

0.295

0.589

0.005

0.344

0.559

Omniscient Authority

0.006

0.440

0.509

0.007

0.537

0.466

0.009

0.645

0.424

Quick Learning

0.001

0.077

0.782

0.026

1.962

0.165

0.021

1.574

0.214

Certain Knowledge

0.014

1.059

0.307

0.000

0.012

0.914

0.003

0.211

0.647

Simple Knowledge

0.029

2.183

0.144

0.017

1.315

0.255

0.075

6.025

0.016

Version

0.018

0.440

0.725

0.022

0.556

0.646

0.036

0.924

0.434

Sub-scale

Note. 1, 74 df
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Table 4.36.
Results of ANCOVA using the Personal Epistemology sub-scales to predict difference metrics for evolution understanding for students
in classes at UM and EWU taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment.
Difference

Changed Answers

Correction Scale

r2

F

p

r2

F

p

r2

F

p

Innate Ability

0.002

0.350

0.555

0.001

0.147

0.702

0.001

0.121

0.729

Omniscient Authority

0.000

0.063

0.802

0.000

0.014

0.907

0.002

0.428

0.514

Quick Learning

0.029

5.392

0.021

0.014

2.456

0.119

0.002

0.295

0.588

Certain Knowledge

0.001

0.232

0.631

0.006

1.135

0.288

0.009

1.621

0.205

Simple Knowledge

0.011

2.029

0.156

0.031

5.724

0.018

0.036

6.675

0.011

Version

0.038

2.373

0.072

0.009

0.555

0.645

0.027

1.617

0.187

Sub-scale

Note. 1, 178 df.
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Table 4.37.
Results of ANCOVA using the sub-scales derived from the data to describe personal epistemology to predict difference metrics for
evolution understanding for students at MSU classes taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment.
Difference

Changed Answers

Correction Scale

r2

F

p

r2

F

p

r2

F

p

Quick & Easy Knowledge

0.019

1.086

0.302

0.160

10.471a

0.002

0.285

21.916 a

<0.001

New Innate

0.000

0.005

0.944

0.002

0.097

0.756

0.000

0.000

0.998

New Omniscient

0.007

0.360

0.551

0.015

0.842

0.363

0.000

0.001 a

0.972

Certain Knowledge

0.028

1.561

0.217

0.045

2.583

0.114

0.019

1.037 a

0.313

Idiosyncratic Knowledge

0.010

0.566

0.455

0.008

0.442

0.509

0.001

0.050

0.824

Version

0.023

0.430

0.732

0.011

0.212

0.887

0.003

0.048

0.986

Sub-scale

Note. 1, 55 df.
a

Significant covariate-factor interaction.
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Table 4.38.
Results of ANCOVA using the sub-scales derived from the data to describe personal epistemology to predict difference metrics for
evolution understanding for students in classes at UM and EWU taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment.
Difference

Changed Answers

Correction Scale

r2

F

p

r2

F

p

r2

F

p

Quick & Easy Knowledge

0.016

2.470

0.118

0.111

19.178

<0.001

0.075

12.491

0.001

New Innate

0.001

0.226

0.635

0.004

0.588

0.445

0.002

0.302 a

0.583

New Omniscient

0.001

0.103

0.749

0.024

3.837

0.052

0.037

5.808

0.017

Certain Knowledge

0.001

0.145

0.704

0.003

0.409

0.523

0.003

0.487

0.487

Idiosyncratic Knowledge

0.001

0.144

0.705

0.024

3.827

0.052

0.016

2.444

0.120

Version

0.035

1.830

0.144

0.024

1.254

0.292

0.033

1.749

0.159

Sub-scale

Note. 1, 178 df.
a

Significant covariate-factor interaction.
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Table 4.39.
Regression analysis using Quick & Easy Knowledge to predict Changed Answer scores
for students in the MSU class.
Version

F

df

p

r2

Original

0.163

1, 17

0.692

0.010

New Narrative

3.432

1, 13

0.089

0.222

New Imagery

2.777

1, 17

0.115

0.148

New Narrative/Imagery

6.057

1, 13

0.030

0.335

Table 4.40.
Regression analysis using Quick & Easy Knowledge to predict Correction Scale scores
for students in the MSU class.
Version

F

df

p

r2

Original

2.332

1, 17

0.146

0.127

New Narrative

5.859

1, 13

0.032

0.328

New Imagery

4.453

1, 17

0.051

0.218

11.794

1, 13

0.005

0.496

New Narrative/Imagery
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Attitude towards Evolution: As with other covariates, Attitude toward Evolution
did not seem to affect Difference scores for either the MSU class or the UM and EWU
classes (Table 4.41). Attitude towards Evolution was an important predictor for both the
proportion of Changed Answers and the Correction Scale for students in the MSU class,
however. Similarly, for students in classes at UM and EWU, this scale also was
important for Changed Answers and Correction Scale, but not for Difference scores. In
addition, the covariate influenced the relationships between Correction Scale scores and
version. Post-assessment evolution understanding scores were more incorrect for
students watching the New Imagery version than for other versions (Table 4.42).

NOS Understanding: Likewise, NOS Understanding was not an important
predictor for Difference scores for either set of classes, but served to predict both
Changed Answers and Correction Scale for students in both the MSU class and students
in classes at UM and EWU (Table 4.43). Adjusting for the covariates did not affect the
influence of Version on student understanding, however.

Open-ended Questions and Evolution Understanding
Responses to the open-ended evolution questions were classified according to a
framework developed by Perkins (unpubl., see Chapter 3). Students’ answers were often
quite short and usually represented a single concept. Not all students answered all
questions, nor did they necessarily include similar concepts among questions. As a
result, analysis was limited to broad generalizations designed to provide some insight to
student thinking.
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Table 4.41.
Results of ANCOVA using the Attitude toward Evolution scale to predict difference metrics for evolution understanding for students in
classes taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment.
Difference
df

p

Changed Answers
r2

Class

F

MSU

2.013

1, 58 0.161 0.034

UM & EWU

0.531

1, 170 0.467 0.003

F
12.881

df
1, 58

p

Correction Scale
r2

0.001 0.182

15.672 1, 170 <0.001 0.084
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F
19.657

df

p

r2

1, 55 <0.001 0.263

16.634 1, 170 <0.001 0.089

Table 4.42.
Unadjusted and estimated marginal means adjusted by Attitude towards Evolution for
Correction Scale for students in classes at UM and EWU.
Unadjusted

Adjusted

Version

n

Mean

SE

Mean

SE

Original

40

0.665

0.019

0.675

0.019

New Narrative

34

0.671

0.019

0.668

0.019

New Imagery

24

0.751

0.021

0.740

0.021

New Narrative/Imagery

41

0.667

0.020

0.669

0.018

The open-ended evolution questions indicated that students held a diversity of
concepts about the evolutionary process, including misconceptions, proximate
conceptions (less abstract, individual-level concepts), and evolutionary concepts (more
abstract, population-level concepts; see Chapter 3 for more details). Generally, a greater
number of each kind of concept, on average, was included in response to the postassessment question related to Fatal Flower than the literature-based pre-assessment
questions (Table 4.44). Misconceptions increased between pre- and post-assessments for
all individuals, but evolutionary conceptions seemed to increase more for students that
watched the new narrative version of the program than other versions.
In addition to the open-ended evolution questions, students were asked whether
the imagery or story had a particular effect on their understanding. Broadly grouping
individuals into “yes” and “no” permitted another approach to determining the effect of
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Table 4.43.
Results of ANCOVA using the NOS Understanding scale to predict difference metrics for evolution understanding for students in
classes taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment.
Difference
Class

F

df

p

Changed Answers
r2

F

df

p

Correction Scale
r2

F

df

p

r2

MSU

1.658 1, 112 0.201 0.015

15.563 1, 112 <0.001 0.122

21.305 1, 112 <0.001 0.160

UM & EWU

3.790 1, 233 0.053 0.016

46.126 1, 233 <0.001 0.165

45.480 1, 233 <0.001 0.163
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viewing on evolution understanding. Students’ responses to the effect of imagery
significantly contributed to the model of evolution understanding (F = 4.258; 1, 269 df; p
= 0.040). In addition, students that believed the imagery helped their understanding
tended to have higher assessment scores than those who did not.

Discussion
Attitudes and Beliefs
Clearly, examining attitudes, beliefs, and understanding is a complex process not
easily addressed with standardized instruments. My goal was not to develop scales, but
to use previously published metrics addressing attitudes and beliefs about science.
Nevertheless, this research provides some insight to the consistency of several metrics
important in the literature, the relationships among these metrics, and their value as
predictors related to evolution understanding. These scales are not without their
criticism, especially the examination of NOS Understanding (e.g., Aikenhead, Ryan, &
Fleming, 1989; Lederman & O’Malley, 1990). The means used to construct scales are
critical to their validity (Aikenhead, 1988). Because these scales are supposed to
describe theoretical constructs, part of the intrigue of using tried and tested metrics in
educational research is to predict outcomes of experimental treatment, not just to describe
student thinking.
This research supported several theory-bound scales but highlighted difficulties
with others. Helms et al. (2006) urged that items from theoretical constructs be dropped
only after careful consideration because dropping items implies that reliability is a
characteristic of the scale rather than the sample, and it encourages heavy reliance on
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Table 4.44.
The mean number of misconceptions, proximate conceptions (less abstract individual-level concepts), and evolutionary concepts
(more abstract, population-level concepts) found in students’ short answers to standard open-ended questions about the evolutionary
process.
Proximate Conceptions

Misconceptions

Evolutionary Conceptions

Treatment

n

Pre

Post

Difference

Pre

Post

Difference

Pre

Post

Difference

Original

70

0.8

1.0

0.2

1.2

1.8

0.6

1.3

1.5

0.2

New Narrative

61

0.7

1.1

0.3

1.3

1.8

0.5

0.9

1.5

0.6

New Imagery

69

0.6

1.0

0.5

1.4

1.8

0.4

1.4

1.6

0.2

New Narrative/Imagery

69

0.8

1.0

0.2

1.2

1.7

0.5

1.3

1.4

0.2
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these point estimates of reliability in judging the data’s worthiness. As a result, I took
two approaches to scale analyses. The first used the scales and sub-scales as they were
originally described. The second examined the relationships within this particular
sample.
Several scales describing Attitudes toward Science, Personal Epistemology,
Attitudes toward Evolution, and NOS Understanding were employed to examine the
effects of watching a nature program on subsequent evolution understanding. The scales
served to characterize students participating in the experiment based on the assumption
that these characteristics would not change during its short duration. The Attitudes
toward Science (Adolphe, 2002; Fraser, 1981) and its seven sub-scales proved quite
dependable (one sub-scale was not), with generally high reliability and strong suites of
items that could be reduced to a single component fairly easily. These components were
highly intercorrelated, and PAF indicated that the broad, general theoretical constructs
were the same, but their detection was somewhat different for this sample. Indeed, three
of the seven constructs (Career Interest, Enjoyment of Science, and Leisure Interest) were
effectively reduced to a single sub-scale. Other sub-scales constructed from the sample
mirrored the original constructs but with fewer items.
The Personal Epistemology scale was not reliable with this sample. Few of the
sub-scales describing Personal Epistemology as originally described seemed to
consistently measure their intended constructs. The subsets of items measuring Innate
Ability and Omniscient Authority were fairly reliable, however, and lost very little
cohesiveness when the items from all five sub-scales were exposed to PAF. Other
authors have attempted to resolve issues with the theoretical constructs of these personal
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epistemology sub-scales. In fact, one aspect of Schraw et al.’s (2002) efforts with the
Epistemic Belief Inventory had been to remove ambiguity from the Omniscient Authority
sub-scale. The three sub-scales addressing Quick Learning, Certain Knowledge and
Simple Knowledge were totally inadequate metrics for this sample. In fact, defining any
components that described the data related to items from these sub-scales was difficult.
Ironically, students’ responses toward two theoretical scales, Quick & Easy (a
derived sub-scale of personal epistemology) and Attitude toward Evolution (a previously
published scale), may have been a function of popular discourses. One noticeable
influence during the construction of the Personal Epistemology sub-scales seemed to be
items that used the word “theory”. Understanding that knowledge does not come in neat
little packets called “facts” is important to the Simple/Complex Knowledge component of
most Personal Epistemology research, let alone the nature of scientific knowledge. After
all, the theory of evolution is one of the most important organizing principles in biology.
In this study, students’ beliefs about knowledge primarily scaled along a quick-and-easy
to slow-and-complex axis, largely affected by how they responded to the influence of
theories. In fact, PAF indicated that the relatively high loadings (> 0.55) associated with
the two items that included the word “theory” were important components of the first
factor of the Personal Epistemology sub-scale derived from the data. Indeed, recent
arguments to challenge evolution have stressed that evolution is “just a theory”.
Formerly, the fashionable persuasive campaign to “disprove” evolution addressed the
“failure” of the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics to explain how “order” could be an outcome
of evolution. In this application, the item related to the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics in
the Attitude toward Evolution scale (Ingram & Nelson, 2006) had to be deleted because
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so few students understood its meaning. Therefore, the older scale construction that
reflected historic arguments against evolution may need to be revised to reflect the effects
of current rhetorical tactics on attitudes toward knowledge and evolution.
Not surprising, then, NOS Understanding was clearly an important covariate in
the analyses, despite the crude measure using only a fraction of the original VOSTS scale
items (Aikenhead & Ryan, 1992). Numerous authors have argued for enhancing NOS
knowledge as a means to increase understanding and acceptance of evolutionary concepts
(Abd-El-Khalick & Lederman, 2000; Alters & Nelson, 2002; Scharmann, Smith, James,
& Jenson, 2005). Results of studies designed to improve the relationship have been
equivocal, however (e.g., Akerson et al., 2006; Johnson & Peebles, 1987; Sadler,
Chambers, & Zeidler, 2004), because of the complexity of teaching both the
philosophical NOS and evolutionary theory. Results from the experimental manipulation
of Fatal Flower indicated that NOS Understanding played a central role in the outcomes
of evolution understanding assessments. Even though the effect was indirect, it strongly
advocates teaching NOS to enhance understanding of evolution.

Effects of Modifying CINS
The Conceptual Inventory of Natural Selection (CINS; Anderson et al., 2002) was
developed as a tool for describing evolution understanding. The multiple-choice
assessment used distracters (or commonly held misconceptions) to gain insight to
students’ complex conceptual diversities. Although the value of the type of information
gained through CINS may be of some concern (Nehm & Schonfeld, 2008), the reliability
was important if I hoped to find effects given the experimental design. CINS consisted of
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only 20 questions, and despite arguments that the paired questions for the 10 key
concepts could be separated, I chose to modify the tool and maintain 20 questions in both
the pre- and post-assessments. Unfortunately, the modified tool may have confounded
the results of the study because an unrelated sample of students scored lower on the
modified version than on the original version. The impact on evolution understanding of
changing organisms with very minor changes in wording raised interesting questions
about revisiting the Disney Effect (Jensen, Settlage, & Odem, 1996), knowledge transfer,
and evolution understanding, however.

Effects of Fatal Flower on Evolution Understanding
The experimental design to determine the impact of viewing a nature program on
evolution understanding was complex by necessity. Understanding what students know
is not a simple and straightforward task (see Pellegrino, Chudowsky, & Glaser, 2001),
especially on a large scale, but the attitudes and beliefs sub-scales were included to
account for at least some of the variance among individuals. Moreover, significant
results were expected after a single viewing. Stocklmayer & Gilbert (2002) suggested
that for a one-time event, such as viewing a nature program, to have an effect required the
following conditions were important: (1) an intrinsically engaging component, either
through appeal, need, or interest; (2) drawing powerfully on prior experiences; and (3)
demonstrating an apparent relationship to the viewer. Obviously, viewing in this case
had an intrinsically engaging component (course credit of some kind) and, perhaps, built
on prior experiences in the classroom. It is possible that many participating students did
not see an apparent relationship to themselves. Furthermore, most students participated
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online, viewing the nature program at their leisure in their own personal environment.
The original experimental design intended viewing in the classroom to control for a suite
of effects associated with leisure television viewing (Chen, 1994). In addition, the strong
difference between students in the MSU class and other students was unexpected.
Partitioning classes, therefore, affected sample size and likely, effect sizes. Nevertheless,
the trends apparent in the experiment suggested some disturbing results.
Evolution understanding was relatively low overall; MSU students scored just
under 70%, and UM and EWU students scored 55% – essentially “C”s and “F”s.
Although the differences among treatments with the MSU students were not significant,
these were the individuals influenced by the different versions of the nature program in
the manner predicted. The revised narrative appeared to positively affect evolution
understanding, and the original, misconception-laden narrative seemed to negatively
influence understanding, especially when it was coupled with poor imagery. Differences
in CINS assessments were not an influence because MSU student scores differed very
little on the original and modified assessments (13.8 + 0.34 [mean + SE] and 13.7 + 0.37,
respectively). The lack of consistent patterns in the outcomes for students in the UM and
EWU classes likely reflected guesswork associated with their very poor understanding of
evolution.
The timing of the assessments relative to the presentation of evolution in the
classroom may have played a role in the observed differences. Because this was a
voluntary experiment, professors participated when they felt participation would be
appropriate. MSU had just completed a discussion of evolution (at least comments from
students indicated that was the case), whereas students at UM had completed their
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evolution unit weeks prior to the experiment. As a result, students at MSU may have
seen the relevance of the assignment to their own understanding more so than students at
the other universities. Although purely speculative at this stage of research, the issue of
relevance and the influence of poor presentation of science may be profoundly important
as interested viewers seek out free-choice science education opportunities (Chapter 5).
Adding the covariates to the models rarely influenced the effect of the
experimental treatments. Nor were the influences of particular attitudes and beliefs
scales consistent across classes or variables. Attitude toward Evolution and NOS
Understanding were strongly related to Changed Answers and Correction Scales,
however. Students with a more positive attitude toward evolution were likely to change
more answers between the pre- and post-assessments, and those answers were more
likely to be correct in the post-assessment. NOS Understanding had a similar influence
on post-assessment evolution understanding. These relationships were consistent
whether students had a generally better understanding of evolution (MSU class) or a
generally poorer understanding of evolution (UM and EWU classes).
In sum, this experiment indicates that free-choice science learning opportunities
indeed influence evolution understanding (Figure 4.8). The outcomes, however, may
depend more upon knowledge development in a broad sense. Evolution understanding is
clearly influenced by attitudes toward science and evolution, as well as beliefs about
knowledge and the kinds of knowledge science produces. These factors may dampen any
influence a single viewing of a nature program, for example, may have. In addition,
other factors, such as the rhetoric of the marketplace of ideas, may have indirect
influences on the relationship between free-choice opportunities and understanding.
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Figure 4.8. Outcomes of the experimental manipulation of a nature program on evolution understanding. Heavy lines indicated
consistent, significant relationships.
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Unfortunately, effect sizes likely were too small to detect differences because of
the sample size partitioning. Although the logistics of a large-scale assessment may seem
daunting, that kind of sample size may be necessary to adequately determine the
relationships between attitudes and beliefs and knowledge acquisition from nature
programs.

The Fate of Fatal Flower
Research with science fiction movies has found negative impacts on science
understanding with single-viewing events (Barnett et al., 2006). Whether viewing the
different versions of Fatal Flower resulted in long-term conceptual change, for better or
worse, is unknown. Any patterns could result from shifting relevance of concepts in the
learners’ mind or increased access to concepts as a result of viewing (Keil & Newman,
2008). The effect ultimately depends on elaboration by students. For example, if
elaboration is minimal, effects may reflect priming and a shift in relevance. More
engaged students motivated to learn may experience greater elaboration (Dole & Sinatra,
1998; Keil & Newman, 2008), especially as they apply principles of evolution, NOS
Understanding, and beliefs about knowledge, thereby representing something closer to a
conceptual change. Indeed, the qualitative data lend support to potential differences in
engaged students (those that found the narrative and/or imagery important to their
understanding) versus those less inclined. Fatal Flower, and other blue-chip nature
programs, incorporate striking and memorable imagery. In fact, these images may be
more memorable than science courses and lab experiments (Aikenhead, 1988; Barnett et
al., 2006). Indeed, recall of television news is related to images through “explanation”
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and the “emotional bond” they add (Graber, 1990; Zhou, 2005). If “the experience is
everything” (Stocklmayer & Gilbert, 2002), this research indicates that nature programs
may in fact be doing more harm to evolution understanding than good.
Poor presentation of science is common in nature programs (Chapter 6;
Dissertation Appendix 1). In addition, evolution is rarely treated accurately (Aldridge &
Dingwall, 2003; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006; Dissertation Appendix 1) The results from
this experiment suggest that students leaving universities with an “average”
understanding of evolution (like students from MSU) are likely to be negatively
influenced by these poor presentations of nature; students with even less of a grasp of the
theory may be influenced by these programs interacting with the dominant discourse in
popular deconstructions of evolution. MSU is a hub for research in science teaching and
likely represents an upper bound for evolution understanding by non-majors. The
outcome for public understanding of evolution is bleak given that the great majority of
students is not exposed to that level of teaching and experience a very limited number of
biology courses in general.
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Appendix 1. The Knowing the Natural World Pre-assessment.

KNOWING THE NATURAL WORLD
How many courses have you taken that included biology, ecology, or the natural
sciences, not counting this course?
none
1-2
3-4
5-6
More than 6
How old are you?
Year in school:

years

Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Other/Please specify:
Who is your professor for this course?
Circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 =
strongly agree.
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I would prefer to do experiments
than to read about them.

1

2

3

4

5

I would like to be given a science
book or a piece of scientific
equipment as a present.

1

2

3

4

5

Too many laboratories are being
built at the expense of the rest of
education.

1

2

3

4

5

I dislike reading newspaper

1

2

3

4

5
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Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree
articles about science.
Scientists who believe in evolution
do so mainly because they want
to, not because of any evidence.

1

2

3

4

5

Scientists are less friendly than
other people.

1

2

3

4

5

Science is man’s worst enemy

1

2

3

4

5

I dislike reading books about
science during my vacations.

1

2

3

4

5

Absolute moral truth does not
exist.

1

2

3

4

5

The material covered in science
lessons is uninteresting.

1

2

3

4

5

The Second Law of
Thermodynamics shows that
evolution could not have
happened.

1

2

3

4

5

I would rather find out about
things by asking an expert than by
doing an experiment.

1

2

3

4

5

Mutations are never beneficial to
animals.

1

2

3

4

5

There is scientific evidence
supporting that humans were
supernaturally created.

1

2

3

4

5

Things are simpler than most
professors would have you
believe.

1

2

3

4

5

Scientific discoveries are doing
more harm than good.

1

2

3

4

5
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Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree
People should always obey the
law.

1

2

3

4

5

When someone in authority tells
me what to do, I usually do it.

1

2

3

4

5

People shouldn’t question
authority.

1

2

3

4

5

For the following questions, some of the answers are grouped. Read all the possibilities,
and circle the answer that best fits your thinking.
When developing new theories or laws, scientists need to make certain assumptions
about nature (for example, matter is made up of atoms). These assumptions must be
true in order for science to progress properly. Your position, basically (please read
from A to I, and then choose one):
Assumptions MUST be true in order for science to progress:
A. because correct assumptions are needed for correct theories and laws. Otherwise
scientists would waste a lot of time and effort using wrong theories and laws.
B. otherwise society would have serious problems, such as inadequate technology and
dangerous chemicals.
C. because scientists do research to prove their assumptions true before going on with
their work.
D. It depends. Sometimes science needs true assumptions in order to progress. But
sometimes history has shown that great discoveries have been made by disproving a
theory and learning from its false assumptions.
E. It doesn’t matter. Scientists have to make assumptions, true or not, in order to get
started on a project. History has shown that great discoveries have been made by
disproving a theory and learning from its false assumptions.
F. Scientists do not make assumptions. They research an idea to find out if the idea is
true. They don’t assume it is true.
G. I don’t understand.
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H. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice.
I. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint.

For this statement, assume that a gold miner “discovers” gold while an artist “invents”
a sculpture. Some people think that scientists discover scientific THEORIES. Others
think that scientists invent them. What do you think? Your position, basically (please
read from A to I, and then choose one):
Scientists discover a theory:
A. because the idea was there all the time to be uncovered.
B. because it is based on experimental facts.
C. but scientists invent the methods to find the theories.
D. Some scientists may stumble onto a theory by chance, thus discovering it. But other
scientists may invent the theory from facts they already know.
Scientists invent a theory:
E. because a theory is an interpretation of experimental facts which scientists have
discovered.
F. because inventions (theories) come from the mind — we create them.
G. I don’t understand.
H. I don’t know enough about this topic to make a choice.
I. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint.

When scientists classify something (for example, a plant according to its species, an
element according to the periodic table, energy according to its source, or a star
according to its size), scientists are classifying nature according to the way nature
really is; any other way would simply be wrong. Your position, basically (please read
from A to I, and the choose one):
Classifications match the way nature really is,
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A. since scientists have proven them over many years of work.
B. since scientists use observable characteristics when they classify.
C. Scientists classify nature in the most simple and logical way, but their way isn’t
necessarily the only way.
D. There are many ways to classify nature, but agreeing on one universal system allows
scientists to avoid confusion in their work.
E. There could be other correct ways to classify nature, because science is liable to
change and new discoveries may lead to different classifications.
F. Nobody knows the way nature really is. Scientists classify nature according to their
perceptions or theories. Science is never exact, and nature is so diverse. Thus,
scientists could correctly use more than one classification scheme.
G. I don’t understand.
H. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice.
I. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint.

Scientific ideas develop from hypotheses to theories, and finally, if they are good
enough, to being scientific laws. Your position, basically (please read from A to H, and
then choose one):
Hypotheses can lead to theories which can lead to laws:
A. because an hypothesis is tested by experiments, if it proves correct, it becomes a
theory. After a theory has been proven true many times by different people and has
been around for a long time, it becomes a law.
B. because an hypothesis is tested by experiments, if there is supporting evidence, it’s a
theory. After a theory has been tested many times and seems to be essentially
correct, it’s good enough to become a law.
C. because it is a logical way for scientific ideas to develop.
D. Theories can’t become laws because they both are different types of ideas. Theories
are based on scientific ideas which are less than 100% certain, and so theories can’t
be proven true. Laws, however, are based on facts only and are 100% sure.
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E. Theories can’t become laws because they both are different types of ideas. Laws
describe things in general. Theories explain these laws. However, with supporting
evidence, hypotheses may become theories (explanations) or laws (descriptions).
F. I don’t understand.
G. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice.
H. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint.
Some cultures have a particular viewpoint on nature and man. Scientists and scientific
research are affected by the religious or ethical views of the culture where the work is
done. Your position, basically (please read from A to J, and then choose one):
Religious or ethical views DO influence scientific research:
A. because some cultures want specific research done for the benefit of that culture.
B. because scientists may unconsciously choose research that would support their
culture’s views.
C. because most scientists will not do research which goes against their upbringing or
their beliefs.
D. because everyone is different in the way they react to their culture. It is these
individual differences in scientists that influence the type of research done.
E. because powerful groups representing certain religious, political or cultural beliefs
will support certain research projects, or will give money to prevent certain research
from occurring.
Religious or ethical views do NOT influence scientific research:
F. because research continues in spite of clashes between scientists and certain
religious or cultural groups (for example, clashes over evolution and creation).
G. because scientists will research topics which are of importance to science and
scientists, regardless of cultural or ethical views.
H. I don’t understand.
I. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice.
J. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint
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Circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 =
strongly agree.
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Scientists do not have enough
time to spend with their families.

1

2

3

4

5

Students who learn things quickly
are the most successful.

1

2

3

4

5

School should have more science
lessons each week.

1

2

3

4

5

I dislike science lessons.

1

2

3

4

5

If you don’tt learn something
quickly, you won’tt ever learn it.

1

2

3

4

5

If a person tries too hard to
understand a problem, they will
most likely end up being
confused.

1

2

3

4

5

Really smart students don
don’t have
to work as hard to do well in
school.

1

2

3

4

5

I would dislike being a scientist
after I leave school.

1

2

3

4

5

When I leave school, I would like
to work with people who make
discoveries in science.

1

2

3

4

5

Canary Island Lizards
The Canary Islands are seven islands just west of the
African continent. The islands gradually became
colonized with life: plants, lizards, birds, etc. Three
different species of lizards found on the islands are
similar to one species found on the African continent
(Thorpe & Brown 1989). Because of this, scientists assume that the lizards traveled
from Africa to the Canary Islands by floating on tree trunks washed out to
t sea.
300

Choose the answer that best reflects how an evolutionary biologist would answer.
Lizards eat a variety of insects and plants. Which statement describes the availability
of food for lizards on the Canary Islands?
a. Finding food is not a problem since food is always in abundant supply.
b. Since lizards can eat a variety of foods, there is likely to be enough food for all of the
lizards at all times.
c. Lizards can get by on very little food, so the food supply does not matter.
d. It is likely that sometimes there is enough food, but at other times there is not
enough food for all of the lizards.
What do you think happens among the lizards of a certain species when the food
supply is limited?
a. The lizards cooperate to find food and share what they find.
b. The lizards fight for the available food and the strongest lizards kill the weaker ones.
c. Genetic changes that would allow lizards to eat new food sources are likely to be
induced.
d. The lizards least successful in the competition for food are likely to die of starvation
and malnutrition.
Populations of lizards are made up of hundreds of individual lizards. Which statement
describes how similar they are likely to be to each other?
a. All lizards in the population are likely to be nearly identical.
b. All lizards in the population are identical to each other on the outside, but there are
differences in their internal organs such as how they digest food.
c. All lizards in the population share many similarities, but there are differences in
features like body size and claw length.
d. All lizards in the population are completely unique and share no features with other
lizards.

Which statement could describe how traits in lizards pass from one generation of
lizards to the next generation?
a. Lizards that learn to catch a particular type of insect will pass the new ability to
offspring.
b. Lizards that are able to hear but have no survival advantage because of hearing, will
eventually stop passing on the “hearing” trait.
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c. Lizards with stronger claws that allow for catching certain insects have offspring
whose claws gradually get even stronger during their lifetime.
d. Lizards with a particular coloration and pattern are likely to pass the same trait on to
offspring.

Fitness is a term often used by biologists to explain the evolutionary success of certain
organisms. Below are descriptions of four fictional female lizards. Which lizard might
a biologist consider to be the “most fit”?

body length
offspring surviving
to adulthood
age at death
comments

Lizard A

Lizard B

Lizard C

Lizard D

20 cm

12 cm

10 cm

15 cm

19

28

22

26

4 years

5 years

4 years

6 years

Lizard A is very
healthy,
strong, and
clever

Lizard B has
mated with
many lizards

Lizard C is dark
colored and
very quick

Lizard D has
the largest
territory of all
the lizards

a. Lizard A
b. Lizard B
c. Lizard C
d. Lizard D

According to the theory of natural selection, where did the variations in body size in
the three species of lizards most likely come from?
a. The lizards needed to change in order to survive, so beneficial new traits developed.
b. The lizards wanted to become different in size, so beneficial new traits gradually
appeared in the population.
c. Random genetic changes and sexual recombination both created new variations.
d. The island environment caused genetic changes in the lizards.

What could cause one species to change into three species over time?
a. Groups of lizards encountered different island environments so the lizards needed
to become new species with different traits in order to survive.
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b. Groups of lizards must have been geographically isolated from other groups and
random genetic changes must have accumulated in these lizard populations over
time.
c. There may be minor variations, but all lizards are essentially alike and all are
members of a single species.
d. In order to survive, different groups of lizards needed to adapt to the different
islands, and so all organisms in each group gradually evolved to become a new lizard
species.

Circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 =
strongly agree.
Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree
If two people are arguing about
something, at least one of them
must be wrong.

1

2

3

4

5

The more you know about a topic,
the more there is to know.

1

2

3

4

5

Scientists are just as interested in
art and music as other people are.

1

2

3

4

5

Sometimes there are no right
answers to life’s big problems.

1

2

3

4

5

Science helps to make life better.

1

2

3

4

5

The Earth is not old enough for
evolution to have taken place.

1

2

3

4

5

Listening to talk about science on
the radio would be boring.

1

2

3

4

5

Too many theories just complicate
things.

1

2

3

4

5

If you haven’t understood a
chapter the first time through,
going back over it won’t help.

1

2

3

4

5
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Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree
Scientists are about as fit and
healthy as other people.

1

2

3

4

5

Parents should teach their
children all there is to know about
life.

1

2

3

4

5

I enjoy reading about things that
disagree with my previous ideas.

1

2

3

4

5

I dislike repeating experiments to
check that I get the same results.

1

2

3

4

5

Some people are born with special
gifts and talents.

1

2

3

4

5

I would rather agree with other
people than do experiments and
find out for myself.

1

2

3

4

5

For the following questions, some of the answers are grouped. Read all the possibilities,
and circle the answer that best fits your thinking.
Good scientific theories explain observations well. But good theories are also simple
rather than complex. Your position, basically (please read from A to I, and then
choose one):
A. Good theories are simple. The best language to use in science is simple, short, direct
language.
B. It depends on how deeply you want to get into the explanation. A good theory can
explain something either in a simple way or in a complex way.
C. It depends on the theory. Some good theories are simple, some are complex.
D. Good theories can be complex, but they must be able to be translated into simple
language if they are going to be used.
E. Theories are usually complex. Some things cannot be simplified if a lot of details are
involved.

304

F. Most good theories are complex. If the world was simpler, theories could be
simpler.
G. I don’t understand.
H. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice.
I. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint.

For this statement, assume that a gold miner “discovers” gold while an artist “invents”
a sculpture. Some people think that scientists discover scientific LAWS. Others think
that scientists invent them. What do you think? Your position, basically (please read
from A to H, and then choose one):
Scientists discover scientific laws:
A. because the laws are out there in nature and scientists just have to find them.
B. because laws are based on experimental facts.
C. but scientists invent the methods to find those laws.
D. Some scientists may stumble onto a law by chance, thus discovering it. But other
scientists may invent the law from facts they already know.
E. Scientists invent laws, because scientists interpret the experimental facts which they
discover. Scientists don’t invent what nature does, but they do invent the laws
which describe what nature does.
F. I don’t understand.
G. I don’t know enough about this topic to make a choice.
H. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint.

Science rests on the assumption that the natural world CANNOT be altered by a
supernatural being (for example, a deity). Your position, basically (please read
from A to H, and then choose one):
Scientists assume that a supernatural being will NOT alter the natural world:
A. because the supernatural is beyond scientific proof. Other views, outside the realm
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of science, may assume that a supernatural being can alter the natural world.
B. because if a supernatural being did exist, scientific facts could change in the wink of
an eye. BUT scientists repeatedly get consistent results.
C. It depends. What scientists assume about a supernatural being is up to the
individual scientist.
D. Anything is possible. Science does not know everything about nature. Therefore,
science must be open-minded to the possibility that a supernatural being could alter
the natural world.
E. Science can investigate the supernatural and can possibly explain it. Therefore,
science can assume the existence of supernatural beings.
F. I don’t understand.
G. I don’t know enough about this topic to make a choice.
H. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint.

If scientists find that people working with asbestos have twice as much chance of
getting lung cancer as the average person, this must mean that asbestos causes lung
cancer. Your position, basically (please read from A to H, and then choose one):
A. The facts obviously prove that asbestos causes lung cancer. If asbestos workers have
a greater chance of getting lung cancer, then asbestos is the cause.
The facts do NOT necessarily mean that asbestos causes lung cancer:
B. because more research is needed to find out whether it is asbestos or some other
substance that causes the lung cancer.
C. because asbestos might work in combination with other things, or may work
indirectly (for example, weakening your resistance to other things which cause you
to get lung cancer).
D. because if it did, all asbestos workers would have developed lung cancer.
E. Asbestos cannot be the cause of lung cancer because many people who don’t work
with asbestos also get lung cancer.
F. I don’t understand.
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G. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice.
H. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint.

Scientists should NOT make errors in their work because these errors slow the
advance of science. Your position basically (please read from A to H, and then choose
one):
Errors slow the advance of science:
A. because misleading information can lead to false conclusions. If scientists don’t
immediately correct the errors in their results, then science is not advancing.
B. because new technology and equipment reduce errors by improving accuracy and so
science will advance faster.
Errors CANNOT be avoided:
C. so scientists reduce errors by checking each others’ results until agreement is
reached.
D. some errors can slow the advance of science, but other errors can lead to a new
discovery or breakthrough. If scientists learn from their errors and correct them,
science will advance.
E. Errors most often help the advance of science. Science advances by detecting and
correcting the errors of the past.
F. I don’t understand.
G. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice.
H. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint.
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Galapagos Finches
Scientists have long believed that the 14 species on the
Galapagos Islands evolved from a single species of finch
that migrated to the islands one to five million years ago
(Lack 1940). Recent DNA analyses support the
conclusion that all of the Galapagos finches evolved
from the warbler finch (Grant et al. 2001; Petren et al.
1999). Different species live on different islands. For
example, the medium ground finch and the cactus finch
live on one island. The large cactus finch occupies another island. One of the major
changes in the finches in their beak sizes and shapes, as shown in this figure.
Choose the one answer that best reflects how an evolutionary biologist would answer.
What would happen if a breeding pair of finches was placed on an island under ideal
conditions with no predators and unlimited food so that all individuals survived?
Given enough time
a. the finch population would stay small because birds only have enough babies to
replace themselves.
b. the finch population would double and then stay relatively stable.
c. the finch population would increase dramatically.
d. the finch population would grow slowly and then level off.

Finches on the Galapagos Islands require food to eat and water to drink.
a. When food and water are scarce, some birds may be unable to obtain what they
need to survive.
b. When food and water are limited, the finches will find other food sources, so there
is always enough.
c. When food and water are scarce, the finches all eat and drink less so that all birds
survive.
d. There is always plenty of food and water on the Galapagos Islands to meet the
finches’ needs.

Once a population of finches has lived on a particular island for many years,
a. the population continues to grow rapidly.
b. the population remains relatively stable, with some fluctuations.
c. the population dramatically increases and decreases each year.
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d. the population will decrease steadily.

In the finch population, what are the primary changes that occur gradually over time?
a. The traits of each finch within a population gradually change.
b. The proportions of finches having different traits within a population change.
c. Successful behaviors learned by finches are passed on to offspring.
d. Mutations occur to meet the needs of the finches as the environment changes.

Depending on their beak size and shape, some finches get nectar from flowers, some
eat grubs from bark, some eat small seeds, and some eat large nuts. Which statement
best describes the interactions among the finches and the food supply?
a. Most of the finches on an island cooperate to find food and share what they find.
b. Many of the finches on an island fight with one another and the physically strongest
ones win.
c. There is more than enough food to meet all the finches’ needs to they don’t need to
compete for food.
d. Finches compete primarily with closely related finches that eat the same kinds of
food, and some may die from lack of food.

How did the different beak types first arise in the Galapagos finches?
a. The changes in the finches’ beak size and shape occurred because of their need to
be able to eat different kinds of food to survive.
b. Changes in the finches’ beaks occurred by chance, and when there was a good
match between beak structure and available food, those birds had more offspring.
c. The changes in the finches’ beaks occurred because the environment induced the
desired genetic changes.
d. The finches’ beaks changed a little bit in size and shape with each successive
generation, some getting larger and some getting smaller.

What type of variation in finches is passed to the offspring?
a. Any behaviors that were learned during a finch’s lifetime.
b. Only characteristics that were beneficial during a finch’s lifetime.
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c. All characteristics that were genetically determined.
d. Any characteristics that were positively influenced by the environment during a
finch’s lifetime.

What caused populations of birds having different beak shapes and sizes to become
distinct species distributed on the various islands?
a. The finches were quite variable, and those whose features were best suited to the
available food supply on each island reproduced most successfully.
b. All finches are essentially alike and there are not really fourteen different species.
c. Different foods are available on different islands and for that reason, individual
finches on each island gradually developed the beaks they needed.
d. Different lines of finches developed different beak types because they needed them
in order to obtain the available food.

Circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 =
strongly agree.
Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree
There is no fossil evidence
supporting that humans and apes
evolved from a common ancestor.

1

2

3

4

5

I would rather solve a problem by
doing an experiment than be told
the answer.

1

2

3

4

5

Finding out about new things is
unimportant.

1

2

3

4

5

People’s intellectual potential is
fixed at birth.

1

2

3

4

5

It is statistically impossible that
life arose by chance.

1

2

3

4

5
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Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

A supreme being (e.g., God)
created humans pretty much in
their present form; humans did
not evolve from other forms of
life (e.g., fish and/or reptiles).

1

2

3

4

5

Money used on scientific projects
is wasted.

1

2

3

4

5

Some people just have a knack for
learning and others don’t.

1

2

3

4

5

This country is spending too much
money on science.

1

2

3

4

5

Science is one of the most
interesting school subjects.

1

2

3

4

5

Money spent on science is well
worth spending.

1

2

3

4

5

What is true today will be true
tomorrow.

1

2

3

4

5

Over billions of years all plants
and animals on Earth (including
humans) descended (evolved)
from a common ancestor (e.g., a
one-celled organism).

1

2

3

4

5

I like to listen to people whose
opinions are different from mine.

1

2

3

4

5

How well you do in school
depends on how smart you are.

1

2

3

4

5

I would enjoy school more if there
were no science lessons.

1

2

3

4

5

I would enjoy visiting a science
museum on the weekend.

1

2

3

4

5
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Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree
There is no real evidence that
humans evolved from other
animals.

1

2

3

4

5

I dislike listening to other people
people’s
opinions.

1

2

3

4

5

I find it boring to hear about new
ideas.

1

2

3

4

5

Venezuelan Guppies
Guppies are small fish found in streams in Venezuela. Male guppies
are brightly colored, with black, red, blue and iridescent (reflective)
spots. Males cannot be too brightly colored or they will be seen
and consumed by predators, but if they are too plain, females will
choose other males. Natural selection and sexual selection push in opposite directions.
When a guppy
ppy population lives in a stream in the absence of predators, the proportion
of males that are bright and flashy increases in the population. If a few aggressive
predators are added to the same stream, the proportion of bright
bright-colored
colored males
decreases within
in about five months (3
(3-4
4 generations). The effects of predators on
guppy coloration have been studied in artificial ponds with mild, aggressive, and no
predators, and by similar manipulations of natural stream environments (Endler 1980).
Choose the one answer that best reflects how an evolutionary biologist would answer.
A typical natural population of guppies consists of hundreds of guppies. Which
statement best describes the guppies of a single species in an isolated population?
a. The guppies share all of the same characteristics and are identical to each other.
b. The guppies share all of the essential characteristics of the species; the minor
variations they display don
don’t affect survival.
c. The guppies are all identical on the inside, but have many diffe
differences
rences in appearance.
d. The guppies share many essential characteristics, but also vary in many features.

Fitness is a term often used by biologists to explain the evolutionary success of certain
organisms. Which feature would a biologist consider to be most important in
determining which guppies were the “most fit”?
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a. Large body size and ability to swim quickly away from predators.
b. Excellent ability to compete for food.
c. High number of offspring that survived to reproductive age.
d. High number of matings with many different females.

Assuming ideal conditions with abundant food and space and no predators, what
would happen if a pair of guppies was placed in a large pond?
a. The guppy population would grow slowly, as guppies would have only the number of
babies that are needed to replenish the population.
b. The guppy population would grow slowly at first, then would grow rapidly, and
thousands of guppies would fill the pond.
c. The guppy population would never become very large, because only organisms such
as insects and bacteria reproduce in that manner.
d. The guppy population would continue to grow slowly over time.

Once a population of guppies has been established for a number of years in a real (not
ideal) pond with other organisms including predators, what will likely happen to the
population?
a. The guppy population will stay about the same size.
b. The guppy population will continue to rapidly grow in size.
c. The guppy population will gradually decrease until no more guppies are left.
d. It is impossible to tell because populations do not follow patterns.

In guppy populations, what are the primary changes that occur gradually over time?
a. The traits of each individual guppy within a population gradually change.
b. The proportions of guppies having different traits within a population change.
c. Successful behaviors learned by certain guppies are passed on to offspring.
d. Mutations occur to meet the needs of the guppies as the environment changes.
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For the following questions, some of the answers are grouped. Read all the possibilities,
and circle the answer that best fits your thinking.
Even when people use mathematics accurately in science and engineering, they can
only predict what will probably happen. They can never conclude with 100%
certainty. Your position, basically (please read from A to G, and then choose one):
Predictions are never 100% certain:
A. because there is always measurement error or human error.
B. because there are always unknown or unforeseen events which will affect a result.
C. Predictions with mathematics are usually 100% certain, because they are based on
tested results.
D. Predictions with mathematics are always 100% certain because mathematics itself is
certain.
E. I don’t understand.
F. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice.
G. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint.

In spite of their knowledge and training, scientists and technologists can be fooled by
what they see on TV or read in newspapers. Your position, basically (please read from
A to H, and then choose one):
Scientists and technologists CAN BE fooled by the media:
A. because they are so open-minded and always accept new ideas.
B. because their special knowledge doesn’t help them detect errors in the media.
C. because they are only human. Like everyone, they are influenced by the media
(except when the topic is in their field of specialization).
Scientists and technologists are NOT fooled by the media:
D. because they know the facts. Knowledge of science tells them what is correct.
E. because they are trained to look at things logically. They know the correct
information or they know how to check it out.
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F. I don’t understand.
G. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice.
H. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint.

Even when making predictions based on accurate knowledge, scientists and engineers
can tell us only what probably might happen. They cannot tell what will happen for
certain. Your position basically (please read from A to H, and then choose one):
Predictions are NEVER certain:
A. because there is always room for error and unforeseen events which will affect a
result. No one can predict the future for certain.
B. because accurate knowledge changes as new discoveries are made, and therefore
predictions will always change.
C. because a prediction is not a statement of fact. It is an educated guess.
D. because scientists never have all the facts. Some data are always missing.
E. It depends. Predictions are certain, only as long as there is accurate knowledge and
enough information.
F. I don’t understand.
G. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice.
H. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint.

Many scientific models used in research laboratories (such as the model of heat, the
neuron, DNA, or the atom) are copies of reality. Your position, basically (please read
from A to J, and then choose one):
Scientific models ARE copies of reality:
A. because scientists say they are true, so they must be true.
B. because much scientific evidence has proven them true.
C. because they are true to life. Their purpose is to show us reality or teach us
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something about it.
D. Scientific models come close to being copies of reality, because they are based on
scientific observations and research.
Scientific models are NOT copies of reality:
E. because they are simply helpful for learning and explaining, within their limitations.
F. because they change with time and with the state of our knowledge, like theories
do.
G. because these models must be ideas or educated guesses, since you can’t actually
see the real thing.
H. I don’t understand.
I. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice.
J. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint.

Even when scientific investigations are done correctly, the knowledge that scientists
discover from those investigations may change in the future. Your position, basically
(please read from A to G, and then choose one):
Scientific knowledge changes:
A. because new scientists disprove the theories or discoveries of old scientists.
Scientists do this by using new techniques or improved instruments, by finding new
factors overlooked before, or by detecting errors in the original “correct”
investigation.
B. because the old knowledge is reinterpreted in light of new discoveries. Scientific
facts can change.
Scientific knowledge APPEARS to change:
C. because the interpretation or the application of the old facts can change. Correctly
done experiments yield unchangeable facts.
D. because new knowledge is added on to old knowledge; the old knowledge doesn’t
change.
E. I don’t understand.
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F. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice.
G. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint.

Circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 =
strongly agree.
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I would dislike becoming a
scientist because it needs too
much education.

1

2

3

4

5

What is true is a matter of
opinion.

1

2

3

4

5

The government should spend
more money on scientific
research.

1

2

3

4

5

The methods used to determine
the age of fossils and rocks are
not accurate.

1

2

3

4

5

Science is easy to understand
because it contains so many facts.

1

2

3

4

5

Instructors should focus on facts
instead of theories.

1

2

3

4

5

A career in science would be dull
and boring.

1

2

3

4

5

Science lessons are fun.

1

2

3

4

5

The best ideas are often the most
simple.

1

2

3

4

5

It is better to ask the teacher the
answer than to find out by doing
experiments.

1

2

3

4

5
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Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree
Public money spent on science in
the last few years has been used
wisely.

1

2

3

4

5

Science can help to make the
world a better place in the future.

1

2

3

4

5

Working on a problem with no
quick solution is a waste of time.

1

2

3

4

5

Most things worth knowing are
easy to understand.

1

2

3

4

5

I would like to belong to a science
club.

1

2

3

4

5

Smart people are born that way.

1

2

3

4

5

There is fossil evidence supporting
that animals, including humans,
did not evolve.

1

2

3

4

5

Children should be allowed to
question their parents’ authority.

1

2

3

4

5

I would like to teach science when
I leave school.

1

2

3

4

5

I would like to be a scientist when
I leave school.

1

2

3

4

5

I get bored when watching science
programs on TV at home.

1

2

3

4

5

I am curious about the world in
which we live.

1

2

3

4

5
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Cheetahs (large African cats) are able to run faster than 60 miles per hour when chasing
prey. How would a biologist explain how the ability to run fast evolved in cheetahs,
assuming their ancestors could run only 20 miles per hour?

Squirrels have claws that they use to help them climb the bark of trees and jump from
branch to branch. They had ancestors that did not have good claws, so they were not as
good at climbing and jumping. Explain how modern day squirrels have claws that are
good for climbing and jumping even though their ancestors did not.
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Appendix 2. The Knowing the Natural World Post-assessment.
[Note. These questions were substituted for the original CINS questions in the preassessment for students completing the post-assessment only]
KNOWING THE NATURAL WORLD
Hummingbirds
Hummingbirds are small birds with long, thin beaks. They are
known for their ability to hover in mid-air by rapidly flapping
their wings from 15-80 times per second! Hummingbirds feed
on nectar and insects. The long thin beak allows birds to feed
on nectar stored deep within flowers. The beak also can be
opened wide, and the lower half has the ability to flex
downward to create an even wider opening, which facilitates
the capture of flying insects. Hummingbirds are native only to the Americas, with more
species of hummingbirds found in the tropical Andes Mountains of South America than
any other place.
Choose the answer that best reflects how an evolutionary biologist would answer.
Hummingbirds eat insects as well as nectar. Which statement describes the
availability of food for hummingbirds in the Andes?
a. Finding food is not a problem since food is always in abundant supply.
b. Since hummingbirds can eat a variety of foods, there is likely to be enough food for all
of the hummingbirds at all times.
c. Hummingbirds can get by on very little food, so the food supply does not matter.
d. It is likely that sometimes there is enough food, but at other times there is not
enough food for all of the hummingbirds.

What do you think happens among the hummingbirds of a certain species when the
food supply is limited?
a. The hummingbirds cooperate to find food and share what they find.
b. The hummingbirds fight for the available food and the strongest hummingbirds chase
the weaker ones away.
c. Genetic changes that would allow hummingbirds to eat new food sources are likely to
be induced.
d. The hummingbirds least successful in the competition for food are likely to die of
starvation and malnutrition.
320

Populations of hummingbirds are made up of hundreds of individual hummingbirds.
Which statement describes how similar they are likely to be to each other?
a. All hummingbirds in the population are likely to be nearly identical.
b. All hummingbirds in the population are identical to each other on the outside, but
there are differences in their internal organs such as how they digest food.
c. All hummingbirds in the population share many similarities, but there are differences
in features like body size and bill length.
d. All hummingbirds in the population are completely unique and share no features with
other hummingbirds.

Which statement could describe how traits in hummingbirds pass from one generation
of hummingbirds to the next generation?
a. Hummingbirds that learn to nectar from a particular type of orchid will pass the new
ability to offspring.
b. Hummingbirds that are able to hear, but have no survival advantage because of
hearing, will eventually stop passing on the “hearing” trait.
c. Hummingbirds with longer bills that allow for obtaining nectar from certain orchids
have offspring whose bills gradually get even longer during their lifetime.
d. Hummingbirds with a particular coloration and bill length are likely to pass the same
trait on to offspring.

Fitness is a term often used by biologists to explain the evolutionary success of certain
organisms. Below are descriptions of four fictional male hummingbirds. Which
hummingbird might a biologist consider to be the “most fit”?
Hummingbird A Hummingbird B Hummingbird C Hummingbird D
beak length

20 cm

12 cm

10 cm

15 cm

offspring
surviving to
adulthood

19

28

22

26

age at death

4 years

5 years

4 years

6

comments

Hummingbird B
Hummingbird D
Hummingbird C
Hummingbird A is
has mated with
has the largest
very healthy,
has a long bill and
many
territory of all the
strong, and clever
is very quick
hummingbirds
hummingbirds
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a. Hummingbird A
b. Hummingbird B
c. Hummingbird C
d. Hummingbird D

According to the theory of natural selection, where did the variations in Andean
species of hummingbirds most likely come from?
a. The hummingbirds needed to change in order to survive, so beneficial new traits
developed.
b. The hummingbirds wanted to eat different foods, so beneficial new traits gradually
appeared in the population.
c. Random genetic changes and sexual recombination both created new variations.
d. The environment of the Andes caused genetic changes in the hummingbirds.

What could cause one species to change into so many species over time?
a. Groups of hummingbirds encountered different mountain environments so the
hummingbirds needed to become new species with different traits in order to
survive.
b. Groups of hummingbirds must have been geographically isolated from other groups
and random genetic changes must have accumulated in these hummingbird
populations over time.
c. There may be minor variations, but all hummingbirds are essentially alike and all are
members of a single species.
d. In order to survive, different groups of hummingbirds needed to adapt to the
different types of flowers, and so all organisms in each group gradually evolved to
become a new hummingbird species.
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Costus
Many flowers can be classified as having either a bee- or
hummingbird-pollination syndrome based on distinct suites of floral
characters. For example, flowers of bee-pollinated Costus (ginger
plants) have broad, pale tubes that are white or yellow and often
striped with red or purple, and the floral bracts are green. Flowers
of hummingbird-pollinated species have a
narrow, tubular form, and the floral bracts
are yellow, orange, or red. Flowers in both
pollination categories are odorless and
diurnal, and they produce relatively large
quantities of nectar. Geological uplift in the Andes Mountains
caused range shifts and occasionally isolated populations of
Costus, resulting in “islands” of this rich food resource. Bees are
less active in the cool, wet weather that is common at higher
elevations in the tropics and are rarely found above 2000 m.
Choose the one answer that best reflects how an evolutionary biologist would answer.
What would happen if several Costus were placed on a mountain in the Andes under
ideal conditions with no predators and unlimited light and water so that all individuals
survived? Given enough time
a. the Costus population would stay small because plants only have enough babies to
replace themselves.
b. the Costus population would double and then stay relatively stable.
c. the Costus population would increase dramatically.
d. the Costus population would grow slowly and then level off.

Costus in the Andes Mountains require cross-fertilization (pollen from other
individuals) to produce vigorous offspring.
a. When bees are scarce, some Costus may be unable to obtain the pollinators they
need to reproduce.
b. When bees are limited, the Costus will attract other pollinators, so there is always
enough.
c. When bees are scarce, the Costus all reproduced less so they all survive.
d. There are always plenty of bees in the Andes to meet the Costus’ needs.
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Once a population of Costus has lived in a particular area for many years,
a. the population continues to grow rapidly.
b. the population remains relatively stable, with some fluctuations.
c. the population dramatically increases and decreases each year.
d. the population will decrease steadily.

In the Costus population, what are the primary changes that occur gradually over
time?
a. The traits of each Costus within a population gradually change.
b. The proportions of Costus having different traits within a population change.
c. Successful behaviors learned by Costus (such as cheating) are passed on to
offspring.
d. Mutations occur to meet the needs of the Costus as the environment changes.

Depending on their tube size and shape, some Costus are pollinated by bees, some by
gnats, and some by hummingbirds. Which statement best describes the interactions
among the Costus and their pollinators?
a. Most of the Costus in the Andes cooperate to find pollinators.
b. Many of the Costus in the Andes compete with one another for pollinators and the
strongest ones win.
c. There are more than enough pollinators to meet all the Costus’ needs so they don’t
need to compete for pollinators.
d. Costus compete primarily with closely related species that require the same kinds
of pollinators, and some may not reproduce from lack of pollinators.

How did the different tube types first arise in the Andean Costus?
a. The changes in the Costus’ tube size and shape occurred because of their need to
be able to attract different kinds of pollinators to reproduce.
b. Changes in the Costus’ tube occurred by chance, and when there was a good match
between tube structure and available pollinators, those Costus produced more
seeds.
c. The changes in the Costus’ tube occurred because the environment induced the
desired genetic changes.
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d. The Costus’ tube changed a little bit in size and shape with each successive
generation, some getting larger and some getting smaller.

What type of variation in the bees is passed to the offspring?
a. Any behaviors that were learned during the bee’s lifetime.
b. Only characteristics that were beneficial during a bee’s lifetime.
c. All characteristics that were genetically determined.
d. Any characteristics that were positively influenced by the environment during the
bee’s lifetime.

What caused populations of Costus having different flower shapes and sizes to
become distinct species distributed on the various mountains of the Andes?
a. The Costus were quite variable, and those whose features were best suited to the
available pollinators on each mountain reproduced most successfully.
b. All Costus are essentially alike and there are not really different species.
c. Different pollinators are available on different mountains and for that reason,
individual Costus on each mountain gradually developed the tubes they needed to
attract pollinators.
d. Different lines of Costus developed different tube types because they needed them
in order to attract pollinators.

Miami Blue Butterflies
The Miami Blue, Cyclargus thomasi bethunbakeri, is a small,
brightly colored butterfly endemic to Florida; additional
subspecies occur in the Bahamas and Hispaniola. The
butterfly inhabits tropical hardwood hammocks (closed
canopy forests) and their associated margins, beachside
scrub and tropical pine rocklands. Once widespread and
locally abundant, the Miami blue has been eliminated from
much of its former range due to ever-expanding urbanization
and the associated loss of coastal habitat. It is now one of
Florida’s most endangered insects with a single remaining
extant population supporting less than 100 individuals.
Choose the one answer that best reflects how an evolutionary biologist would answer.
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A typical natural population of butterflies consists of hundreds of butterflies. Which
statement best describes the butterflies of a single species in an isolated population?
a. The butterflies share all of the same characteristics and are identical to each other.
b. The butterflies share all of the essential characteristics of the species; the minor
variations they display don’t affect survival.
c. The butterflies are all identical on the inside, but have many differences in
appearance.
d. The butterflies share many essential characteristics, but also vary in many features.

Fitness is a term often used by biologists to explain the evolutionary success of certain
organisms. Which feature would a biologist consider to be most important in
determining which butterflies were the “most fit”?
a. Large body size and ability to fly quickly away from predators.
b. Excellent ability to compete for food.
c. High number of offspring that survived to reproductive age.
d. High number of matings with many different females.

Assuming ideal conditions with abundant food and space and no predators, what
would happen if a pair of Miami Blues were placed on an island off the coast of
Florida?
a. The Miami blue population would grow slowly, as butterflies would have only the
number of babies that are needed to replenish the population.
b. The Miami blue population would grow slowly at first, then would grow rapidly, and
thousands of butterflies would fill the hammock.
c. The Miami blue population would never become very large, because only organisms
such as weeds and bacteria reproduce in that manner.
d. The Miami blue population would continue to grow slowly over time.

Once a population of butterflies has been established for a number of years in a real
(not ideal) tropical hardwood hammock with other organisms including predators,
what will likely happen to the population?
a. The butterfly population will stay about the same size.
b. The butterfly population will continue to rapidly grow in size.
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c. The butterfly population will gradually decrease until no more butterflies are left.
d. It is impossible to tell because populations do not follow patterns.

In butterfly populations, what are the primary changes that occur gradually over time?
a. The traits of each individual butterfly within a population gradually change.
b. The proportions of butterflies having different traits within a population change.
c. Successful behaviors learned by certain butterflies are passed on to offspring.
d. Mutations occur to meet the needs of the butterflies as the environment changes.

What did watching the video do for your understanding of evolution?
Was the story particularly important to your understanding? Give specific examples.
Was the imagery particularly important to your understanding? Give specific examples.
The program showed how some orchids have structures that seem to mimic the females
of a species of wasp. Males are attracted to this structure and try to mate with it, and
they inadvertently pollinate the flower. How would an evolutionary biologist explain this
type of mimicry, assuming that the orchids’ ancestors did not have these structures?
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CHAPTER 5.
WHAT IS “EDUCATIONAL” IN A FREE-CHOICE SCIENCE WORLD?
DETERMINING WHAT AUDIENCES BELIEVE ABOUT THE EDUCATIONAL
VALUE OF NATURE PROGRAMS

Abstract:
Wildlife and nature programs have the potential to engage and teach large
audiences about the natural world in free-choice learning environments, but they also
may be complicit in the public’s misunderstanding of basic scientific principles such as
evolution. Theory suggests that epistemological beliefs and cognitive dispositions affect
when and what individuals learn, especially for socio-scientific topics such as evolution.
As a result, audiences may look to descriptors like “educational” as they consider freechoice learning experiences without any prior knowledge of the content value. This
paper reports on a study conducted to determine what audiences believe to be the
“educational value” of wildlife and other nature films. Results indicated that 95.9% (n =
294) of respondents believed nature films were “educational,” while slightly fewer
(87.4%) agreed that the primary goal for these programs is to teach about nature. Indeed,
the more respondents believed nature programs were designed to be educational, the
more they believed that both the science (p < 0.001) and nature (p < 0.001) were
portrayed accurately. In terms of the public understanding of science, audiences clearly
treat nature programs as credible and authoritative sources of information, a significant
issue given that they are expecting to learn from a source that often provides inaccurate
and misleading explanations of important processes such as evolution.
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How educational are free-choice science learning opportunities? This question is
difficult to answer because it first requires a definition of “educational” in an out-ofschool context. From the perspective of those who produce science information for the
public, the question may seem relatively straightforward. An “educational” opportunity
would be one that is specifically designed to teach about a subject and is grounded in
some disciplinary standards. In fact, key formal education resources, including Project
2061 (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1990) and the National
Science Education Standards (NSES; National Research Council, 1996), can be used to
assess the adequacy of the information presented in resources outside of formal
environments (Bybee, 2001). For example, Yager & Falk (2007) showcase a variety of
successful examples of how the NSES can and should be applied to learning
opportunities outside of school.
Educators differ about the labels applied in these environments, however; nonformal, informal, and free-choice have all been used to describe the distinction from
structured school environments. According to Falk (2001), the term “informal” (and
similarly non-formal) implies a difference in the process of learning as a function of the
physical setting. On the other hand, “free-choice” implicates the social context and
underlying motivation of the learner; a free-choice learning environment describes the
unique, intrinsic needs and interests of the learner (Falk, 2001). In a free-choice context,
therefore, individuals are free to choose when, where, and what they want to learn, and
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those choices may or may not include resources guided by the NSES, for example.
Obviously, examinations or other tests of understanding are not a component of the freechoice environment. Moreover, in free-choice contexts learners are not segregated by
age or achievement like they may be in formal environments, and opportunities to learn
science are generally designed for broad audiences. So, by assuming the actual learning
process is the same across environments, defining “educational” from a producer’s
perspective in a free-choice context may overlook the diversity and motivation of
individuals approaching these educational opportunities. This paper explores the
educational value of science knowledge in the free-choice environment from the
perspective of the consumer.
From a consumer’s perspective, the free-choice science world is full of learning
opportunities, including museums, zoos, local parks, science centers, news,
documentaries, science- and non-science-fiction films, popular television, and the internet
(Bates, 2005; Falk, Storksdieck, & Dierking, 2007). It is a “marketplace of ideas,” to
borrow a metaphorical model of free-speech (see also Bartley III, 1987) which, in theory,
allows for the open sharing of diverse ideas that leads ultimately to “truth.” Oliver
Wendell Holmes, when he coined the metaphor, argued that “the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market” (Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 1919). From a democratic theory perspective, the
marketplace focuses on maximum idea exchange in the context of effective selfgovernment, whereas the economic perspective of this free-speech model focuses on
maximizing consumer welfare and competition (Napoli, 1999). These two theoretical
perspectives combine to idealize the marketplace as a source of competitive, efficient,
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and unregulated ideas, highly sensitive to consumer preferences, that yields informed
decision-making and a well-functioning democracy (Napoli, 1999). In fact, the
marketplace of ideas metaphor is most often used in the context of consumers’ and
citizens’ rights to receive information (Sweeney, 1984 in Napoli, 1999), but it is
criticized for its unwarranted broad application in jurisprudence (Hopkins, 1996).
Criticisms also have focused on issues of ontology associated with the “truth” to which
Holmes refers, as well as cognitive dissonance (Ingber, 1984; Baker, 1989), but can just
as easily include epistemology. Nevertheless, the metaphor serves as a useful model to
begin exploring how consumers approach educational opportunities related to science
outside of formal school contexts.
Why should science educators be concerned about the consumer’s perspective for
defining resources as “educational”? In the marketplace of ideas, the learning process
may be the same as formal learning environments, but marketplace influences, not
standards-based influences, visibly dominate. The marketplace is full of competing ideas
all vying for some competitive grasp of the public opinion of “truth.” Consumers must
choose among competing claims, but acceptance and rejection is rarely straightforward
(Locke, 1999); the processing of these diverse experiences is complex (Bates, 2005). As
Locke (1999) noted, the degree of acceptance and rejection of claims is a balance of
specific circumstances, experience, and other possible sources of assumed authoritative
knowledge. Therefore, the rhetorical organization of scientific discourse in the
marketplace of ideas may have a huge affect on consumer’s perspectives.
However, not all of the competing ideas in the free-choice marketplace are of
equal “educational” value. Knowledge constructed from poor sources obtained in the
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marketplace can lead to misconceptions that can be very difficult to alter (Wandersee,
Mintzes, & Novak, 1994), especially when adults are no longer influenced by formal
learning environments. In addition, individuals motivated to learn are most likely to
incorporate the broad knowledge messages communicated through free-choice venues
(Falk, Heimlich, & Bronnenkant, 2008; Maurer & Reinemann, 2006). So, if messages
that portray science poorly are common in the marketplace, motivated learners (i.e., those
most likely to engage in science and society debates) will learn incorrect conceptions
about key scientific processes, such as evolution.
Science educators need to understand all of the opportunities available to
consumers of science as we address the public understanding of science and science
literacy because both science in general, and evolution in particular, are being challenged
in the marketplace for their “truth” value. Although philosophical discussions about
ontology, axiology, and epistemology are enormously fruitful in a “metacognitive” sense,
ultimately we need to return to an understanding of shared, public knowledge and its role
in the scientific enterprise (Chalmers, 1999). For example, antibiotic resistance, gene
therapy, disease, food production, environmental quality, and biotechnology are all areas
of active biological research at the interface with society. While they are topics that
clearly involve multiple ways of knowing, truly understanding the science underlying
these topics requires a fundamental understanding of the theory of evolution (Antolin &
Herbers, 2001). Knowing that antibiotics affect only bacteria, not viruses, is one level of
understanding; understanding that time-honored drugs are no longer effective, perhaps a
result of the overuse of antibiotics in everyday life, is another level of understanding; and
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understanding that antibiotics are strong selective agents that act on the incomplete
eradication of populations is yet another.
In the marketplace of ideas, scientists and non-scientists (e.g., creationists) present
different versions of the world in rhetorical terms of competing reasoning of an
argument; they use similar argumentative modes and techniques (Locke, 1999).
Purveyors of messages in the marketplace often use discrepant or inconsistent
information with the purpose of bringing about attitude change (Baker, 1989).
Consumers may be unaware that museums, websites, and nature programs may be
misused by groups with a particular agenda who manipulate these different media to
compete for some “truth” value or credibility. For example, creationists may want to
persuade the “uncertain” public to question the fundamentals of evolution, and science as
a whole (Clark, Foster, & York, 2007; Scott & Matzke, 2007). Their goal is to return our
society to its fundamentalist roots – to “defeat scientific materialism and its destructive
moral, cultural and political legacies and to replace materialistic explanations with the
theistic understanding that nature and human beings are created by God”
(www.antievolution.org, also see Forrest & Gross, 2004) through a deliberate attack in
the marketplace of ideas. Indeed, one part of their persuasion strategy includes the tactic
of arguing for “equal time” for the “alternative theory” of intelligent design (Forrest,
2007).
More than any other, this strategy to invoke “equal time” appeals to people’s
sense of reciprocity (Cialdini, 1993). It also plays well with journalists trying to meet
some semblance of “balance,” and the appeal to “fairness” creates additional uncertainty
by casting doubt on the credibility of anyone who will not “play by the rules.” As a
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result, dissonance purveyors with a message perceived as strong by the uncertain
consumer in the marketplace may be afforded the same credibility as an evolutionary
scientist despite differences in information and knowledge provided. In this free-for-all
marketplace of ideas, acceptance and rejection depend on consumers’ levels of
understanding, their experiences, their culture, and the rhetorical organization that
influences their responses to authoritative knowledge (Locke, 1999).
This is particularly true with media, like wildlife and nature programs, already
considered “educational” by convention. While nature programs have the potential to
engage and teach large audiences about the natural world in free-choice learning
environments, they also may be complicit in the public’s misunderstanding of evolution.
Both Mitman (1999) and Bousé (2000) clearly have endorsed embracing a highly
skeptical view of reality presented in wildlife films, warning that this genre is driven by
the need for compelling story lines rather than scientific accuracy. Dingwall & Aldridge
(2006) suggest that nature film narratives implicitly endorse creationist accounts of life
on earth, especially in the “blue-chip” sub-genre, a sub-genre with high production values
and strong visual appeal, often without a host – the narration is voiced over the
production.
The producers of these programs clearly represent different worldviews, but the
information they add to the marketplace of ideas calls into question how to navigate
through resources that have different connotations of “educational.” Ironically, a learner
motivated to seek a free-choice science learning experience may have little information to
assess the quality of the experience sought. From a consumer’s perspective, individuals
must either already possess the knowledge to assess the quality of the experience or rely
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on an assessment applied by some other source. Yet, awards and the credibility of the
awarding institutions, accreditation, and sponsorships may not always be obvious, or
straightforward characteristics.

Theoretical Underpinning and Research Questions
Television Audiences
Understanding how audiences approach free-choice science learning opportunities
begins with new conceptualizations of these important consumers. Communication is not
a linear model. No longer are studies of mass communication based on content-analysis
(an assessment from producers’ perspectives) assuming a linear flow of information that
audiences acquire (see Bates, 2005). For example, visitors to museums actively engage
prior experiences in their interpretation of exhibits (Stocklmayer & Gilbert, 2002).
Television, on the other hand, has a long history of considering audiences as passive
receptacles of the medium’s account of the world (Wilson, 1993), but free-choice
audiences do not just passively consume materials they find in the marketplace. Indeed,
recent media-effects models incorporate audience engagement, using prior knowledge as
a predictor of how media messages are internalized (Busselle, Ryabovolova, & Wilson,
2004; Potter, Pashupati, Pekurny, Hoffman, & Davis, 2002). Likewise, researchers
exploring the public understanding of science suggest that future work should attend
more fully to audience processing of science-related media along with their content
analyses of texts (Bates, 2005).
Uses-and-gratifications research approaches television as a source of influence on
conceptual understanding within the context of other possible influences (Rubin, 2004).
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Audiences purposefully seek out programs from a diverse selection of television
programs, as well as competing forms of media, with a specific goal in mind (Rubin,
2004). The consumer is an active viewer. The content alone may be less important to the
meaning that is ultimately constructed than the media experiences audiences bring, the
context in which they use media, and how and why they use the medium (Brown 1998).
What then is the influence of nature programming on knowledge development
related to the understanding of evolution? Ultimately, two kinds of information are
needed: (1) whether viewers possess, and use, the kinds of knowledge provided to them
by the nature program, and (2) what kinds of knowledge viewers actually possess and use
when understanding the nature program (Livingstone, 1998). Whether or not viewers can
use the information depends in part on the conceptual understanding of science and, in
the analysis that follows, evolution. In addition, the prior experiences audiences have
with specific genres are critical in their textual readings and interpretation of new
experiences (Bates, 2005; Busselle and Bilandzic, 2008; Livingstone, 1998).
Wildlife and nature programs that present evolutionary science poorly may be
particularly insidious if audiences perceive the genre as “educational.” For example,
audiences expect certain types of character and plot development in soap operas because
of past experiences with soap operas, and they interpret these elements in light of those
past experiences (Livingstone, 1998). Moreover, emotional connections affect recall and
memory (Fujioka, 2005). Thus, past experiences with educational programming may
leave audiences unaware that narratives in wildlife and nature programs are shaped from
dramatic perspectives rather than educational perspectives. For example, wildlife
programs often feature orphans as the main characters, but life history evolution predicts
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that in species with high parental care (most charismatic megafauna), orphans will rarely
survive to adulthood. Narration that incorporates teleology as a mechanism may not
directly promote alternative “theories” to evolution, such as intelligent design (Dingwall
and Aldridge 2006), but it can promote alternative conceptions nonetheless.

Personal Epistemology
Personal epistemology, or the beliefs an individual holds about knowledge and its
production, may provide the theoretical grounding to predict media influences, and more
broadly, the learning outcomes about science in the marketplace of ideas. Specifically,
personal epistemology may be closely tied to the kind of knowledge viewers use when
understanding a nature program. Numerous models are available that address how
individuals’ beliefs about the certainty, source, justification, acquisition, and structure of
knowledge affect learning (see Duell & Schommer-Atkins, 2001). Multi-dimensional
models predict that these dimensions develop independently, whereas uni-dimensional
models hypothesize that if one dimension develops the other dimensions also develop
(Duell & Schommer-Atkins, 2001). Using a multi-dimensional approach, Schommer
(1990) and Schraw et al. (2002) characterize personal epistemology along five axes: (1)
the stability of knowledge, ranging from knowledge being unchanging to knowledge
being tentative; (2) the source of knowledge, ranging from omniscient authority to reason
and empirical evidence; (3) the structure of knowledge, ranging from isolated bits and
pieces to integrated concepts; (4) the speed of learning, ranging from quick to not-at-all
to gradual; and (5) the ability to learn ranging from being fixed at birth to being able to
change.
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The Reflective Judgment Model takes a uni-dimensional approach to personal
epistemology. With extensive study, King & Kitchener (1994) describe seven stages in
the development of complex reasoning about ill-structured problems (problems that
cannot be solved with a high degree of certainty). These stages can be grouped into three
levels: pre-reflective, quasi-reflective, and reflective thinking (King & Kitchener, 2004).
Pre-reflective thinking is characterized by judgments that knowledge is certain and single
correct answers exist that usually come from authority figures. Quasi-reflective thinking
is characterized by judgments that uncertainty is part of the process of knowing,
understanding that knowledge is an abstraction, and that it is constructed – not simply
accepted from others. Individuals recognize different types and rules of evidence. Their
judgments, however, indicate a tenuous relationship between gathering evidence and
drawing conclusions, resulting in idiosyncratic views of knowledge claims. Reflective
thinking is characterized by judgments that consistently use evidence and reason.
Reflective thinkers are metacognitive thinkers, aware of the context dependency of
knowledge and the need to revisit and re-evaluate conclusions and knowledge claims
(King & Kitchener, 2004).
Although psychologists disagree about the independence of the development, the
dimensions of most personal epistemology models generally fall into two classes (Hofer,
2004):
1. the nature of knowledge (what one believes knowledge is), including dimensions
of certainty of knowledge and simplicity of knowledge; and
2. the nature or process of knowing (how one comes to know), including dimensions
such as source of knowledge and justification for knowing (a dimension specific
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to the Reflective Judgment Model that describes how individuals evaluate
knowledge; King & Kitchener, 1994).
In addition, researchers generally agree that these beliefs play an important role in
learning. For example, if people believe knowledge is certain and passed down by
authority figures, they are less likely to question authority in the classroom (SchommerAikins, 2004) or in free-choice learning environments. This can be particularly
worrisome with regards to “ill-structured” problems and controversial or socioscientific
issues (Sadler, 2004) because the marketplace is full of authority-driven resources that
derive their credibility from little more than name recognition (e.g., The Center for
Science and Culture). Personal epistemology may be especially important in a broad
cultural acceptance of evolution (Sinatra, Southerland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003).
The challenge, then, is that people continue to learn outside of the classroom, and
they may be incorporating mixed messages into their understanding depending on the
free-choice science resources from which they draw their knowledge. Therefore,
understanding the educational beliefs audiences may have about nature films may be a
key first step in improving evolution education in a broad context. Individuals motivated
to learn may choose resources based on some unknown assessment of the “educational”
value. If audiences generally consider wildlife and nature films to be educational, then
the film’s flawed representation of science may not only be overlooked, but the
misconceptions portrayed may be incorporated into viewers’ conceptualizations.
This study attempts to determine audience’s views of the educational value of
wildlife and nature films. Personal epistemology may play an important role in the
impact wildlife and nature programs have on the viewing public’s understanding of
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evolution. If viewers believe knowledge is certain, then they may accept the information
presented in wildlife and nature films without question. Similarly, if they believe
knowledge is passed down from authority figures, they may be even less likely to
question the authority of free-choice learning environments. Individuals with higher
levels of education in general, and the natural sciences in particular, should be more wary
of nature films than less well-educated individuals because of both advanced
understanding of scientific processes and advanced development of personal
epistemology. They should have less of an expectation for an “educational” experience.
A more subtle distinction lies with how educational audiences believe nature
programs are designed to be. Addressing the design aspect may remove some bias
associated with interest in nature programs in general. Indeed, audiences that believe
wildlife and nature films are designed to be educational may be more likely accept the
content as an accurate portrayal of natural processes, like evolution, than audiences that
do not (Figure 5.1).

Materials and Methods
Developing the Instrument
I designed a survey (Chapter Appendix 1) using principles outlined in Dillman
(2007). Twenty closed questions (e.g., Likert-scale, yes/no) intended to assess different
aspects about beliefs about the educational value of nature programs or characteristics of
the respondents were developed. These items were designed to elicit individuals’ beliefs
about nature programs and the information used to make those judgments.
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Nature Programs
Descriptive
• age
• gender
• education

Epistemological
• certain-uncertain
• authoritative-constructed
• simple-complex

Audience Characteristics

Audience Beliefs

Nature programs are educational
• opinion
• defining characteristics
Nature programs are designed to be educational
• opinion
• portrayal of science/nature
Public Understanding of
Science & Evolution

Figure 5.1. The research approach for determining audiences beliefs about the
educational value of nature programs. Heavy arrows indicate the variables addressed
with the audience survey.
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Because defining the educational value of a television program was potentially
problematic, the dependent variable, educational, was operationalized in the survey in a
variety of forms. The first form was a direct question: “Do you believe that nature films
are educational?” The second form was the development of a scale designed to identify
the qualities respondents associate with the word. Participants were asked whether they
agreed or disagreed with a series of statements (e.g., “If a nature film is educational, then
it is accurate, the content has been reviewed/approved by scientists, and it presents the
most current scientific understanding) scored on Likert-type scales from strongly agree to
strongly disagree (Chapter Appendix 1).
Determining whether a nature film was “educational” was only one approach to
the problem; determining whether audiences believed films were designed to be
educational added a dimension that extended beyond whether an individual liked
“educational” programs. In general, if a wildlife/nature film was designed to be
educational, then by definition, one would expect the primary goal for the program to be
teaching about wildlife and nature. Similarly, one would expect that the narration was
written to explain and clarify the scientific understanding of the wildlife and/or the
ecology of the topic. A subtler distinction was the expectation that the producers have
advanced knowledge about wildlife and natural sciences. Therefore, designed to be
educational was operationalized using several items that produced straightforward,
nominal answers: (1) do you believe the primary goal of most nature films is to teach
about nature, (2) do you believe the narration for nature films is written to explain and
clarify what we know about nature, and (3) do you believe the producers for nature films
are experts in the natural sciences. A second item addressed the knowledge respondents
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believed producers had with regard to science. “Do you believe the producers for nature
films know more about wildlife and natural sciences than you do?” was a Likert-scale
item ranging from producers know significantly more to significantly less than the
respondent (Rank Knowledge). A third form questioned whether respondents believed
that science and nature were portrayed accurately (Portrayal of Science, Portrayal of
Nature).
Two different metrics were used as independent variables: descriptive
characteristics and epistemological characteristics. These variables were operationalized
in several forms. Descriptive characteristics included gender, the highest level of
education the participant had achieved, the number of courses respondents had taken that
included biology, ecology, or the natural sciences, and the respondents’ self-reported
interest in biology, ecology, or the natural sciences. Epistemological characteristics were
based on recent assessments developed in personal epistemology (e.g., Hofer, 2000; King
& Kitchener, 1994; Schommer, 1990; Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002) relating to the
nature of knowledge (certainty and simplicity of knowledge) and the nature and the
process of knowing (sources of knowledge and justification for knowing). People that
believe knowledge is certain should be more likely to believe nature films are
educational, and people that believe knowledge is passed down from omniscient authority
should believe nature films are designed to be educational. Addressing how individuals
related the structure of knowledge to their beliefs may not be as generalizable because
some nature films clearly approach the story from an integrated standpoint. Nevertheless,
understanding the complexity of knowledge should influence beliefs about the
educational value of nature films.
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The personal epistemology characteristics defined here are likely related to the
descriptive characteristics (King & Kitchener, 1994), but personal epistemology metrics
are subtle and require extensive questioning to obtain measurements. Therefore, I chose
to include personal epistemology items specific to issues regarding evolution education
as proxies for larger, more complex metrics. Nominal items included asking whether
respondents believed nature films should only include facts about nature not theories,
whether theories were important in nature films, whether trustworthy narrators are an
important component of the educational experience, and whether issues have more than
one side. Respondents also were asked about the influence of fact-based stories on
knowledge simplicity, whether knowledge changed over time, and whether most things
worth knowing are simple to understand (Chapter Appendix 1).
Items were tested in three phases to improve clarity and assess the information
being collected. The first test included a group of five professionals with experience in
education, evolution, and television production. These individuals spoke openly about
their thinking as they answered each survey item. This initial testing indicated that some
items required revision to clarify objectives, but all five professionals agreed in the value
of the research. In addition, time to completion during this initial testing was measured.
The second phase was a “beta-test” with the revised items using students in an
upper division forest ecology course taught at the University of Montana. This sample
was selected specifically to determine how adults with an advanced knowledge of the
natural processes portrayed in nature programs might think about the educational value of
those programs. Results from this second phase indicated that some of the items were
still not addressing their intended goals (e.g., the acceptability of faking situations in
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nature films), so the survey was offered to ecologists and science educators at a national
meeting of the Ecological Society of America as a third phase. Visitors to a scientific
poster presenting the results from the beta-test of the instrument were solicited for their
responses. Several open-ended items were included in this version of the instrument to
determine whether concepts were being addressed adequately with other items.
Reviewers were very helpful with their input, and the open-ended items were converted
to closed items based on their responses. The final survey included 28 items, taking less
than 10 minutes to complete (Chapter Appendix 1).

Implementing the Survey
The ideal survey population for this research is adults who may or may not watch
nature films. This population does not include homeless individuals, but it does not
exclude individuals that do not own television sets. This survey population would be the
most broadly representative in assessing how one defines nature films as educational and
who has thought about the educational value of these films. Alternatively, a population
exposed to nature films frequently should represent the uppermost bounds of the
variables being tested. The city of Missoula, Montana, annually hosts an international
wildlife film festival, and the festival organizers actively involve the Missoula
community, through citizen judging panels, parades, and/or public viewings. A major
goal for the organizers is, in fact, promoting the educational value of these types of films.
Moreover, Missoula is a community with close ties to the ecological world around it; a
large proportion of the community lives there to experience the outdoors. Therefore, the
likelihood of individuals thinking about the educational value of nature films in this
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community is high. Indeed, this population should provide more illuminating results than
a broad US survey population. Therefore, the sample frame was limited to Missoula
County.
Participants were selected systematically from the most recent local telephone
book using a randomly generated starting number. Only home addresses or individuals
listing their business address as their sole address (e.g., lawyers) were included. The
number of respondents required was derived from the amount of sampling error tolerated,
the population size from which the sample was drawn, the variation in response
characteristics, and the confidence interval desired for the estimates according to:
 



 1 
1  /   1



where Ns is the completed sample size, Np is the population size, p is the proportion of the
population expected to choose one of two response categories, B is the accepted sampling
error, and C is the Z statistic corresponding to the confidence level desired (Dillman,
2007). Using a 95% confidence interval, an 80/20 split (an homogenous response level),
and a population of 35,000 households in the telephone book, the sample size calculated
was 243 respondents. Dillman’s (2007) Tailored Design Method suggested that upwards
of a 60% response rates could be expected, so a total of 480 respondents were contacted
with a pre-notice postcard explaining the research and indicating the survey would be
arriving shortly. Only one adult per household was directed to respond to the survey. A
confidentiality agreement was in place per Institutional Review Board specifications at
The University of Montana.
Roughly 30% of surveys were returned within 10 days of being sent. The 2006
American Community Survey (http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable?_bm=y&346

geo_id=05000US30063&-qr_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_DP5&ds_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_&-_lang=en&-redoLog=false&-_sse=on) provided a
breakdown of the adult population of Missoula County. Early analyses confirmed
predictions that the sample would represent an older segment of the population than
census data would indicate; the mail sample was significantly short on individuals 40
years old and younger. Rather than continue on with an expensive method designed to
elicit a greater response rate from this segment of the population, efforts were re-directed
towards younger members of the Missoula community. A single reminder/thank-you
letter was sent to all participants (which elicited an additional 75 responses), and that
aspect of the survey was closed.
Although the population at The University of Montana may not have represented
the entire missing age group, it was chosen as the most likely source for a large number
of “younger” respondents. Invitations to complete surveys were solicited at different
times of day at several different locations around the campus, targeting individuals that
likely did not live on campus (parking lots, main points of entry/exit, and the “mall”
between the library and the University Center) and thus, respondents tended to be older
than students living in on-campus residences. To enhance the likelihood of broad
representation, participants were offered the opportunity to enter a drawing for a $50 gift
card for the university’s bookstore.

Analyses
Likert-scale variables: All of the 7-item Likert-scale variables were highly
skewed with generally high kurtosis and consequently very little variability (Table 5.1).
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Transformations did not improve the distributions of the responses. As a result,
responses to these items were reclassified to reflect more even distributions than the
original scale variables without losing much of the diversity of original data. The Likertscale variable describing how educational respondents believed nature films actually are
required additional re-coding. Initial examination of this variable indicated incongruities
with other measures of this concept; respondents seemed to believe that nature films were
less educational than they had indicated previously. Only 53% ranked the educational
value at 5 or greater (of 7 possible), and 35% ranked it 3 or less. This ranking likely
reflected an error in survey design, however. On the survey form, the item about the
educational value of nature programs appeared immediately after the item asking
respondents how educational they believed nature films were designed to be, but the two
items scaled in opposite directions. As a result, respondents may have used the same
scale on both items in their assessments, that is, inadvertently reversing the scale for their
thoughts about the educational value of nature films. The item addressing design was
highly skewed toward “designed to be educational”. In fact, the modal response was 2
(on a scale from 1 = designed to be educational to 7 = not designed to be educational),
and 80% of respondents ranked the variable 3 or above. Respondents that did reverse
scales should have been most apparent for those selecting the same numerical value for
each item; someone that ranked the design of nature films as a “2” would have selected
“2” for the educational value rather than “6” if they had reversed the scale. Indeed, 84
individuals selected identical values for the two items (20 of which were “4” or the
equivalent of “no opinion”). When those respondents’ scores were reversed (i.e., “2”
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Table 5.1.
Measures of the shape of the distributions of Likert-scale items obtained from the
audience survey.
Likert-scale Item

n

Skewness

SE

Kurtosis

SE

Designed to be Educational

293

-0.917

0.142

0.651

0.284

Educational Value

295

-0.615

0.142

-0.543

0.283

Interest

297

-0.703

0.141

-0.273

0.282

Portrayal of Science

293

-0.556

0.142

0.158

0.284

Portrayal of Nature

293

-0.901

0.142

0.928

0.284

replaced with “6”), the distribution reflected the skewed distribution apparent in the
variable “designed to be educational” (Figure 5.3).
Responses to 7-item Likert scales were converted from interval data by recoding
them as three or four relatively equally distributed categories that varied depending on
the original distribution of the data (Table 5.2). For example, responses of 1, 2, 3, and 4
on the Designed to be Educational Likert scale were recoded as “1”, 5 was recoded as
“2”, 6 as “3”, and 7 as “4” to represent those who did not feel strongly about the design,
those that were almost neutral, those that strongly believed, and those that very strongly
believed that nature films were designed to be educational (the scale was reversed to
reflect a similar direction in responses). Similarly, Interest was recoded to three
categories representing those with high interest, those with moderate interest, and those
with little or no interest.
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Table 5.2.
Sample size and proportion of responses for categories of recoded Likert-scale items.

Item

1

2

3

4

Designed to be Educational

60 (21%)

68 (23%)

116 (40%)

49 (17%)

Educational Value

58 (20%)

110 (37%)

99 (34%)

28 (10%)

Interest

86 (29%)

134 (45%)

77 (26%)

---a

Portrayal of Science

44 (15%)

72 (25%)

94 (32%)

83 (28%)

Portrayal of Nature

73 (25%)

91 (31%)

101 (35%)

28 (10%)

a

Recoded scale only included three categories.

One additional Likert-scale item was recoded; Rank Knowledge was recoded
from a 6-item scale to three categories. These categories represented those individuals
that felt they know significantly more about wildlife than nature film producers, those
that felt they know slightly more, and those that felt they know the same or less.
Variables were coded and analyzed using SPSS (v16.0). Generally, nonparametric tests (Chi-square, Mann-Whitney U-test, Kruskal-Wallis H-test) were used to
analyze relationships because of the non-numerical nature of most variables and violation
of normality assumptions for other variables, whether they be independent or dependent.
Where variables did not appear to violate assumptions of normality, analogous parametric
tests were used.
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Results
Characteristics of the Sample Population
Of the 480 surveys sent out by mail, 207 were returned for a 43% return rate. In
addition, 94 responses were obtained via the on-campus survey. The average age of the
289 participants that provided their age was 47.1 years old (SE = 1.20). Proportions
in10-year age categories were fairly consistent with proportions from the 2006 American
Community census, however ages from 25 to 45 were slightly underrepresented and ages
55 to 64 were slightly overrepresented in this sample. In addition, more males (53%, n =
157) than females (47%, n = 139) completed surveys. Nearly half (49.0%) of all
respondents had completed at least a bachelor’s degree, although, as would be expected,
this sample was highly dependent upon the survey sub-sample; campus respondents were
generally still completing their first degree and mail respondents had completed degrees
(Table 5.3). Nevertheless, campus respondents had not taken more biology courses than
mail respondents (Table 5.4).
Respondents were not all avid nature film viewers, as might be expected from a
self-selected sample. In fact, responses were distributed fairly evenly across the options
for frequency of viewing except those that rarely or never watched (> 1-2 times per
month = 26%, 1-2 times per month = 23%, 1-2 times every few months = 26%, 1-2 times
per year = 19%, and never = 5%; n=300). In addition, mail survey respondents were not
more likely to represent avid nature film viewers than campus survey respondents (Figure
5.2). Interest in biology, ecology, or the natural sciences was highly skewed, however,
with more than 70% of respondents ranking their interest as high (1-3 of a possible 7;
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Table 5.3.
The proportion of respondents in the mail and campus samples and the highest level of
education they had attained.
Highest Level of Education

Mail

Campus

Some high school

1

0%

0

0%

High school diploma or equivalent

27

13%

9

10%

Some technical school

5

2%

0

0%

Technical degree or equivalent

7

3%

1

1%

Some college

35

17%

45

48%

2-year college degree

14

7%

8

9%

Bachelor’s degree

60

29%

18

19%

Master’s degree

37

18%

9

10%

Higher degree

18

9%

4

4%

Total

204

94

Note. The difference between samples was significant (χ2 = 20.78, 3 df, p <
0.001).
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Table 5.4.
The proportion of respondents in the mail and campus samples and the number of
courses they had taken that included biology, ecology, or the natural sciences.
Number of Biology Courses

Mail

Campus

none

28

14%

7

7%

1-2

59

29%

33

35%

3-4

54

27%

23

24%

5-6

23

11%

10

11%

more than 6

39

19%

21

22%

Total

203

94

Note. The samples were not significantly different (χ2 = 3.405, 4 df, p = 0.49).

Chapter Appendix 1). The campus survey respondents tended to be more interested in
these subjects than the mail survey respondents, but the difference was not significant.

Scale Construction
Because the overall purpose of the survey was not to develop scales describing
audience beliefs but to predict relationships between beliefs about knowledge and beliefs
about the educational value of nature programs, items were generally treated as separate
variables. Two scales were identified a priori, however: personal epistemology and
audiences’ defining characteristics of nature programs. Different approaches were
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Mail survey
Campus survey

Proportion of sample

30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Regularly

Frequently

Often

Rarely/never

Frequency of viewing

Figure 5.2. Proportion of respondents from each sub-sample (mail survey n = 207,
campus survey n = 93) watching nature films regularly (more than 1-2 times per month),
frequently (1-2 times per month), often (1-2 times every few months), and rarely (1-2
times per year to never).

necessary in the development of these scales because the original items did not all yield
the same kind of data (e.g., nominal or interval).

Personal Epistemology Dimensions: A limited and varying number of items
addressed three axes of personal epistemology, so the items addressing the (1) tentative
nature of knowledge, (2) source of knowledge, and (3) complexity of knowledge were
collapsed to reflect the boundaries of their respective dimensions (Table 5.5). First, to
address what respondents believed about the tentative nature of knowledge (from stable
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Proportion of responses

40%

Original

35%

Recoded

30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
1
2
3
Not educational

4

5

6
7
Very educational

Figure 5.3. Proportion of respondents ranking the educational value of nature programs
from not educational to educational (n = 295). Original = non-recoded data. Recoded =
data were adjusted for respondents likely misreading the ranking scale.

and unchanging to uncertain and evidentiary), a single Likert-type item that asked about
agreement or disagreement with the idea that our basic understanding of a topic would
not change in five years was collapsed to reflect the sample population. Fifty-nine
percent of respondents strongly disagreed indicating some understanding of the tentative
nature of knowledge, but 25% only mildly disagreed, and 16% believed otherwise. As a
result, a high score of “3” was assigned to respondents that strongly disagreed, a
moderate score of “2” to those that only mildly disagreed, and a low score of “1” to those
that agreed or strongly agreed (Table 5.5).
Second, two items were posed that were directed at the source of knowledge from
omniscient authority to evidence and reason. Respondents were asked about the
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educational value of a nature film using a trustworthy narrator, and 39.0% indicated that
yes, the narrator’s credibility was associated with an educational experience. Likewise,
when asked whether respondents agreed or disagreed with the statement that if two
different nature films present two different arguments about the same topic, at least one
of them must be wrong, the majority of respondents disagreed (yes = 12.9%, no = 87.1%,
n = 294). Using a cross-tabulation of the two yes/no items, individuals were assigned a
score of “2” (use of evidence and reason) if they responded “no” to both, and a score of
“1” (respond to omniscient authority) if they responded “yes” to either (Table 5.5).
Third, the last epistemological characteristic explored respondents’ beliefs about
the structure of knowledge by focusing on the importance of isolated bits of information
versus integrated concepts. When asked if scientific theories are unimportant because
they are “just theories” (a vernacular misconception about the nature of scientific
theories), a significant majority disagreed (yes = 13.4%, no = 86.6%). Similarly, when
asked whether only facts not theories should be presented in nature films, 20.4% said
“yes” and 79.6% said “no.” Two additional items addressed respondents’ beliefs about
this complexity of knowledge using Likert-type scales. In general, respondents agreed
that nature films were easy to understand because they contained so many facts, and that
most things worth knowing in nature films are simple to understand (Figure 5.4). These
four items employed different scales and collapsing required a series of cross-tabulations
that divided respondents based on some ability to recognize the complexity of knowledge
or their reliance on facts (Table 5.5). Consequently, I used cross-tabulations in three
steps. First, I combined the two yes/no items into a single variable with three categories
(“yes” to both, “no” to both, and combination of “yes” and “no”). Second, I combined
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Table 5.5.
Items used to measure and construct three nominal scales describing personal
epistemology: understanding of the tentative nature of knowledge, the role of the source
of knowledge, and understanding the complexity of knowledge.
Scale

Item

Mean

Mode

Range

1.6

1

0-4

2.4

3

1-3
(low, medium,
high)

Trustworthy Narrator (yes/no)

1.6

2

1-2

Omniscient Authority (yes/no)

1.9

2

1-2

1.5

2

1-2
(low, high)

Nature of Theories (yes/no)

1.9

2

1-2

Fact-based Knowledge (yes/no)

1.8

2

1-2

Easy Knowledge (Likert type)

2.9

2

1-3

Simple Knowledge (Likert-type)

2.8

2

1-3

1.6

2

1-2
(low, high)

Tentative Nature of Knowledge
Stable Knowledge (Likert-type)
recodeda
Source of Knowledge

recoded
Complexity of Knowledge

recoded
Note. See Chapter Appendix 1 for survey.
a

Items within each sub-category were collapsed using cross-tabulation and grouping to
produce the recoded variables.
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Proportion of responses

60%

Easy

50%

Simple

40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Strongly
disagree

Disagree

No opinion

Agree

Strongly
agree

Figure 5.4. The proportion of respondents that agreed or disagreed with the survey
Likert-scale items addressing the epistemological characteristic Complexity of
Knowledge (n = 296). Easy = “wildlife and nature films are easy to understand because
they contain so many facts”. Simple = “most things worth knowing in nature films are
simple to understand”.

Easy Knowledge with Simple Knowledge into another variable, the highest values (5-6)
were recoded to “3”, the intermediate values (4) to “2”, and the lowest values (2-3) to
“1”. Third, I combined the values from these two variables to produce the final collapsed
item, with low values (2-3) representing low understanding (“1”) and high values (4-5)
representing high understanding (“2”). These new collapsed variables (Tentative
Knowledge, Source of Knowledge, Complex Knowledge) were used to test for effects of
personal epistemology on respondents’ beliefs about the educational value of nature
films.
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The Defining Characteristics of Educational Nature Programs: One of the
approaches used to determine what respondents believed about the educational value of
nature programs involved a series of statements describing potential characteristics of
educational nature films; respondents were asked to agree or disagree with each in a
Likert-scale format. Not surprisingly, the responses to this series of items were highly
correlated. In fact, only 11 relationships were not correlated at the p < 0.001 level, and
those primarily involved respondents’ beliefs about giving human motivations to wildlife,
whether nature films should fake situations, and whether review and approval by
filmmakers was an important component of defining an educational film. Factor analysis
indicated that the items could be reduced to two components that together explained 52%
of the variation in the original items (Table 5.6). These two components represented the
concept of accurate portrayal (Portrayal = scientist approval, accurate, real stories, current
science, no sensationalism, and learn from watching), and the concept of representative
production aspects (Production = fake scenes, anthropomorphism, and filmmaker
approval; Table 5.7). As a result, the two new variables Portrayal and Production were
used as dependent variables to examine audience beliefs about the educational value of
nature programs.

Personal Epistemology
As theory would predict, the descriptive characteristics of respondents were
indeed related to the epistemological characteristics (Table 5.9). For example,
respondents with more education, especially in the natural sciences, generally had higher
scores for both Tentative Knowledge and Complex Knowledge than those with less

359

Table 5.6.
Factor structure of the initial and rotated factor analysis of items describing the
characteristics of an educational nature program.
Rotated

Initial
Component Eigenvalue % variance

Eigenvalue % variance

1

3.135

34.831

3.128

34.752

2

1.601

17.794

1.609

17.873

Note. n = 262. Eigenvalues < 1.0 have been omitted.

education. Age also appeared to affect how respondents thought about the Source of
Knowledge, but in an unexpected direction. Apparently, younger individuals were more
wary of authority in nature programs than older individuals.

Audience Beliefs about the Educational Value of Nature Films
An overwhelming majority of respondents believed that nature films are
educational (yes = 95.9%, no = 4.1%), and ranked the educational value high (mode =6,
65% ranking 5 out of 7 or above). This unwavering homogeneity of responses did not
lend itself to meaningful analyses with the independent variables, however. Only level of
interest and the epistemological characteristic Complex Knowledge were related to the
educational value respondents assigned to nature films (Table 5.10). Those that tended to
rank their level of interest as low also ranked the educational value of nature films as low.
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Table 5.7.
Factor loadings for components identified with factor analysis using the items describing
the characteristics of an educational nature program.
Component
Item

1

Accurate

0.767

Scientist Approval

0.742

Real Stories

0.741

Current Science

0.731

Sensation

0.633

Learn from Watching

0.517

2

Anthropomorphisma

0.824

Filmmaker Approval

-0.697

Fakea

0.606

Note. n = 262. All loadings smaller than 0.4 have been omitted.
a

Reverse keyed.
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Table 5.8.
The proportion of respondents in the mail and campus samples and their interest in
biology, ecology, or the natural sciences.
Level of Interest

Mail

Campus

1 (low interest)

5

2%

1

1%

2

10

5%

5

5%

3

14

7%

13

14%

4

28

14%

10

11%

5

52

26%

14

15%

6

49

24%

19

20%

7 (high interest)

45

22%

32

34%

Total

203

94

Note. The samples were not significantly different (χ2= 11.790, 6 df, p = 0.07).
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Table 5.9.
Statistical relationships between descriptive and epistemological characteristics of the
sample population.
Epistemological characteristic
Tentative
Knowledge

Source of
Knowledge

Complex
Knowledge

Highest level of education

χ2
df
p

13.310
6
0.038

.638
3
0.888

13.206
3
0.004

Biology courses

χ2
df
p

23.183
8
0.003

8.045
4
0.090

13.239
4
0.010

Gender

χ2
df
p

2.834
2
0.242

3.616
1
0.057

.423
1
0.515

Numerical age of respondent

F
df
p

2.485
2, 282
0.208

5.282
1, 273
0.022

1.153
1, 265
0.284

Descriptive characteristic

363

Table 5.10.
Statistical relationships between items that addressed whether respondents believed
nature programs were educational and respondent characteristics.
Educational

Educational
Value

Highest level of education

χ2
df
p

2.660
3
0.447

6.746
9
0.664

Biology courses

χ2
df
p

6.457
4
0.168

17.084
12
0.146

Interest

χ2
df
p

0.632
2
0.729

16.713
6
0.010

Gender

χ2
df
p

0.137
1
0.711

4.854
3
0.183

Numerical age of respondent

F
df
p

1.871
1, 280
0.172

2.196
3, 278
0.089

Tentative Nature of Knowledge

χ2
df
p

3.602
2
0.165

4.899
6
0.557

Source of Knowledge

χ2
df
p

0.344
1
0.558

3.703
3
0.295

Complexity of Knowledge

χ2
df
p

0.402
1
0.526

17.548
3
0.001

Respondent characteristics
Descriptive characteristics

Epistemological characteristics

Note. Educational was operationalized as a nominal variable (yes/no) and a Likert-scale
variable (range 1-7) whose values were collapsed to four nominal categories (see above).
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Similarly, those less likely to think of knowledge as isolated bits (Complexity of
Knowledge) were more critical and likely to rank the educational value as low.
Another measure of what audiences believed about how educational nature
programs are involved agreeing or disagreeing with a series of statements describing the
characteristics of educational nature programs. Respondents clearly believed that to be
educational nature films should be accurate, the stories should have really happened,
nature films should present the most current findings, and people should learn from
watching (Figure 5.5). The majority of respondents at least mildly agreed (mildly agree =
53.4%, strongly agree = 30.0%) that to be educational, scientists should have approved
the content of the nature film. Although respondents agreed that nature films should not
sensationalize how nature works (Figure 5.5), respondents did not feel strongly about
anthropomorphizing wildlife or faking situations to add to the story (Figure 5.6).
Feelings were mixed about whether other filmmakers should have approved the content;
about half agreed and the other half disagreed.
As with the straightforward items about educational value, little evidence
indicated that respondents waivered from their beliefs when defining characteristics of
nature programs. Portrayal (the new scale developed from the data) was related only to
the personal epistemology characteristic Complex Knowledge (Table 5.11). Those with
higher Complex Knowledge scores had lower scores on the Portrayal scale than those
with lower Complex Knowledge scores. The highest level of education and all three
epistemological characteristics were related to the new scale, Production, that described
respondents’ beliefs about production aspects of nature films. Higher levels of education
and higher epistemological scores were related to higher Production scores.
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Figure 5.5. Proportion of respondents that agreed or disagreed with items comprising the
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Portrayal scale characterizing educational nature films (n = 262).
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Figure 5.6. Proportion of respondents that agreed or disagreed with items comprising the
Production scale characterizing educational nature films (n = 262).
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When examined separately, epistemological characteristics were related to the use
of anthropomorphism in nature films, and the role of film-maker approval, but not
whether producers fake scenes to add to the story (Table 5.12). Individuals that tended to
believe in unchanging knowledge passed from authority in isolated bits were more likely
to accept anthropomorphism as a characteristic of nature programs than those that
accepted knowledge as tentative (Tentative Nature of Knowledge), arising from reason
and evidence (Source of Knowledge), and complex (Complexity of Knowledge).
Similarly, individuals that accepted knowledge as tentative, arising from reason and
evidence, and complex were less likely to believe that film-maker approval was an
important characteristic in defining educational nature programs than those that believe in
unchanging knowledge passed from authority in isolated bits.

Audience Beliefs about the Design of Nature Programs
As discussed previously, respondents believed nature films were designed to be
educational; over half scored them in one of the top two positions. Similarly, respondents
believed that the primary goal of most nature films is to teach about nature (yes = 87.4%,
no = 12.6%), and the narration for nature films is written to explain and clarify what we
know about nature (yes = 87.2%, no = 12.8%). When asked to rank their knowledge
versus nature program producers, respondents consistently believed they knew less about
wildlife and the natural sciences then producers. In fact, nearly half (47.2%) believed
producers knew “significantly more” than they did. In contrast, however, only 20.9% of
respondents believed producers for nature films were experts in the natural sciences.
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Table 5.11.
Statistical relationships between items that addressed the defining characteristics of
nature programs and respondent characteristics.
Portrayal

Production

Highest level of education

F
df
p

0.911
3, 255
0.436

6.529
3, 255
< 0.001

Biology courses

F
df
p

0.638
4, 255
0.636

2.129
4, 255
0.078

Interest

F
df
p

1.982
2, 259
0.140

1.401
2, 259
0.248

Gender

F
df
p

0.083
1, 258
0.774

3.766
1, 258
0.053

Numerical age of respondent

r2
F
df
p

<0.001
0.008
1, 253
0.927

0.006
1.511
1, 253
0.220

Tentative Nature of Knowledge

F
df
p

0.039
2, 258
0.962

8.057
1, 258
< 0.001

Source of Knowledge

F
df
p

0.371
1, 255
0.543

10.273
1, 255
0.002

Complexity of Knowledge

F
df
p

13.997
1, 251
<0.001

8.357
1, 252
0.004

Respondent Characteristics
Descriptive characteristics

Epistemological characteristics
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Table 5.12.
Statistical relationships between the three items comprising the Production variable and
epistemological characteristics.
Anthropomorphize Fake Scenes

Epistemological characteristics

Film-Maker
Approval

Tentative Nature of Knowledge

χ2
df
p

15.023
6
0.020

6.892
6
0.331

14.212
6
0.027

Source of Knowledge

χ2
df
p

9.980
3
0.019

3.176
3
0.365

9.611
3
0.022

Complexity of Knowledge

χ2
df
p

17.873
3
<0.001

0.519
3
0.915

12.289
3
0.006

The variables addressing the design of nature films were only somewhat related to
descriptive characteristics. Individuals with some post-high school education were most
likely to agree that the primary goal of nature films was to teach about nature than
individuals with more or less education (Table 5.13); the number of biology courses
respondents had taken was not related to their beliefs. Although age was not related to
agreeing with this goal, gender was. Females were more likely than males to agree that
the primary goal was to teach about nature. Females also were more likely than males to
agree that the narration is written to clarify what we know about nature. Although a
surprising proportion of respondents believed that producers know more about wildlife
and the natural sciences than they did (Figure 5.7), biology education, interest, gender,
and age influenced respondents’ ranking. Those with more biology education and/or
interest tended to rate producers’ knowledge relative to their own as being lower than
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those that had fewer biology courses or less interest. Females underrated their knowledge
more than males. Older individuals also were more likely to believe nature program
producers know significantly more about the natural world than they do. In addition,
gender and interest were related to how strongly respondents believe nature programs
were designed to be. Females ranked this variable the highest more often than males.
Respondents with high interest tended to believe nature programs were designed to be
educational more strongly that those with low interest (Table 5.13).
Personal epistemology was related to design variables with most effects resulting
from how people thought about the complexity of knowledge. The variables describing
respondents’ understanding of knowledge complexity were related to whether
respondents believed the primary goal of nature films was to teach about nature, whether
the narration was written to clarify what we know about nature, and how educational
respondents believed nature films were designed to be (Table 5.13). In all three
relationships, individuals with more developed personal epistemologies were more likely
to identify the production of nature films as media goals rather than educational goals.
Indeed, defining experts may be an important media literacy issue in nature films.
The personal epistemology variables that described the source and complexity of
knowledge explained how respondents ranked their knowledge relative to producers was
affected by both how they viewed the Source of Knowledge and the Complexity of
Knowledge variables (Table 5.13). Similarly, responses to whether or not respondents
believed producers were experts. In fact, respondents who believed in stable knowledge
(Tentative Nature of Knowledge) passed from authority (Source of Knowledge) in
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Table 5.13.
Statistical relationships between items related to how educational nature programs are
designed to be and respondent characteristics.
Respondent
Characteristics

Primary
Goal

Narration

Rank
Knowledge

Designed
to be
Educational

Experts

Descriptive characteristics
Highest level of
education

χ2
df
p

7.780
3
.051

0.879
3
0.830

3.712
6
0.716

10.172
9
0.337

2.226
3
0.527

Biology courses

χ2
df
p

3.501
4
0.478

2.043
4
0.728

37.776
8
<0.001

6.904
12
0.864

3.714
4
0.446

Interest

χ2
df
p

0.533
2
0.766

0.255
2
0.880

22.591
4
<0.001

33.781
6
<0.001

0.427
2
0.808

Gender

χ2
df
p

4.236
1
0.040

4.215
1
0.040

7.178
2
0.028

8.971
3
0.030

0.143
1
0.706

Numerical age of
respondent

F
df
p

0.017
1, 271
0.897

0.237
1, 281
0.627

5.820
1, 286
0.003

1.175
3, 276
0.319

0.572
1, 278
0.450

Epistemological characteristics
Tentative Nature of
Knowledge

χ2
df
p

2.596
2
0.273

0.692
2
0.708

2.302
4
0.680

9.047
6
0.171

4.943
2
0.084

Source of Knowledge

χ2
df
p

0.853
1
0.356

0.825
1
0.364

11.600
2
0.003

1.712
3
0.634

5.998
1
0.014

Complexity of
Knowledge

χ2
df
p

10.891
1
0.001

5.058
1
0.025

7.436
2
0.024

13.509
3
0.004

5.263
1
0.022
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Proportion of responses

50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

none
1-2
2-3
4-5
more than 6

The same or less

Slightly higher

Significantly higher

Figure 5.7. The proportion of respondents ranking producers’ knowledge about wildlife
and the natural sciences as higher or not higher than their own given the number of
courses they’d taken that included biology, ecology, or the natural sciences (n = 297).

isolated bits (Complexity of Knowledge) were more likely to agree that producers were
experts than those who did not.
Two items were included in the survey specifically to test the effects of beliefs
about the design of nature programs on respondents’ beliefs about the credibility of the
resource. In every case, respondents’ beliefs about the credibility of the information in
nature programs were related to their beliefs about the design of the programming. For
example, if respondents believed that the primary goal of nature programs was to teach
and the narration was written to clarify what we know about nature, they often believed
that both the science was portrayed accurately and nature was portrayed accurately (Table
5.14). Similarly, the relationships between both the accurate portrayal of science and of
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Table 5.14.
Statistical relationships between items related to how educational nature programs are
designed to be and how accurately respondents believe the science and nature are
portrayed.
Designed
to be
Educational

Primary
Goal

Narration

Rank
Knowledge

Portrayal of Science

χ2
df
p

23.037
3
<0.001

27.250
3
<0.001

26.502
6
<0.001

99.564
9
<0.001

15.849
3
0.001

Portrayal of Nature

χ2
df
p

18.641
3
<0.001

12.162
3
0.007

28.882
6
<0.001

144.4821
9
<0.001

20.042
3
<0.001

Educational Value

Experts

nature were related to respondents’ beliefs about producers’ expertise. Moreover, the
degree to which respondents believed nature films were designed to be educational was
related to the accuracy of the science and nature portrayed. Likewise, the degree to
which respondents believed producers knew more about the natural sciences than they
did was related to respondents’ beliefs about the accuracy of the science and nature
portrayed.

Discussion
Only recently have science educators attempted to define “educational” in freechoice environments. Typically, these types of explorations are based on deficit models
– models that set a standard and then determine how well the public rises to meet that
standard with their knowledge (Sturgis & Allum, 2004). Researchers exploring the free373

choice environment, however, have stressed that people are very competent in specific
areas of their own choosing and related to their own interests (Falk, 2002). This survey
took a different approach, allowing the public to identify whether they viewed nature
programs as educational resources.
The overwhelming majority of respondents believed nature programs were
educational. More importantly, respondents believed that nature films were designed to
be educational and people should learn from watching them. Consequently, the role
these programs play in the public understanding of science and evolution in the
marketplace of ideas may be significantly related to these two variables alone. Nearly
half of the respondents indicated that they watched nature programs at least once or twice
a month. As an audience, therefore, they are not only motivated to learn, they are
thinking of the experience as “educational.”
How did consumers define educational nature films? Respondents were asked to
rank their agreement or disagreement with a series of statements about potential
characteristics of nature programs. Expectations were clearly related to accurate
explanations of current scientific understanding. Nevertheless, audiences were more
open than expected to anthropomorphizing and faking scenes (apparently only as long as
the stories were not overly sensationalized). Although the item was designed to address
how we might define “educational” in terms of a nature show, respondents may have
interpreted the question to mean that if a show had been identified as educational, how
well did it meet the criteria listed. Either way, these diverging concepts might have been
related to audiences’ perceptions of these programs as a form of entertainment; over 90%
agreed that nature films are designed to be entertaining. Because this inconsistency was
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not related to personal epistemology, perhaps respondents believed they were savvy
enough about the medium to see production value in the visual and story aspects at the
expense of realism.
Items about where one might go to watch educational and entertaining programs
on the survey instrument indicated similar conflict with the definition of “educational” in
free-choice situations. Most respondents indicated that they would turn to the Discovery
Channel (versus PBS) to watch “entertaining” shows. To watch “educational” shows,
however, they would turn to PBS and Discovery. Individuals may consider PBS a
credible source that airs programs of high educational value. Alternatively, if respondents
have conceptually defined “educational” as “not entertaining,” it may be from
experiences that led them to believe PBS shows one kind of nature program (dry, boring,
“educational”) and the Discovery Channel shows another (entertaining and, perhaps, even
“educational”). In addition, some of the difficulties in defining educational in this
context may be due to a “nature film tautology”: nature films are educational, by
definition, and the two concepts cannot be disconnected.
If the marketplace of ideas holds similar dilemmas for consumers approaching
other free-choice science resources, understanding personal epistemology may provide
valuable insight to how these dilemmas play out. Public understanding of science
research wrestles with questions of expertise and authority related to socioscientific
issues (e.g., Collins & Evans, 2002; Jasanoff, 2003; Kolstø, 2001; Rip, 2003; Wynne,
2003), and many authors suggest examining how individuals negotiate through the
knowledge offered in the marketplace (e.g., Felt, 2000). This work highlights some
important points easily transferrable to other free-choice opportunities.
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For example, personal epistemology research suggests that individuals who
believe knowledge is certain and passed down from “expert” filmmakers serving as
authority figures were not likely to question the information presented. As predicted,
several relatively basic measures of personal epistemology were related to what
respondents believed about the role of expertise. In fact, those respondents relying on
authority as a source of knowledge were most likely to believe in the importance of filmmaker approval (χ2 = 9.611, 1 df, p = 0.022), as well as the expertise of film-makers.
Respondents who believed in complex knowledge were more critical of the importance of
film-maker approval in defining an educational experience, as well as anthropomorphism
as a device, and the educational value of nature films in general.
Surprising were the significant relationships between the respondents’ ranking of
their own knowledge relative to filmmakers and how respondents viewed authority and
knowledge complexity. Even though many respondents had significant experience with
biology, ecology, and the natural sciences, nearly 46% of respondents believed
filmmakers knew significantly more about science and nature than they did. This
relationship was apparent during the testing of the instrument, too. In fact, the pre-test
individuals were upper-level university students majoring in ecological sciences. Most
had significant experience with these disciplines, yet over half believed filmmakers had
more expertise than they did. Few nature film producers, in fact, have advanced degrees
in science, however; their expertise comes in the form of telling stories through
television. Even the Natural History Filmmaking Master of Fine Arts Program at
Montana State University, a program designed specifically to enhance nature film
production, does not require advanced coursework in the sciences (students are
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encouraged to develop working relationships with scientists and assist in field projects;
http://naturefilm.montana.edu/index.php). Therefore, respondents may have presumed
some context-specific expertise associated with the filmmaker’s personal research and
ability to tell a story. Apparently, the relationship is affected by advanced familiarity
with the biological sciences, however. The small sample of ecologists and science
educators used in the pre-testing was less likely to believe filmmakers knew significantly
more than they did; over half ranked them as slightly or significantly less. Nevertheless,
the fact that the accuracy of the portrayal of both the science and nature were strongly
related to how respondents ranked their personal knowledge speaks volumes about how
consumers may approach expertise and authority in the marketplace.
Of greater concern is the level of personal epistemology at which most individuals
operate according to the Reflective Judgment Model (King & Kitchener, 1994). Years of
research indicate that after four years of college, individuals are thinking at only a quasireflective level (understanding that knowledge is constructed – not simply accepted from
others, recognizing that uncertainty is part of the process of knowing and different types
and rules of evidence, but subject to idiosyncratic views of knowledge claims). In this
view, the variability in how diverse publics interface with science in the marketplace may
be the result of personal epistemologies that predominately represents pre-reflective and
quasi-reflective thinking. The idiosyncratic beliefs about credibility and authority
associated with these levels of reflective judgment result because of the tenuous
relationship between gathering evidence and drawing conclusions in the marketplace of
ideas (King & Kitchener, 1994).

377

Television may be especially important to consider from a personal epistemology
perspective. Because of its broad reach and celebrity-making power, television may have
particularly strong appeal in terms of credibility and authority. de Cheveigné and Véron
(1996) classified television viewers according to their attitudes toward television and
attitudes toward acquiring knowledge from television (Table 5.15). They found that even
viewers who believed the acquisition of knowledge from television was problematic
(“beneficiaries” and “intellectuals”) relied strongly on credibility and authority in their
judgments. Indeed, Livingstone (1998) suggested that when it is a trusted and solemn
source of information, television likely affects viewers in a strong sense. Paradoxically,
nature films classified as “blue-chip” (‘mega-fauna’ in an environment of visual splendor,
a dramatic story line, and marked by the absences of politics, people or historical
reference points) and “presenter-led” (expanded human presence, more human/animal
interaction, dynamic editorial approaches) generally contained the most egregious
narratives with respect to evolution (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006). Although D. R.
Anderson (1998) argued that “educational television is not an oxymoron,” not all
“educational” television is created equal. The influence of apparently credible sources
combined with narratives that introduce misconceptions to broad and diverse audiences
may make “educational” television the antithesis of “educational.”
The results from this survey indicate at least three issues that need to be addressed
more thoroughly within the theoretical framework of personal epistemology: issues of
gender, issues surrounding knowledge gaps, and issues surrounding evolution
understanding. Females underrated their knowledge relative to producers more than
males and more strongly believed nature films were designed to be educational. Gender
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Table 5.15.
Classification of science television viewers according to their attitudes toward television
and acquiring knowledge from television (from de Cheveigné & Véron, 1996).
Acquisition of knowledge from television

Favorable

Not problematic

“beneficiaries”
TV is a legitimate source of
knowledge, and science is accessible
a credible authority is essential

“intimistic”
positive attitudes toward TV, but
more critical and less curious about
learning

Not favorable

Attitude toward television

Problematic

“intellectual”
TV is not a legitimate source of
knowledge
prefer documentaries with
unmediated viewpoint

“excluded”
“can’t” understand science and what
they do understand can’t be science

is apparently related to disparities in attitudes toward science that materialize from sociodemographic backgrounds (education and religious belief; Hayes & Tariq, 2000).
Personal relevance is obviously important to discussions about science and evolution
(Sadler, Chambers, & Zeidler, 2004). In addition, women tend to use media that fosters
informal learning less than men and may hold comparatively lower levels of scientific
knowledge (Nisbet et al., 2002).
Likewise, the knowledge-gap hypothesis predicts that increasing the flow of news
on topics, such as climate change and evolution, results in greater acquisition of
knowledge about that topic among the more highly educated segments of society than
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less educated segments (Tichenor, Donohue, & Olien, 1970). Indeed, knowledge gaps
may result specifically because individuals with more education tend to have more
developed personal epistemologies and may be able to navigate the competing ideas of
the marketplace better than those less well educated. The results from this survey
indicate that nature programs may fall into that gap.
Other research has shown gender to be an important predictor of attitudes about
human evolution (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2008; Schibeci, 1984). These results suggest
that females should have poorer understanding of evolution, especially if they are using
nature films to construct knowledge. Clearly, future research needs to examine the role
of personal epistemology in gender-specific understanding of evolution.
Ultimately, these findings may have particular importance in terms of how
evolution is portrayed in nature films. Evolution educators have a distinctly different
view of the educational value of nature films (see also Smith & Resier, 1997). Contentanalyses indicate serious issues regarding the presentation of this important biological
process (Aldridge & Dingwall 2003; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006). Although the
approach and experiences audiences bring to a learning opportunity in the free-choice
marketplace may be more important to learning outcomes than the content (D. Anderson,
Lucas, & Ginns, 2003; Falk & Adelman, 2003; Gijlers & de Jong, 2005; Lawson &
Worsnop, 1992; Livingstone, 1998; Rubin, 2004; Stocklmayer & Gilbert, 2002), the
combination of audience approach and poor science content has the potential to
significantly affect conceptions about evolution.
Evolution is a complex concept, and the path of least resistance is often the wrong
one. Personal experiences comprise a powerful source of perceived evidence that can be
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incorporated into “lay theories” about how the world works. Where these lay theories
relate to ecology, and evolution in particular, they can lead to misconceptions that can be
very difficult to alter (Wandersee et al., 1994). If a nature program resonates on some
level with individuals’ “lay theories” about evolution, it may have long-lasting effects on
learning. For example, people identify with individuals, not populations, and the
concepts of “improvement” and “adaptation” frequently are applied to individuals
overcoming adversity – everyone loves the triumph of the underdog. If this application
stems from an experience they perceive watching television (such as the orphaned
cheetahs that survive in the harsh and cruel savannah), it may end up as an unconscious
embodiment of the process of evolution (R. W. Busselle & Greenberg, 2000). Of course
these events are relevant to biological evolution; who survives and who does not
underlies a major component of fitness and the process of natural selection.

Conclusions
From a consumer’s perspective, scientific “truth” in the free-choice marketplace
might be defined through some connotation of “educational,” and this definition may be
much broader than how a producer (science educator) might define it. Understanding
epistemological worldviews may help audiences bridge this gap. Epistemological
worldviews that ultimately help consumers navigate through science learning
opportunities in the marketplace of ideas may be developed and nurtured in formal
education environments with “mile-deep” philosophies that incorporate the nature of
knowledge in general, and the nature of scientific knowledge in particular (see Alters &
Nelson, 2002; Bell & Lederman, 2003; Cobern, 2000). Teachers also need to be aware of
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the flaws in nature film narratives. Beautifully crafted nature programs that highlight the
splendor of the natural world may be valuable tools to generate interest in ecology and
science in students. However, constructivist frameworks clearly caution about the
difficulties with which alternative conceptions are overcome (Mintzes & Wandersee,
1998). Nature film narratives that use concepts of “design” indiscriminately may be
promoting misconceptions unintentionally (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006). A broadly
defined “educational” experience used in the science classroom may be even more
harmful to science conceptions than a similar experience in the free-choice world.
Nevertheless, as Ziman (1992) noted, in the marketplace of ideas “the public
receives and uses scientific knowledge that is incoherent, practically inadequate,
incredible, and inconsistent.” If nature films are an important source of free-choice
science learning, the issue is clear: audiences inevitably will incorporate misconceptions
about science and nature if no effort is made to teach some level of media literacy.
Nature films cannot be considered “educational” by default. Especially if teachers are
using nature programs in the science classroom, “educational” has to be defined and
standards have to be developed that programs must meet before taking on the
“educational” moniker. In the free-choice environment, clearly a need to inform the
public of the misnomer emerges.
Recently, Falk et al. (2007) suggested that rather than framing efforts in
communicating science, educators should approach this from the perspective of offering
the public opportunities for engaging with, appreciating, and better understanding the
science that interests them. Giving the public the tools to navigate those opportunities in
an open marketplace is difficult, however. Several authors have called for developing a
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learning infrastructure that includes both free-choice and formal learning opportunities
(Bybee, 2001; Muscat, 2001) with a goal to create an agenda centered on lifelong
learning (Muscat, 2001). Although such an extensive network within a diverse and everchanging marketplace of ideas seems overwhelmingly difficult to achieve, the possibility
of a system that casts a wide net and helps consumers navigate through the myriad of
resources, no matter their level of interest or prior knowledge, is intriguing.
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Appendix 1. The Survey Instrument

AUDIENCES’ BELIEFS ABOUT
THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF NATURE FILMS
This short survey addresses how audiences feel about films that portray wildlife and
nature. The survey is part of a graduate student project, and the information will be used
to assist educators at the University of Montana using these types of films. Participation
is completely voluntary and no record of participants will be kept. All information is
strictly confidential. If you have any questions, contact Alison Perkins
(alison.perkins@mso.umt.edu). Please, only one adult per household need respond.
Thank you for taking the time to share your thoughts.
Start Here
1.

How often do you watch nature films?
More than 1-2 times per month
1-2 times per month
1-2 times every few months
1-2 times every year
Never

2.

Where have you watched most nature films?
Film festival
Television
Video rental
Online

3.

Why would you watch a nature film? (Select all that may apply.)
To learn about nature
To be entertained
To see wildlife in its natural environment
Other
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.

4.

Wildlife and nature films are easy to understand because they contain so many
facts. (Easy Knowledge)
strongly agree
mildly agree
mildly disagree
strongly disagree
no opinion

5.

What are the characteristics of an educational nature film? Please indicate whether
you would agree or disagree with the following statements:
If a nature film is educational, then you believe:
a. it is accurate.

strongly
agree

mildly
agree

mildly
disagree

strongly
disagree

b. the content has
been
reviewed/approved
by scientists.

strongly
agree

mildly
agree

mildly
disagree

strongly
disagree

c. the story it tells
really happened.

strongly
agree

mildly
agree

mildly
disagree

strongly
disagree

strongly
agree

mildly
agree

mildly
disagree

strongly
disagree

strongly
agree

mildly
agree

mildly
disagree

strongly
disagree

strongly
agree

mildly
agree

mildly
disagree

strongly
disagree

strongly
agree

mildly
agree

mildly
disagree

strongly
disagree

strongly
agree

mildly
agree

mildly
disagree

strongly
disagree

strongly
agree

mildly
agree

mildly
disagree

strongly
disagree

d. it presents the most
current scientific
understanding.
e. it may fake
situations or scenes
to add to the story.
f. people should learn
from watching it.
g. it gives wildlife
human motivations
we can relate to.
h.
the content
has been
reviewed/approved
by other
filmmakers.
i. it does not
sensationalize /
over-dramatize how
nature works.
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6.

Do you believe the primary goal of most nature films is to teach about nature?
Yes
No

7.

Do you believe the narration for nature films is written to explain and clarify what we
know about nature?
Yes
No

8.

Do you believe that nature films are educational?
Yes
No

9.

How educational do you believe nature films are designed to be? (Please circle
the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = designed to be
educational to 7 = not designed to be educational.)
Designed to be
educational
1
2

3

4

5

Not designed to
be educational
6
7

10. How educational do you believe nature films actually are? (Please circle the
number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = not educational to 7 = very
educational.)
Not
educational
1
2

3

4

5

Very
educational
6
7

11. Scientific theories are not important in nature films because they are just theories.
(Nature of Theories)
Yes
No
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12. If you wanted to watch an entertaining nature film, what channel would you go to?
Discovery Channel
Animal Planet
National Geographic Channel
Public Broadcasting System (PBS)
Other

13. How would you rate your interest in biology, ecology, or the natural sciences?
(Please circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = high
interest to 7 = low interest.)
High
interest
1

2

3

4

5

6

Low
interest
7

14. If you wanted to watch an educational nature film, what channel would you go to?
Discovery Channel
Animal Planet
National Geographic Channel
Public Broadcasting System (PBS)
Other

15. Most things worth knowing in nature films are simple to understand. (Simple
Knowledge)
strongly agree
mildly agree
mildly disagree
strongly disagree
no opinion
16. How accurately do you believe wildlife and nature films portray science? (Please
circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1= very accurately to
7= not very accurately.)
Very
accurately
1
2

3

4
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5

Not very
accurately
6
7

17. How accurately do you believe wildlife and nature films portray nature? (Please
circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1= very accurately to
7= not very accurately.)
Very
accurately
1
2

3

4

5

Not very
accurately
6
7

18. Do you believe the producers for nature films know more about wildlife and natural
sciences than you do?
Significantly more
Slightly more
About the same
Slightly less
Significantly less
No opinion

19. If two different nature films are presenting two different arguments about the same
topic, at least one of them must be wrong. (Omniscient Authority)
Yes
No

20. Do you believe the producers for nature films are experts in the natural sciences?
Yes
No

21. Nature films are more educational when they use a trustworthy narrator in the
program than when the narration is just added in later by an unknown voice.
(Trustworthy Narrator)
Yes
No

396

22. Five years from now, producers don’t need to make a new nature film about a topic
because, even though they might get some new footage, there probably will not be
much that is new to add to our basic understanding of the topic. (Stable Knowledge)
strongly agree
mildly agree
mildly disagree
strongly disagree
no opinion

23. Do you believe nature films are designed to be entertaining?
Yes
No

24. Nature films should only include facts about nature not theories. (Fact-based
Knowledge)
Yes
No

25. What is the highest level of education you have received?
Some high school
High school diploma or equivalent
Some technical school
Technical degree or equivalent
Some college
2-year college degree
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree
Higher degree

26. How many courses have you taken that included biology, ecology, or the natural
sciences?
none
1-2
3-4
5-6
More than 6
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27. What is your gender?
Male
Female

28. What is your age?

years

Do you have any comments?

Thank you so much for taking the time to fill out this survey!
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CHAPTER 6.
SOURCES AND SENTIMENT: HOW NATURE PROGRAMS MAY BE
LEADING SCIENCE LITERACY ASTRAY

Abstract:
Television is a powerful source of mass communication, but the “educational”
content is rarely critically examined. Nature and wildlife programs are generally
considered educational; audiences clearly believe them to be accurate sources for the
portrayal of science and nature. These programs use the same devices as fictional
television, however, and the narratives often include serious misconceptions about
science and important ecological processes, such as evolution. I used the Science and
Nature Program Assessment Tool (SNaP) to examine the science content of programs
appearing during a sweeps month on four channels: Animal Planet, Discovery Channel,
National Geographic Channel, and PBS. Overall, programs did not score well (range 3378%); the presentation of science was particularly poor (8-57%). Misconceptions were
common in the Presentation of Facts and Interpretation category; Animal Planet and
Discovery Channel programs were the most egregious and National Geographic
programs the least. In fact, Animal Planet and National Geographic Channel differed
significantly in all categories describing the presentation of science, as well as Total
Score. These differences may translate to science literacy issues on a socio-economic
scale. Nevertheless, because nature programs are such beautiful spectacles, they have the
potential to be credible educational resources. Science educators need to be aware of the
issues associated with these programs, however, and design instruction materials and

399

approaches that specifically address the poor science. SNaP can be a valuable tool for
students to learn more than just science content, they also can use this too to develop the
critical evaluation skills necessary to make scientific sense of the content.

Keywords: nature programs, evolution understanding, nature program assessment tool

In spite of on-going efforts by science educators, research indicates that many
people still hold serious misconceptions about evolution and other key scientific concepts
(Nelson, 2000; Rudolph & Stewart, 1998; Southerland, Abrams, Cummins, & Anzelmo,
2001). These misconceptions can have far-reaching effects when they influence policy at
the public interface with science. Whether it be adding “intelligent design” as part of the
science curriculum in schools (see, for example, Evolution shares a desk with ‘Intelligent
Design’ [Washington Post 12/26/04]) or dismissing compelling and peer-reviewed
evidence of global climate change, misconceptions commonly held by the general public
diminish opportunities to engage thoughtfully in civic discourse that has important policy
implications.
But where do these misconceptions come from? Misconceptions are constructed
from a variety of sources, whose influences surely overlap. The Committee on
Undergraduate Science Education (1997) outlines several sources of misconceptions
about science, including vernacular issues, experience, and formal and informal sources.
Misconceptions can arise because common words have different meanings in scientific
versus common language contexts. For example, “fitness” may refer to physical strength
(Bishop & Anderson, 1990), and “theory” is often used in everyday language to mean a
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“guess”. Everyday experiences also may lead to misconceptions; for example, personal
experiences with streams and rivers may lead to misconceptions about how water flows
underground (Committee on Undergraduate Science Education, 1997). The inheritance
of a genetic disease or family characteristic may affect how individuals think about
heritability, variation, and time. Another important source of misconceptions arises from
formal educational environments that do not adequately address prior misconceptions that
students hold. If students are taught new information without being encouraged to
confront their own preconceived notions and nonscientific beliefs, they may simply
accommodate the new knowledge in the framework of an old misconception (Alters &
Nelson, 2002; Committee on Undergraduate Science Education, 1997). For example,
teaching genetics does not necessarily help students incorporate the role of changes in
gene frequencies into how populations actually change over time (Clough & WoodRobinson, 1985). Indeed, without finding a way to learn something about the more
abstract statistical components of genetics, misconceptions may arise about beneficial
mutations and the directed transformation of species over time. In addition, informal
sources, including parents, television, the Internet, fiction, and religious and myth-based
sources may influence misconceptions. Clearly, wives tales about lightning strikes can
be transmitted and learned in informal environments (Committee on Undergraduate
Science Education, 1997). Similarly, fictionalized accounts in movies and on television
of a young earth and humans living with dinosaurs conflict with scientific evidence.
Nature programs can provide a powerful tool for science education and lifelong
science learning, especially if they address science and nature content thoughtfully. In
fact, viewing television programs, such as Jacques Cousteau’s The Cousteau Odyssey,
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can positively influence public attitudes and behaviors toward the environment (Eagles &
Demare, 1999; Fortner, 1985; Holbert, Kwak, & Shah, 2003). Attitudes and
understanding are not the same, however. Nature programs may be enticing emotional
sentinels for the natural world, but without balance, positive environmental attitudes may
conflict with science understanding. This conflict may have unintended consequences
such as pitting endangered shorebirds against introduced red foxes in ecosystem
management.
Science-related programming can just as easily promote or create misconceptions
about scientific concepts and theories. Misconceptions about science can be especially
problematic if the way the concepts are presented encourages, rather than challenges,
prior naïve conceptions (see Linn 1983; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982; Strike
and Posner 1992; Watson and Kopnicek 1990). Science educators need to be aware of
the range of influences these free-choice opportunities can have on public understanding,
especially in relation to important ecological processes such as evolution.
Audiences, and many educators, view nature films as environmental
documentaries, but most are fictionalized accounts whose narratives are driven by the
cinematic themes and thrills of mainstream entertainment that ensure commercial success
(Bousé, 2000; Cottle, 2004; Mitman, 1999). Some educators have cautioned that the use
of language in these programs may reinforce misconceptions about evolution (e.g.,
Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006). Indeed, the very production
values of awe-inspiring nature programs (expert photography, underexplored locations,
respected presenters, cutting-edge science) not only promote teleological (purpose-
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driven) and design-based explanations of evolution but also misconceptions about the
nature of the scientific endeavor (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).
Similarly, video images designed to enhance the narratives of nature programs
may serve as powerful “virtual witnessing” events for viewers (Kirby, 2003, see also
Graber, 1990), resulting in an epistemological impact that is difficult to overcome,
especially with socially controversial topics such as evolution and global change. Even
scientists fall prey to the power of the moving image. For example, Padian (1987)
suggests that scientific reconstructions of bat-winged pterosaurs were influenced by
“plausibility” of pictorial images. He notes, “a picture is not only worth a thousand
words; however inaccurate, it may be worth a wealth of well-documented evidence to the
contrary” (p. 76). Visual representations (such as graphs) are essential for
communicating ideas in the science classroom; however, the design of such
representations is not always beneficial for learners (Cook 2006). Viewers make factual
assessments using the experiences gained watching crime dramas, for example (Shrum,
1999), and judgments about evolution and science likely are correspondingly affected
based on experiences with nature programs. Indeed, research into the effects on learning
from one beautifully crafted nature film suggests that the misconceptions presented in the
narration affect undergraduate students’ understanding of evolution (Bright et al.,
abstract; Dissertation Appendix 1). Consequently, individuals may approach democratic
issues related to science with prior knowledge and naïve conceptions about the natural
world that may stem directly from experience, or virtual experience, with nature
programs.
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Understanding what individuals learn outside of school is a difficult task because
the free-choice marketplace for science education content is consumer oriented.
Individuals have different identity-related motivations for their free-choice learning
opportunities, and these motivations can predict learning outcomes (Falk, Heimlich, &
Bronnenkant, 2008). If viewers distinguish between educational and entertainment value,
they may approach the content presented in a film or program differently, being more
open to learning from programs that are considered “educational.” More importantly, the
understanding of individuals motivated to learn about nature from programs they deem
“educational” may be affected more than those that are watching purely for
entertainment, or not watching at all.
In a recent survey concerning audiences and the educational value of nature
programs, respondents were asked about their beliefs regarding the educational value of
nature programs (see Chapter 5). Respondents indicated that the National Geographic
Channel and PBS were the primary sources they would turn to to watch educational
nature programs. Discovery Channel also was listed as a source of educational programs
but most frequently listed as a source of entertaining programs. Animal Planet largely
was considered a source of entertaining programs. (National Geographic and PBS were
less frequently listed as a source of entertaining nature programs.) The criteria for how
individuals make that value judgment were not clear because the vast majority of
respondents (>95%) believed that nature programs were indeed educational and that they
portrayed science and nature accurately.
Clearly, people are looking to specific channels for their science content, but what
are they actually getting? I predicted that the nature programs appearing on channels
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with a mission geared toward educational programs would represent the science related to
nature better than those whose mission was geared towards entertainment. My
assumptions were that commercial channels were driven by different factors than those
funded with public money, and that comparisons would be valid from a human
constructivist perspective, where ultimately, the viewer was the important variable.

Methods
To determine the quality of science education resources available to viewers, I
examined a selection of nature programs offered during a “sweeps” month for their
accuracy and presentation of the science. Sweeps is the period where commercial
stations are rated for their commercial value. As a result, channels actively solicit
audiences with new programming and scheduling to enhance viewership. Stations
funded with public money, such as PBS, are not subject to the same commercial ratings,
but they may schedule programs to encourage viewership to determine their audience
share. Programs on each of four channels (Animal Planet, Discovery Channel, National
Geographic Channel, and PBS) during November, 2008, were identified using schedules
found on their websites. Only programs identified as broadly including nature and/or
wild animals were included. Animal Planet and National Geographic Channel both
offered significant programming, and 10 hours of programming were selected randomly
from among an alphabetized list of potential programs. Recording equipment availability
affected access to National Geographic Channel programming, however, and several
shows had to be replaced based on their scheduling. Nature programming was far less
common on PBS and Discovery Channel during November, 2008. Because they rely on
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public funding, PBS was not affected by sweeps. On the other hand, Discovery promoted
a series titled Whale Wars about the tactics of protesters to foil whale hunting expeditions
for that month’s sweeps. As a result, few nature programs were included in the
November, 2008, schedule for Discovery. Discovery Channel did produce the highly
acclaimed Planet Earth series, however, and two episodes that appeared in January,
2009, were included in this assessment to add to the limited sample size.
The accuracy and quality of the science presented in the nature programs viewed
were assessed using the Science and Nature Program Assessment Tool (SNaP;
Dissertation Appendix 1). The review criteria used in the tool were based on important
elements of the National Science Education Standards (National Research Council, 1996)
and the Guidelines for Excellence (North American Association for Environmental
Education (NAAEE), 2000). The SNaP tool grouped review criteria into categories
representing the presentation and interpretation of facts, scientific context, presentation of
nature of science “issues,” and the human dimensions of the science profession. All
criteria, except for two categories describing misconceptions, were scored on a scale from
one (poorly met or addressed) to four (highly met or addressed). Each scale was
converted to quarter points so that each criterion contributed a maximum of 1.0 point to
the overall score. As a penalty within the presentation of facts and interpretation
category, the two categories assessing the inclusion of misconceptions were scored from
zero (no misconceptions) to three (serious misconceptions) and converted to a negative
third-point scale. Each of these criteria contributed a maximum of -1.0 to the overall
score (see Table 6.1 for an example calculation). Because not all programs address all
the elements that could be reviewed using SNaP (e.g., not all programs include graphics),
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scores for each category were standardized by summing all scores for relevant criteria
and dividing by the number of criteria evaluated. The final score was weighted by the
total score of a separate category describing the overall impression of the program.
In a previous study, the SNaP tool proved applicable to a broad range of nature
programs, the scores were consistent among science educators, and the criteria functioned
to identify nature programs with serious flaws in the presentation of ecological science
(Dissertation Appendix 1). In addition, the evaluation of characteristics of nature
programs using SNaP was flexible enough to assess programs in out-of-school settings.
For the present study, I was interested specifically in the factual presentation and
interpretation of the science, the context of the science presented, and the presentation of
the nature of the scientific process. Programs were recorded and reviewed individually,
and the scores entered into a spreadsheet for tallying. I calculated the mean score for
each category and the total weighted score for each program. I used parametric statistics
(SPSS v. 16.0) to compare programs scores among channels.

Results
Program diversity varied among the four stations. All offered some high
production nature programs – programs that included extensive high quality footage and
scripting (“blue-chip” programs of Aldridge & Dingwall, 2003), in addition to a number
of “one-off” programs (“one-off” programs are usually produced independently, and they
may or may not be incorporated into a series). Animal Planet offered the greatest
diversity of programs, including several under-produced series that simply recited bits of
information about the organism or incorporated amateur footage, such as Untamed and
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Table 6.1
Example calculation of criteria used in the SNaP tool. Within the Facts & Interpretation
category, the first five criteria were scored from one (poorly met or addressed) to four
(highly met or addressed), converted to a quarter-point scale, and averaged as the
category sub-total. The last two criteria were scored from zero (no misconceptions) to
three (serious misconceptions), converted to a third-point scale, averaged, and then
subtracted from the category sub-total as a penalty.
Score

Points

Authorities are credible

4

1.0

Factually correct

3

0.75

Correctly presents current theory

2

0.5

Presents a range of perspectives from different scientists and/or
different research groups

2

0.5

Actively investigates alternative interpretations of scientific
theory/fact as part of the story

1

1.0

Criterion

sub-total

0.75

Inadvertently promotes misconceptions of scientific theory or
facts (penalty)

2

-0.66

Intentionally promotes misconceptions of scientific theory or facts
(penalty)

0

0

sub-total
Total Presentation of Facts & Interpretation score
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-0.33
0.42

Uncut, Unexplained/Unexplored, and Weird, True, & Freaky. Orangutan Island was the
only ongoing series reviewed during this assessment; in its second season, the program
included 13 episodes that explored the orangutan rescue operation in Borneo. The only
two nature programs that appeared on the Discovery Channel during November, 2008,
were pseudo-experimental examinations of feeding in bears and crocodiles. The program
host demonstrated the awesome power of these ferocious predators and then climbed into
a sturdy, clear predator-safe box to react to them as they approached. In contrast, Planet
Earth was the highly acclaimed “blue-chip” series produced for Discovery and originally
aired on British Broadcasting Company in 2006 and in the US in 2007. Planet Earth
represented high production values and investment. National Geographic highlighted
nature with several series featuring diverse content, including Wild, America’s Wild
Spaces, Living Wild, and Reptile Rulers. The nature programming on PBS was
essentially limited to Nature, a weekly one-hour series and the occasional one-off
programs offered by local program directors.
Nature programs were not the dominant type of program on any channel during
the review period. Programs that included nature were most common on Animal Planet;
approximately 40% of the weekly schedule was devoted to nature programs. Both
Discovery Channel and National Geographic Channel focused on a diversity of program
content. Discovery’s content was extremely limited in November, 2008, but the Planet
Earth series was featured in January, 2009. Nature programs accounted for
approximately 15% of weekly programs on National Geographic (pet shows accounted
for over 20%). As mentioned previously, PBS’s nature programming was almost
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completely restricted to Nature, although NOVA has explored ecological science in the
past (just not in November).
Several themes emerged in the content presented in the programs reviewed.
Sensationalizing fear of nature was a common programming trend, at least on the
commercial stations. The Maneaters series, on Animal Planet, featured individual
programs titled “Killers in the Water” and “Big Cats.” Untamed and Uncut was a series
of short segments (approximately 5 minutes) that almost exclusively featured animals
attacking humans or each other. Discovery programs highlighted the “feeding frenzy”,
including “Bear Feeding Frenzy” and “Crocodile Feeding Frenzy.” Similarly, Wild, on
National Geographic Channel included shows titled “Man-eating Prides” and “Whales:
The Dark Side.” (Surprisingly, the “dark side” of killer whales included interesting
research on their mating behavior and cultural transmission of some behaviors.) Living
Wild: “Nature’s War Zone,” also on National Geographic, depicted the nesting behavior
of sea turtles, and although sea turtles and their young faced different predators, the “war
zone” metaphor was without merit (or support in the script). Despite its name, however,
“America’s Deadly Dozen” (America’s Wild Spaces series) was less about being afraid of
the animals that prey on humans and more about human intrusion into their habitat.
Shark stories also were popular on both Animal Planet and National Geographic Channel
in November (Discovery hosts “Shark Week” annually in late summer).
Titles notwithstanding, the nature programs that appeared during the November
sweeps did not represent the science well. Using SNaP, science scores were universally
very low with Animal Planet, Discovery, and PBS averaging about 25% of the total
possible (Table 6.2). National Geographic averaged somewhat higher with an average
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score of 42%. Even the adjusted scores weighted by overall impression and
recommendation were 60% and below (Table 6.2).
The overall impression of programs was generally high whereas NOS and context
tended to be relatively low across all four channels (Figure 6.1). Differences were
apparent in the Facts and Interpretation category, however. Misconceptions were
accounted for in the Facts and Interpretation category and were subtracted from the
overall category score. When examined separately, National Geographic programs
included the fewest misconceptions, and programs airing on Discovery and Animal
Planet included the most (Figure 6.2). The context of the science and the nature of the
scientific endeavor were rarely explored in any program on any channel. National
Geographic and PBS tended to include more context in their programs than Animal

Table 6.2.
Mean percentage and range of science scores and adjusted overall scores for programs
reviewed using the SNaP Assessment Tool.
Channel

n

Total science score

Adjusted score

Animal Planet

12

27%
(9%-51%)a

48%
(30%-64%)

Discovery

3

23 %
(17%-30%)

50%
(33%-65%)

National Geographic

13

42%
(26%-57%)

60%
(48%-69%)

PBS

4

31%
(9%-45%)

56%
(46%-78%)

a

Range of scores.
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0.7

Facts

Context

NOS

Impression

0.6
SNaP Score

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Animal Planet

Discovery

National Geographic
Channel

PBS

Figure 6.1. Mean percentage scores obtained using the SNaP Assessment Tool for the
Facts & Interpretation (Facts), Scientific Context (Context), Nature of Science Issues
(NOS), and Overall Impression (Impression) categories for programs viewed on Animal
Planet, Discovery, National Geographic, and PBS.

Planet and Discovery, and National Geographic was the only channel that regularly
included at least some discussion of evidence, uncertainty, explanation, and prediction.
When programming on Animal Planet and National Geographic Channel was compared,
the two channels differed significantly in quality of science presented. All three SNaP
content scores, as well as the adjusted scores, were significantly higher in programs on
National Geographic Channel than on Animal Planet (Table 6.3).
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Facts & Interpretation

Misconceptions

0.8
0.7

SNaP Score

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Animal Planet

National Geographic
Channel

Figure 6.2. Mean scores for the Presentation of Facts and Interpretation category of the
SNaP Assessment Tool for programs viewed on each channel. Misconception scores are
separated out of the total category score for comparison.

Discussion
The results clearly illustrate that nature programs do not represent science or the
scientific process well, despite the fact they are consistently labeled as “educational.”
Not only is the science misrepresented, evolutionary theory is often presented as
teleological, need-based, or caused by the environment (see also Aldridge & Dingwall,
2003; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006). Nature and science television shows may be the only
contact a significant portion of the population has with the natural world, and programs
often are used in classrooms as teaching tools. Science educators should be concerned
about the content of the programs being produced and promoted because these programs
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Table 6.3.
Mean scores and standard errors of the Facts & Interpretation, Scientific Context,
Nature of Science Issues, and Overall Impression categories from the SNaP Assessment
Tool for programs viewed Animal Planet and National Geographic Channel.
Channel

n

Facts &
Interpretationa

Scientific
Contextb

Nature of
Science Issuesc

Overall
Impressiond

Animal Planet

12

0.23 + 0.11

0.33 + 0.02

0.26 + 0.01

0.60 + 0.03

National Geographic 13

0.49 + 0.06

0.40 + 0.02

0.36 + 0.03

0.74 + 0.02

a

F = 4.570, 1, 23 df, p = 0.043.

b

F = 7.149, 1, 23 df, p = 0.014.

c

F = 7.050, 1, 23 df, p = 0.014.

d

F = 12.303, 1, 23 df, p = 0.002.

may have profound effects on the knowledge students bring to the classroom, as well as
on the conceptual knowledge they will have once they leave the formal education system.
Ausubel (1968) emphasizes that the most important aspect for teaching is to find
out what a learner already knows. Students indeed bring the experiences they have had
with television into the science classroom (Dhingra, 2003, Aikenhead, 1988), not just
textual readings, but visual representations as well (Cook, 2006). In a constructivist
context, individuals watching nature shows are “experiencing” science, and unfortunately
the lesson they may take home is that nature is purposeful and responds to need.
Moreover, they may learn that scientific knowledge is idiosyncratic and certain, and that
evidence is not separated from explanation and consensus. Consequently, for educators,
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understanding prior knowledge is critical in designing instruction that adequately
addresses potential areas of misunderstanding (National Research Council, 2007).
Familiarity with the merits and faults of nature programming may give educators a
foundation from which to draw in the conceptual change process. Indeed, the challenge
to science educators is to use this media effectively to address naïve views about science
(Aikenhead, 1988, see Chapter 3 for an example of how to do this).

Knowledge Gaps
The disparity between channel availability and programming quality also is
alarming. Neither Animal Planet nor National Geographic Channel is a broadcast
channel; typically both are available only through cable or satellite services. National
Geographic Channel is offered most often in high-end packages. The difference in price
between packages that include Animal Planet and National Geographic, at least for
satellite service, currently runs about $35 per month nationally. The cost of cable
services is highly variable. Special promotions may alter those price points, especially
with cable services, but because promotions typically extend only 3-6 months, they may
not overcome financial deterrents. What does this mean in terms of educational content
for consumers? Nature programs featured on National Geographic Channel were
consistently better quality, in terms of the science presentation, than programs on Animal
Planet. Most importantly, Animal Planet programs included a host of misconceptions
about evolution and science in general. On this station, science often was portrayed as
derived from single observations, and it was fact-based and certain. If access to different
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channels depends on socio-economic status, this could be an implication with
consequences for knowledge gaps among segments of a democratic society.
The Knowledge Gap Hypothesis (Tichenor, Donohue, & Olien, 1970) suggests
that mass media tends to increase, rather than decrease, the gap in knowledge between
segments of the population with higher and lower socioeconomic status (SES) because
higher SES individuals are able to acquire this information at a faster rate. Higher
education and, thus, higher SES, is associated with better reading and comprehension
skills, and greater prior knowledge (Tichenor et al., 1970). Moreover, people with more
education may be both qualitatively and quantitatively better at encoding information
from audio-visual media, in particular, than those with less education (Grabe, Lang,
Zhou, & Bolls, 2000). Of course, like learning in informal environments, the motivation
of individuals is an important variable that can alter this relationship (Garramone, 1983;
Kwak, 1999).
What is the consequence of different access to high quality science-related
programming? Ecological science messages may move through segments of society at
different rates. As a result, assessment of messages related to socio-scientific issues, such
as evolution or global climate change (Sadler, 2004), may be differentially affected by
SES. In fact, individuals that have attained higher education levels may be more likely to
believe in the promise of science in those messages and less likely to hold reservations
than those that have not advanced in their formal schooling (Nisbet et al., 2002). For
example, because those with more education already have comparatively higher levels of
factual and procedural knowledge of science (Nisbet et al., 2002), exposure to different
media of different quality may affect a knowledge gap related to accepting evolution.
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Nature programs are one source of media that individuals can choose to learn about
evolution in nature. Sadly, the sources of information available to individuals motivated
to learn about nature may be limited based on socio-economic circumstances. The
combined effect of poor prior knowledge about ecological processes and economically
limited ability to access quality sources of information may enhance knowledge gap
effects in the general public when it comes to understanding nature and wildlife.

Nature Programs and Science Literacy
Why are nature programs afforded a level of “educational” integrity when the
science content related to the natural world is so poorly presented and potentially harmful
to public understanding? Does the credibility relate more to sentiment than science?
This concern is especially important for those individuals motivated to learn (Falk et al.,
2008) or with a positive environmental attitude (Holbert et al., 2003). There is no
question that nature programs can be beautifully crafted, enchanting and instilling
viewers with a love for the natural world that, ultimately, may affect their behavior as a
citizen. Furthermore, Papson (1992) argues that nature films are legitimized by
emphasizing claims to educational and scientific “truth” when in fact they use the same
production devices as fictional programs. Most viewers would be expected to realize that
CSI: Crime Scene Investigation is fictional and not an educational program. Yet, the
science it portrays, although highly sensationalized, is often at least as accurate as that
found in nature programs based on my reviews. Interestingly, the program has had a
significant effect on the number of college students choosing science-related career paths
(see Johnston, 2003). The “CSI Effect” is currently a popularly debated media effect; the
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science, it seems may or may not influence jurors in terms of the expectations and beliefs
of real forensic evidence (see Schweitzer & Saks, 2007; Shelton, Kim, & Barak, 2006).
Using emotional relationships with nature to garner public interest is not a recent
phenomenon, nor is this science-versus-sentiment controversy unique to nature programs.
As naturalism was becoming popular at the turn of the 19th century, nature writers began
overdramatizing and anthropomorphizing nature to such an extent that John Burroughs
felt compelled to call the issue to the attention of the general public (Lutts, 2001). These
fantastic stories, however, were extremely popular with readers and opened a world seen
by few at that time. The problem lies with the use of the term “educational” as a
descriptor. According to Lutts, the problem with the “nature fakers” was less about
fraud, and more about sentimentalism, philosophical bias, and an inability or
unwillingness to use the tools of science to learn about nature and wildlife. Although
most would assume the educational value of nature books has been resolved since the
highly public debate initiated by Burroughs, the conflict in communication strategies and
expectations continues (Lutts, 2001). The approach to factual representation, accuracy,
and misrepresentation, as well as how well facts can be differentiated from fiction, are
still common issues with nature books (Mayer, 1995). Critical assessment is key
(Eggerton, 1996). Just as teachers need to consider the content of the trade books they
bring to classrooms because science learning in children can be obstructed by fanciful
stories (Mayer, 1995), so too should they consider nature and wildlife programs.
Nature programs on television are not critically examined. This may be a result
of the visual experience audiences have as they witness wildlife and the natural world.
Indeed, from a production perspective, emphasis on photography in nature films (like
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pornography) can supersede emphasis on the actual story. Moreover, models that have
some success are replicated. Audiences are rarely concerned with the appearance of
“truth” in television; their interest is more focused on the coherence and logic of stories
(Shapiro & Fox, 2002). In fact, unless an inconsistency is easily observed, individual
viewers have no reason to assess the realism at all (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008).
The SNaP tool allows viewers to focus and reflect on the science realism in nature
programs and helps them navigate the murky waters of science and sentiment related to
the popularization of ecological science. Ford (2008) argues that students need to learn
the importance of knowing how to assess the efficacy of scientific claims, stating “the
ideal vision of students making their own sense of content is superseded by a more
defensible ideal vision of students learning how to make scientific sense of content.”
Students working individually or in groups can use the SNaP tool to critically evaluate
the science they observed while watching these extraordinary programs. In conjunction
with curricula designed to address the language we use to describe evolution (Chapter 3),
this kind of critical examination also may be able to help students overcome common
misconceptions about evolution. Indeed, with the proper tools, nature programs can be
an amazing source for sharing information about the wonders of wildlife and the natural
world, and to initiate valuable lessons about important ecological processes, such as
evolution.
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CHAPTER 7.
CLIO THE SCIENTIST: USING NARRATIVES TO
BROADEN THE IMPACTS OF INQUIRY1

Abstract:
Inquiry is a vital component of science teaching, and incorporating science texts
may broaden its pedagogical value. We developed an inquiry and take-home story to
engage families in their children’s science learning. We designed the inquiry, “What in
the world do insects see?”, for 1st and 2nd grade students as an exploration of how insects
see their world. Our goal was to illustrate how our understanding of ecological
relationships is affected by our perceptions. By examining the structure of insect eyes,
students learned that insects may see the world very differently than they themselves do.
Students were introduced to insects as pollinators using ultraviolet photographs of
flowers, and they observed flowers and pollinators outdoors. To complement this
investigation, the inquiry was re-written as a story for families to read with their children.
The story included activities from the classroom inquiry and encouraged families to
explore their own backyards. Pre- and post-assessments indicated that the inquiry
significantly increased student understanding that insect pollinators may see flowers quite
differently than humans, but students experiencing both the story and the inquiry gained a
better appreciation of the nature of science than those experiencing either the inquiry or
story alone.

1

All graduate students who received NSF GK-12 funding from the ECOS grant were required to present
one investigation they developed as a chapter in their dissertation and for publication. This chapter was
developed specifically for the journal Science & Children, a journal whose audience is elementary school
teachers.
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Once upon a time there was a little scientist named Clio.
She loved insects!
She loved creepy crawly insects.
She loved beautiful flying insects.
She loved ancient insects.
And she loved insects that pretended to be something
other than insects.
She loved looking at them so much, it got her to thinking…
Do insects like looking at her as much as she likes looking at them?
“I wonder what they see when they look at me?” she asked.

Clio’s questions begin a journey with her grandmother and her father, a story that
builds on concepts learned during a school inquiry on insect vision. Inquiry is a way of
teaching science that exemplifies scientific questioning. Asking questions and proposing
explanations based on evidence reflects the ways in which scientists examine the natural
world, so an emphasis on the scientific process in school may more accurately reveal
science as a world of curiosity rather than a world of facts (National Research Council
1996). Because learning is a cumulative process, creating rich experiences for learning
outside of school in informal (or free-choice) environments can connect and reinforce
understanding (Dierking et al. 2003). In fact, students with enriched informal learning
environments may develop higher reasoning abilities than students who do not have such
opportunities (Gerber et al. 2001). Sharing these experiences with peers, siblings, or
adults is essential to maximize their effectiveness (Gerber et al. 2001), so one way to
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foster the development of scientific reasoning in children is to engage families to
participate in these informal learning experiences (Crowley et al. 2001). Family
members can help students build on “islands of expertise” the children have developed
(Crowley and Jacobs 2002), expertise that was perhaps initiated and nurtured in their
classrooms at school.
How can parents, siblings, and the extended family make the connections between
science at school and at home? By reading together! Science-related reading is a great
source of learning that can transcend these environments. Parents often read about
science and nature to their children, and children are fond of science-related books
(Korpan et al. 1997). Reading, like inquiry, draws on experience and knowledge, and
readers actively construct understanding (Butzow and Butzow 2000; Casteel and Isom
1994). Purposefully designing lessons that connect school with home environments
using science-related stories not only creates positive attitudes in children toward science,
it provides positive experiences for parents and leads to new avenues of communication
for parents and teachers (Shymansky et al. 2000).
Children love learning about insects, providing amazing opportunities for
classroom and schoolyard exploration and inquiry. These engaging creatures provide
diverse opportunities for addressing many science standards, even for the youngest
students. By capitalizing on children’s innate fascination with insects, we can extend
inquiry not just from the classroom to the home, but from the indoors to the outdoors, and
from cities to rural locations – insects are everywhere! “Clio the Scientist” is one such
means to engage the family in the exploration.
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Setting the Stage: What in the World Do Insects See?
Many insects rely on vision to find nectar and pollen, but what do insects see
when they look at a flower? Insect vision is an area of active research in science – an
area that allows fruitful exploration into the nature of the scientific endeavor because of
the bias our own vision brings. As scientists, we use our senses to make observations,
but we can’t assume that what we see is what insects see; we are forced to think outside
of our own senses when we ask questions about insect vision. Our inquiry uses insect
pollinators to help students think about what scientists currently know about insect
eyesight, what they can know, and how students, as scientists, can begin to investigate
eyesight (see http://www.bioed.org/ecos/inquiries/Inquiries/InsectEyes.pdf and Chapter
Appendix 1).
To connect school and home, we developed a narrative take-home story about
“Clio the Scientist” (available at http://www.bioed.org/ECOS/clio). In the story, a young
girl, Clio, who is already interested in insects, turns to her family for help to explore how
insects see the world around them. Her family discusses the same optical illusions used
in the classroom inquiry and provides some new insight into what scientists know about
how birds see (some birds may see ultraviolet colors, too). The story encourages Clio
and the readers to use a scientific approach to answering questions about what insects
see. The readers are prompted to make observations of insect pollinators in their own
backyards, and to draw and record their observations directly in their “book.” Clio’s
story also includes an exercise using cardboard tubes and a discussion of ultraviolet
colors in flowers, similar to the classroom inquiry. The story concludes by encouraging
more questions.
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Assessing the Impacts
Can linking classroom-based inquiry with an engaging story that puts students to
work as scientists when they go home enhance learning? To test the impact of the
inquiry and the take-home story, we collaborated with three enthusiastic teachers. One
teacher used just the class-based inquiry, another used only the “Clio the Scientist” story,
and the third used both the class-based inquiry and the take-home story. Each teacher
gave her students a simple assessment both before and after the unit that included
drawing and responding to several statements.
In the first part of the assessment, students were shown a potted flowering plant
and asked to draw the flower the way an insect might see it. In the pre-assessment,
students in the Inquiry Only class most often drew multiple images of flowers or the
faceted insect eye to represent the multiple images, however one student believed that
insects could only see in black and white, another that insects can’t see the flowers, and
another believed the image would be “fuzzy.” Only one student indicated that insects
were small relative to flowers. Other students drew simple flowers or did not guess what
insects might see. During the post-assessment, this teacher encouraged students to think
about the pictures they had seen during the inquiry. Sixty percent of her students drew
flowers similar to the ultraviolet photos they had seen with dark centers and light outer
edges. Three students drew multiple images of the flower in the post-assessment (all
three had drawn multiple images in the pre-assessment), but one incorporated the
ultraviolet colors of flowers into the multiple images.
Drawings made by students in the Story Only classroom were diverse. Although
the majority of students drew simple flowers during the pre-assessment, four incorporated
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some kind of multiple images of the flower or insect’s eye. Other students believed
insects could see through flowers, two argued that insects could only see black and white,
and two suggested that insects had only smell as a way of finding flowers. Two students
drew the insects as tiny compared with flowers. For the post-assessment, students drew
wonderful portrayals of pairs of flowers illustrating the way humans see them and the
way they may appear in ultraviolet light; nine students drew flowers with large areas of
dark and light contrast. Drawings of three students did not differ between assessments:
one drew the flower as black and white, another drew a simple flower, and the third drew
the flower as multiple images.
In the Inquiry+Story classroom, only one of the students drew multiple images
representing faceted eyes in the pre-assessment, three students suggested insects could
only see in black and white, two students offered a different range of colors, and one
suggested that insects could only see flowers (not the stems). After completing the
inquiry and reading the story at home, almost all the students drew flowers reflecting the
ultraviolet photographs in the post-assessment. The single student who had indicated
multiple images in the pre-assessment also drew the flower as a contrasting dark center
with light petals, but he added the insect would “see millions
of the same picher [sp].” One student drew the flowers as
colorful for humans and gray for insects.
Regardless of how the information was presented, all
the children improved their understanding of how insects
sense the world through vision. Responses to statements in
the second part of the assessment indicated that before
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instruction, most students believed that insect eyes are not the same as human eyes, that
we may not see things the same way, and that our eyes are not the same (Table 7.1).
Especially for students who did not have a view point initially, the inquiry effectively
improved their understanding. In both classrooms that used the inquiry, the differences
were significant: students no longer believed that “Insects see flowers the same way I see
flowers” and “Insect eyes are just like human eyes”. In the Inquiry+Story classroom
students had a better understanding of the nature of the scientific endeavor – that our
brains process the information we see, and that science is active. The classrooms
differed in their effects on learning outcomes, however (Table 7.2). Based on the
differences in pre- and post-assessment scores, students experiencing the inquiry changed
their answers more often or to a greater degree than those who only read the story. The
largest effect on learning was related to the nature of the scientific endeavor. The
proportion of students who realized that scientists don’t know everything about how
insect eyes work jumped from 9% to 93% in the Inquiry+Story classroom.
Clearly, both the inquiry and the story were effective in improving student
understanding about insect eyesight. Through informal conversations with students in the
Inquiry Only classroom at the end of the school year, we discovered that one of their
favorite science learning experiences was to pretend they were insects. Students from the
Inquiry+Story classroom made thank-you posters showing dragonfly eyes as multifaceted and noted they were really good predators capable of catching mosquitoes
because of their keen eyesight. For a local newspaper story, several students mentioned
learning what insects see as their favorite outdoor experience, and one student adeptly
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Table 7.1.
Proportion of students disagreeing with statements made during assessment (only
students completing both the pre- and post-assessments were included in the statistical
analyses).
Inquiry
Only

Statement

n

Inquiry +
Story

n

Story Only

n

Insects see flowers the same way I see flowers (combined: Z = -3.65, p < 0.001)
Pre-test

50%

14

25%

12

63%

19

Post-test

88%a

17

100%b

14

82%

11

Insect eyes are just like human eyes (combined: Z = -1.90, p = 0.06)
Pre-test

77%

13

77%

13

79%

19

Post-test

94%c

17

100%d

15

91%

11

The way I see the world is the way the world really is (combined: Z = -2.42, p = 0.02)
Pre-test

21%

14

36%

11

11%

19

Post-test

41%

17

80%e

15

55%

11

Scientists know how insect eyes work (combined: Z = -1.71, p = 0.09)
Pre-test

14%

14

9%

11

5%

19

Post-test

12%

17

93%f

14

9%

11

a

Z = -2.46, p = 0.01.

b

Z = -2.76, p = 0.01.

c

Z = -1.73, p = 0.08.

d

Z = -1.73, p = 0.08.

e

Z = -2.27, p = 0.02.

f

Z = -2.27, p = 0.02.
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Table 7.2.
Tests for differences in the distribution of differences scores (the inverse of the postassessment score minus pre-assessment score) for the three classrooms.
Likelihood
ratio

df

p

Insects see flowers the same way I see flowers

10.917

6

0.09

Insect eyes are just like human eyes

12.983

6

0.04

The way I see the world is the way the world really is

8.025

8

0.43

Scientists know how insect eyes work

23.526

8

0.003

Question

linked an insect investigation on mouthparts from later in the school year to the insect eye
inquiry.

Conclusion
Literacy and inquiry learning are strongly connected (Yore 2004). From a
constructivist learning perspective, reading can develop similar kinds of science skills as
inquiry. Questioning and analyzing are processes taught by both reading and inquiry;
they provide the framework to set goals, to develop predictions, to organize and explore,
and for reviewing and reflection (Casteel and Isom 1994). Developing narratives from
freely available inquiries is a fairly straightforward process, and it can really enhance
learning. Teachers can use the background information provided in the inquiry to
develop their own storylines and characters based on their personal understanding of both
the topic and their students. Similarly, scientists visiting a classroom could use this
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approach to enhance the impact of their visits. Moreover, take-home narratives can
provide new opportunities to assess student understanding.
In addition to helping students develop skills that can be applied to both inquiry in
science and reading for literacy (Casteel and Isom 1994), inquiry oriented narratives may
serve a diversity of student needs. Reading inquiry oriented narratives may engage
students that identify themselves more as readers than as scientists (e.g., girls; Ford et al.
2006). Development of these narrative texts may be even more valuable to lowsocioeconomic status school districts where informational texts can be unavailable (Duke
2000). Best of all, using a simple narrative may help family members feel more
comfortable with scientific inquiry and provide one way of bridging formal and informal
environments to enhance science education in our communities (Resnick 1987;
Rutherford and Billig 1995; Zuzovsky and Tamir 1989).
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Appendix 1: Inquiry
In a nutshell: What in the world do insects see?
Understanding the limits of scientific knowledge using insect vision
Objectives:
• To explore the physical structures of insect eyes
• To recognize the assumptions scientists make to understand what insects see
Grade Level: 1-2
Materials:
• toilet paper tubes
• 3”x3” cutouts of magazine pictures
• handouts of optical illusions
• pictures of flowers in regular and ultraviolet light from the internet
• scanning electron microscope images of fly eyes
• magnifying jars (or magnifying glasses and containers)
• sweep nets/butterfly nets
• insect mounts
Engage:
First, students explore the limits of binocular vision. Using the cardboard tubes,
they gaze through the tube with one eye and slowly move their hand away from their
other eye until they see “through” their hand. Using two tubes at once, students try to
see two different pictures at once. They also use the tubes to restrict their field of
vision as they try to find their teammate (the cheese) as they pretend to be a fly.
Second, several different optical illusions help students explore how our brains make
us see. Third, students start to think about what may be important for insects to see
(food resources in flowers), and some of the interesting circumstantial evidence
scientists have for their ideas about what insects actually do see (ultraviolet
photographs of flowers and nectar guides).
Explore:
Students go outside and observe insects and flowers and think about what is
important (color, location, flower shape) for insects to see. Using sweep nets,
students capture several kinds of insects and put them into the magnifying jars to
observe the different shapes and placement of eyes. Scanning electron microscope
(SEM) images permit students to see extremely close views of insect eyes. They can
develop hypotheses about insect eyes based on their observations in the outdoors, and
have their own SEM images made.
For more detail, see What in the World Do Insects See at
http://www.bioed.org/ecos/Inquiries/inquiries.aspx
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CHAPTER 8.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

My research examined evolution understanding – what it is and where and when
it develops. Because wildlife and nature programs so often deal with evolutionary
theory, either directly or indirectly, I wanted to explore the role these programs played in
the public understanding of evolution. Specifically, I was interested in determining how
wildlife and nature programs that address ecology and evolution affected learning about
evolution and the natural world.
I began by addressing the literature in a variety of disciplines, from philosophy to
education, and history to communication. Without knowing the context of the problem,
developing an experiment to address the issues or finding a solution is not possible. I
began by chronicling the legal threats to evolution education, and the shift in creationist
tactics to redefine the nature and scope of scientific knowledge. With the nature of
knowledge in question, I examined the ontological and epistemological commitments
related to science and evolutionary knowledge in our society and the historical
development of this important theory. The theory of evolution is complex, however, and
evolution educators have learned much about how people understand evolution, the
nature of science, and knowledge in general in the last 25 years. Indeed, the literature
review in Chapter 2 strongly supports a need for additional research that addresses
science education, and evolution understanding specifically. The remaining chapters
remedied some of that need.
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Using data collected during two introductory biology courses, I asked exactly
what students understood about evolution, and could nature films be used to affect that
understanding (Chapter 3). A multi-step curriculum was designed to help students
overcome misconceptions about evolution; the nature program Fatal Flower was used as
a surrogate to reduce any personal affiliation with the common misconceptions students
held. Initial assessments indicated students indeed held naïve views of evolutionary
processes, and post-assessments indicated that a number of these misconceptions were
overcome as a result of the curriculum. Students were asked to respond to four prepared
alternative explanations about a natural phenomenon. These were similar in content but
differed in their inclusion of common misconceptions about evolution. The results
indicated that students’ conceptual ecologies varied, and as they began to grasp the
complexity of evolutionary theory, their explanations included mostly proximate
explanations and few misconceptions. Students who understood the more abstract
concepts associated with the theory, however, included both misconceptions and
proximate conceptions in their ecologies, indicating a struggle in their conceptual
development. The data from my work and the literature strongly support an approach to
teaching that embraces the diversity of concepts students may hold, recognizing that
learning takes time, numerous contexts are required, and that conceptual change will be
different for different students (diSessa, 2008).
Clearly, the results from the curriculum implemented provided indirect support
for the influence of television programs on evolution understanding, but the data
collected did not address the prior knowledge students brought with them to the
classroom, let alone important covariates that may affect outcomes, such as attitudes
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towards science and beliefs about knowledge. I addressed this gap by examining the
influences that attitudes towards science, attitude toward evolution, beliefs about
knowledge, and understanding the Nature of Science had on evolution understanding
within a large-scale experiment (Chapter 4). I used a beautifully crafted nature program
with poor presentation of evolution content and designed an experiment to tease apart
effects of narration and imagery on understanding. I enlisted students in introductory
biology courses from The University of Montana, Eastern Washington University, and
Michigan State University to experience one of four versions of the nature program: the
original version (re-voiced for consistency), a version with modified narrative but
original imagery, a version with original narrative but modified imagery, and a version
with both modified narrative and imagery. Results of the experiment indicated that the
one-time viewing of a nature program may indeed have affected students’ evolution
understanding. More importantly, this affect was apparent in students that had a
moderate grasp of evolutionary theory – that is, students with the “best” understanding in
this study. The relationships among understanding and individual characteristics, such
as Attitudes toward Science, Attitudes toward Evolution, and Nature of Science
Understanding (NOS) were complex, however. Individuals with a poor understanding of
evolution (most students in the study) were likely influenced by a combination of poor
presentation in the nature program and rhetoric proliferated by anti-evolutionists in the
“marketplace of ideas” that questions the validity of theories in science. Indeed, NOS
was an important covariate in most analyses. As a direct test of watching a single nature
program on evolution understanding, the trends were apparent despite the complexity of
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the experimental design, human research subjects, and the single event viewed at
students’ leisure.
The poor quality of science presented in nature programs in the free-choice
learning environment warranted examining learning from the perspective of the consumer
of those programs. I explored audience beliefs about the educational value of wildlife
and nature films because those beliefs may strongly impact learning outcomes (Chapter
5). Residents of Missoula, Montana were asked to respond to a survey addressing the
characteristics they believed important to educational programs their beliefs about the
presentation of the science in nature programs. As host to the International Wildlife Film
Festival each spring, residents should have been more familiar with the genre relative to
the general population. Over 95% of respondents believed nature films were
“educational” and slightly fewer agreed that the primary goal for these programs was to
teach about nature. In fact, the more they believed these programs were designed to be
educational, the more they believed that the science and nature were portrayed accurately.
Audiences clearly treated nature programs as credible and authoritative sources of
science information, a significant issue given that they are expecting to learn from
something that teaches evolution so poorly (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).
Chapter 5 prompted an important follow-up question: if audiences interested in
the natural world were tuning to nature programming with an interest in learning, what
exactly were they getting in terms of science and evolution education? I developed the
Science and Nature Program Assessment Tool (SNaP) to analyze the content of nature
programs quickly and reliably (Dissertation Appendix 1). Indeed, SNaP permitted
evaluation of over 30 nature programs appearing on Animal Planet, Discovery Channel,
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National Geographic Channel, and PBS during November, 2008, “sweeps” and in
January, 2009. Programs did not score well, especially in the category describing the
presentation of science. Misconceptions were common. The lowest scoring programs
most often appeared on Animal Planet and Discovery Channel; National Geographic
tended to air relatively high-scoring programs. The results indicated that, coupled with
other variables related to socio-economic status, the difference in educational program
quality among channels at different price-points may have repercussions for mass-media
audiences and the public understanding of evolution.
My research with university students lends support to the role of understanding
the nature of the scientific endeavor in understanding evolution and evaluating science in
civil discourse. Teaching NOS is difficult, however, and we take very different
approaches to teaching science to younger versus older students. Young students are
often taught very simple views that do not reflect the power of the knowledge that is
generated with a scientific approach. By the time students reach higher grades, they are
expected to quickly grasp a new, complex approach to scientific inquiry. Teaching NOS
to young children is clearly important; they may be quite capable of sophisticated
thinking, especially within carefully sequenced learning experiences. Unfortunately,
most curricula do not reflect what is now known about younger children’s cognitive
capabilities (National Research Council, 2007).
Using an inquiry plus story approach, Clio the Scientist (Chapter 7) attempted to
remedy the lack of available curricula for young students. I developed an inquiry around
insect vision and what scientists can actually know about what insects see for first and
second graders at Lewis and Clark Elementary School in Missoula, Montana. I wrote and
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designed a take-home story to recapitulate some of the important points and investigative
strategies accompanied the inquiry. Pre- and post-assessments of students’ experience
with the inquiry alone, the story alone, or the inquiry+story indicated that the inquiry was
quite successful at teaching NOS issues. Adding the story re-enforced concepts and
engaged students in a way that the inquiry alone had not. This work showed that even
with a minimum time investment, the effects were large; young students unequivocally
grasped the tentative nature of science conclusion. “Scientists are still working on it!”

Significance
Science is but one way of knowing, and knowing about science requires
sophisticated reasoning skills about the nature of knowledge and how that knowledge is
generated. Advances in science engender their own issues in the public forum, issues that
require understanding of science to address. It is within the public arena that the
individuals need to weigh science with other ways of knowing as they make important
civic decisions. Individuals may or may not have grasped important scientific concepts,
like evolution, during formal schooling. My research suggests that if individuals are
motivated to learn more about the science necessary to make these decisions, they may
need new or different tools to assess the resources available in the free-choice
marketplace. The video interface is increasing at a rapid pace, and free-choice science
learning opportunities related to science in general, and evolution understanding in
particular, will likely become more accessible. Future research needs to apply the wealth
of recent literature related to cognition and learning to both public resources for evolution
education and assessment of learning in those environments.
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Nature programs may be extremely engaging, but they often depict science and
scientific processes poorly. We believe teachers need to be aware of the lack of scientific
accuracy of these programs. We developed and tested a tool designed to help teachers
assess the educational value of nature programs.

Nature programs are more than just entertainment, they also serve as a source of
information and inspiration about the natural world. In fact, several studies indicate that
viewing television can positively influence public attitudes and behaviors toward the
environment (Holbert, Kwak, & Shah, 2003; Eagles & Demare, 1999). If we assume that
nature and science programs actually address science and ecological issues thoughtfully,
then this type of television programming could be a powerful tool for science education.
Unfortunately, science-related programming can just as easily promote or create
misconceptions about scientific concepts and theories, especially if the way the concepts
are presented encourages (versus challenges) prior naïve conceptions. Nature programs
are widely accepted as environmental documentaries, thereby giving them high standing
with viewing audiences, but most nature films actually are fictionalized narratives driven
by the cinematic themes and thrills of mainstream entertainment that ensure commercial
success (Bousé, 2000; Mitman, 1999). Indeed, many educators have cautioned about the
use of language in these programs that reinforces misconceptions (e.g., inheritance of
acquired characteristics; Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006). We
believe that teachers and science educators need to be aware of the concepts these
programs promote, so they can take action to help students become literate in both media
and science (see also Dhingra, 2006). To that end, we developed the Science and Nature
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Program (SNaP) Assessment Tool as an evaluation tool that teachers, and students, can
use to critically examine the content of nature programs.
Nature programs present a host of questions for educational communities. For
example, are the facts and scientific context accurately presented, and are theoretical
constructs, such as natural selection or ecological relationships, adequately explained?
Do films present science in ways that enrich the viewers’ understanding of the scientific
enterprise, or do they make science appear to be nothing more than a set of absolute and
unchanging facts? And when presenting difficult and controversial topics, such as global
climate change or evolution, do the films represent the best science on what is known
about a particular topic, or do they inadvertently (or purposefully) repeat commonly held
misconceptions? These are the kinds of questions educators need to ask of all
educational media, including nature films. Although several film festivals featuring
wildlife and ecological themes offer awards to producers in the genre, these festivals do
not use quantifiable criteria that can help reviewers identify programs with poor
educational content or provide any criticism of inadequate, biased, and/or junk science.
In fact, shows that illustrate science poorly receive awards for aspects unrelated to their
educational or scientific content (e.g., cinematography). Worse yet, some may even
receive recognition for their “educational value,” in spite of their inadequate or incorrect
representations of nature or science. Several alternative sources for reviews of nature and
science films exist (e.g., AAAS publication Science Books and Films), but these reviews
are not quantifiable summaries. Therefore, we developed a review tool with quantifiable
criteria to evaluate whether or not nature films represent science and the scientific
process accurately and whether or not they use relevant metaphors to explain and
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interpret key ecological concepts. Our goal was to develop a rubric that teachers could
use to analyze the scientific content of a broad selection of wildlife and nature programs.

Developing an Evaluation Tool
To ensure SNaP was a credible tool for evaluating the scientific content and
educational value of nature and science films, we based review criteria on important
elements of the National Science Education Standards (National Research Council, 1996)
and the Guidelines for Excellence (North American Association for Environmental
Education (NAAEE), 2000). We also consulted with educators and scientists familiar
with both the constraints of film and television production and with national science
standards. We grouped review criteria into categories representing the scientific context,
presentation of facts, presentation of nature of science “issues,” and the human
dimensions of the science profession (Figure 1). We also included a category for
reviewers to record their overall impression of the program, both quantitatively and
qualitatively.
All criteria, except for two categories describing misconceptions, were scored on
a scale from zero (poorly met or addressed) to four (highly met or addressed). The scale
was converted to quarter points so that each criterion contributed a maximum of 1.0
points to the overall score. A penalty was assessed against the overall score for inclusion
of misconceptions (deliberate or not) using a similar quarter-point scale. We calculated
the mean score for each category for each film. We evaluated films across categories by
compiling mean criteria scores and mean scores per category for all programs reviewed.
We used non-parametric statistics (chi square) to test for differences among category
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scores. Final “grades” were assigned by calculating the mean score of the science
education categories and weighting this score using the Overall Impression Category.
Based on the percentage score, we assigned a traditional letter grade. In general, shows
receiving an “A” were outstanding in all aspects, including accuracy, context, and
interpretation. Shows assigned a “B” may not have represented the science as well as
they could have (e.g., better portrayal of the tentative nature of scientific conclusions),
but were above average overall and visually engaging. A “C” grade indicated the show
was captivating but did not represent scientists or the scientific process very well. Grades
of “D” and “F” indicated both unacceptably poor representations of science and visual
presentation. We developed a flower icon teachers can use to provide a visual depiction
of the quality and highlight a film’s overall effectiveness (Figure 2). On the flower, each
petal represents one of the major content categories plus the Teaching Value category.
The leaves represent the appropriateness for Approach of the Story and coverage of
Human Diversity. Problems in any particular category are clearly illustrated by fallen
petals.

Going to the Movies
To test this tool, we took advantage of the International Wildlife Film Festival
(IWFF), held annually in Missoula, Montana. The IWFF is one of the longest running
film festivals, nearly 30 years, whose mission is “to foster and promote knowledge and
understanding of wildlife and habitat through excellent and honest wildlife films.” Over
200 films are entered annually in this juried competition from a wide range of producers
including corporate producers such as the British Broadcasting Company, Discovery, and
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National Geographic, and independent producers whose work is often picked up by these
companies. The films are judged on broad elements such as “excellence in scientific
accuracy, technical achievement, aesthetic presentation, ethical wildlife practices, and
educational value”
(http://www.wildlifefilms.org/festivals/iwff/2009_IWFF_Packet_Entry.pdf, last accessed
15 February 2009). Consequently, the IWFF provides a unique opportunity to review a
large sample of programs that typically enter the television market.
We had three objectives during the test phase of the evaluation tool. First, we
tried to get as many reviewers as possible to review as large a selection of shows as
possible to determine the range of programming for which the tool was best suited.
Second, we assessed the consistency of the SNaP Tool in identifying problems and issues
in the reviewed films; we used the film Fatal Flower, a previous award winner (Finalist,
Merit Award for Soundmix, Merit Award for Narration, Merit Award for Editing, Merit
Award for Scientific Content), in a case study to assess some of the basic functionality of
the criteria. Third, we assessed variation across a large sample of reviewers with three
specific award-winning programs to explore consistency of the ratings.

A Selection of Shows
We recruited faculty, graduate students, and volunteers interested in
environmental issues to review films at the screenings they attended. We provided each
reviewer with instructions on how to use the SNaP tool. The team of reviewers critiqued
27 films; the mean number of reviewers per film was 2.4 (range 1-5). Most films were
natural history stories, typically presenting “a year in the life of an individual of species
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x.” Indeed, 75 % were rated as 3 or 4 (highly met or addressed) for “Describes the
natural history of a species or place” in the program description category, indicating
extensive agreement among the reviewers. The final distribution of grades was
illuminating (Figure 3); few films scored a passing grade (mean=35%) even after the
scores were weighted by overall impression (mean=52%). In fact, all but three films
received failing grades for the science content (context, facts, and nature of science
issues). The best overall grade was given to a film discussing whether the “culture” of
the great apes was in any way similar to human culture. In contrast, an advocacy film
about saving the planet received the lowest score; the film was full of serious, and
seemingly deliberate, misconceptions about ecological concepts, such as the disconnect
between personal actions and advocacy (e.g., drawing pictures of leaves to save a forest
without recognizing that paper comes from trees).
The grades films received based on the SNaP Tool were not congruent with the
awards presented at the IWFF. All of the films we reviewed received, at a minimum, a
“Finalist Award,” suggesting they had met the festival’s criteria for educational value and
science content. The SNaP Tool revealed a different story about the scientific and
educational value of most of the films we reviewed. Using the SNaP Tool, our reviewers
failed all of the films that had received awards, such as Best of Festival, Best Animal
Behavior, and Best Children’s Show. Even the film awarded Best Science Content, one
program in a series entitled The Shape of Life, scored a miserable 37% based on its
science and educational values, and received a “D” once the overall score was weighted
by the general impression of the film. In fact, the film awarded Best Educational Value
only received a 46% from our reviewers.
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One Fatally Flawed Film
Fatal Flower is a traditional natural history story that explores the evolution of
orchids and their pollinators, as well as their relationships with humans. The program
shows how different species of orchids have adaptations that enable them to be pollinated
by specific pollinators (insects and birds). Thus, from an educational perspective, the
film appears to document an excellent example of co-evolution and natural selection.
Six reviewers with science and education backgrounds concurrently viewed and
critiqued the film using the SNaP Tool. The final weighted grade for Fatal Flower was
only 45% (an “F”); worse yet, its science content rated only 13%. The low grade was a
result, in large part, to the prevalence of misconceptions in the narration (Presentation of
Facts and Interpretation score = 8%). Both seemingly deliberate (orchids “cheat”) and
inadvertent (orchids changed specifically to cheat pollinators) misconceptions were
apparent throughout the narrative. For example, one passage explains that:
“The crucifix orchid also tries to be something that it is not; it copies other plants
nearby which have clusters of yellow and red flowers. The color guides the
butterflies to the nectar, which is produced in the yellow parts of the flower heads.
The crucifix orchid seems to know this, and its flower heads have the same color
pattern, too. Some of the flowers are dark red, while the freshest are orange and
yellow. But there, the similarity ends, as this orchid is a cheat. It may look like
the others, but its flowers are empty. There is no nectar reward at all, so the
butterflies are fooled into pollinating it for free. Orchids really are the femme
fatale of the natural world. They’ve made cheating an art form, using it get
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exactly what they need from the creatures that fall for their many and varied
charms” (emphases added).
Although this dialog may seem engaging, it promotes misconceptions about
evolution such as evolution as an individual-based phenomena, as a Lamarckian process,
and as need-based. The program was quite visually impressive, however (score=0.96).
We found no difference among reviewers in the overall scores (Χ2=0.822, 6 df, P=0.222)
nor in the science content categories alone (Χ2=0.639, 6 df, P=0.381). The reviewers also
were equally consistent about the Overall Impression of the program ( x =0.61±0.081).
Consequently, Fatal Flower seems fatally flawed based on SNaP. Clearly, using this
film in a classroom requires careful curriculum planning and intervention to address the
misconceptions. Ironically, this program may be highly educational but only if teachers
use SNaP to identify and dispel the misconceptions about evolution within its narrative.

Reviewing the Reviewers
To assess variation across reviewers, we recruited 15 students, faculty, and
professionals from around Missoula to evaluate three films at the 2005 IWFF: Ants –
Nature’s Super Power (festival awards: Best Educational Value, Best TV Program; merit
awards: Macrophotography, Animal Behavior, and Science Presentation), Capuchins:
The Monkey Puzzle (festival awards: Best Animal Behavior, Best Narration; merit
awards: Scientific Content, Music, and Educational Value), and Tarantula – Australia’s
King of Spiders (festival awards: Best Scientific Content, Best Script; merit awards:
Educational Value, Graphics & Animation, and Editing & Photography). Not all
reviewers were able to view all films. Using SNaP, all three films received scores that
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were higher on average than scores for the first set of films we reviewed (64% vs. 35%).
Nevertheless, the scores for science content categories were surprisingly low given the
significance of the awards won by these shows. Misconceptions also were prevalent;
reviewers identified seemingly accidental misconceptions in all three films, and
deliberate misconceptions in both the program about capuchin monkeys (e.g., larger brain
size necessarily leads to larger intelligence) and about ants (e.g., kin selection v.
altruism). The Overall Impressions were only slightly greater than the science content
scores; thus the weighting factor did not greatly affect the final scores. In these
comparisons, we identified some differences in scores among reviewers (ants: Χ2=36.84,
14 df, P=0.001; capuchins: Χ2=27.30, 13 df, P=0.011; tarantulas: Χ2=26.00, 11 df,
P=0.007). We also found differences when only the science content categories were
considered (ants: Χ2=32.18, 14 df, P=0.004; capuchins: Χ2=30.80, 13 df, P=0.004;
tarantulas: Χ2=24.26, 11 df, P=0.012). When the reviews were dissected, the differences
were due in large part to the influence of a single reviewer whose background was not in
the sciences specifically and whose scores were consistently higher than other reviewers’
scores. Finally, scores for Overall Impression of programs were similar (ants: x
=0.79±0.027, capuchins: x =0.80±0.031, tarantulas: x =0.77±0.030). Thus, the SNaP Tool
was generally consistent from reviewer to reviewer, but as with any critical review, it
may require some level of reviewer training for the reviews to be the most useful to
people selecting films to use in an educational setting.
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So Where is the Science in Nature Films?
The results of widespread testing of the criteria in our tool revealed that most
nature films do not represent the underlying science adequately. Indeed, other disciplines
take issue with the effect the narrative form may have. Vivanco (2002), in a review of
environmental films, argues that “we have more to gain by scrutinizing the vehicles of
representation, including the realisms they project and the dilemmas they omit, than by
taking their messages and images as disinterested indications of ‘how nature works’ and
how to resolve its problems.” As we struggle for scientific literacy in the 21st century, we
need to be more concerned about scientific context and whether or not theoretical
constructs are misrepresented, especially given popularity of nature films and the extent
to which viewers believe the content to be factual and documentary. Papson (1992)
argues that nature films are legitimized by emphasizing the educational and scientific
“truth,” as distinguished from “fiction,” yet these films use devices common to fiction to
add drama and to create meaning for humans. For example, CSI: Crime Scene
Investigation, a fictional drama, uses science in very effective stories, yet few would
promote the show as educational. “Docu-dramas” about nature (Bousé, 2000) that imply
some level of scientific accuracy, especially when they have been conferred some level of
credibility through awards ceremonies, are particularly problematic.
What are the key problems? Information in programs tends to be presented as
“ready-made science” – the “final product” of scientific inquiry (i.e., characterized by a
stable consensus that is no longer a fruitful avenue for challenge), as opposed to “science
in the making” representing the forefront of scientific research where debatable claims
are common (Latour, 1987). In a recent study exploring students understanding of the

455

nature of science from television genres, students watching episodes of Wild Discovery
and Bill Nye the Science Guy (programs where the science was presented as a set of facts
with a high degree of certainty) had few questions about the content (Dhingra, 2003).
Without an understanding of the nature of the scientific endeavor, students can have
difficulty assessing the merits of the information presented (see also Darley, 2003, Kirby,
2003). Moreover, as part of the narrative story, many wildlife films individualize the
“struggle for existence”; they humanize the dramas (the orphan that struggles to survive
and returns victorious to breed) that can mislead viewers to teleological and Lamarckian
misconceptions about evolution (for excellent reviews of the history of film leading to
this style see Bousé 2000, Mitman 1999). Indeed, Aldridge and Dingwall (2003) and
Dingall and Aldridge (2006) show that references to evolution in nature programs indeed
tend to be teleological – the narratives imply evolution is driven by some purpose. In
fact, these authors conclude that the narrative in this genre actually increases the
differences in understanding of evolution between the general public and biological
scientists (Dingwall and Aldridge 2006). They note “it is highly questionable whether
wildlife and nature programming is making an appropriate contribution to the
preparedness of civil society to deal with key issues in biological and environmental
sciences.”
Misconceptions are difficult enough to deal with in a classroom, but when they
are promoted in informal and free-choice educational environments, especially with
complex and controversial topics such as evolution and global climate change, they can
be particularly insidious. We believe that programs students may perceive as educational
should be reviewed with intense scrutiny to avoid errors that lead to misunderstandings of
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wild animals and the natural world. To this end, the SNaP criteria may be effective in
identifying programs particularly prone to misinforming students’ understanding of
science.

And the Emmy Goes to…
But what is the intent of nature programs? Champ (2002) argues that wildlife
films, for example, encourage wildlife protection, and environmental educators tout their
positive influence on environmental attitudes (Holbert et al., 2003). Indeed, many
ecologists point to wildlife and nature films as inspirational in choosing their profession
(Ecological Society of America, 1993). To be sure, watching educational television is a
choice made by viewers over other options, so captivating audiences is important. In a
study of the effects of different genres, Dhingra (2003) suggests that students are engaged
in television science programs, especially when they include characters and experiences
relevant to the students (The X-Files was included to begin to address this point). Stories
are the heart of the entertainment media, but they may have unintended consequences.
March of the Penguins is a phenomenal visual glimpse into the world of Emperor
Penguins (Aptenodytes forsteri), but without the scientific context, the narrative focuses
public attention on “good parenting” and “intelligent design” (Penguin Family Values
[New York Times 9/18/05]; Penguin Paradox [Boston Globe 10/14/05]). Nature films
often have spectacular footage that can captivate students and draw them in, but they also
can send messages that may have a profound impact on science literacy.
We designed SNaP to assess the quality of the representation of science in nature
programs because so many of these films are used to enrich science instruction in
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schools. Teachers could use the evaluation form to explore the presentation of the
science in nature programs with their students. Indeed, SNaP may be an ideal tool to
begin addressing misconceptions about evolution as students can be critical of the
narrative, indirectly confronting their own misconceptions. In advanced grades, SNaP
could be used as a teaching tool that allows students to explore the science content more
deeply and to investigate misconceptions and inaccuracies. We believe nature programs
offer exciting and emotional gateways to awareness of the environment and ecology. Our
intent is to promote scientific literacy by providing teachers and other viewers with the
tools they need to assess the information quality presented to them through the powerful
medium of television.
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Figure 1. The SNaP criteria.
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A

C

Figure 2. Icon used to depict the final grade assigned with the Science in Nature
Program (SNaP) Assessment Tool. In the center of the Echinacea flower’s cone is the
overall grade assigned to the program. Each petal symbolizes one of the categories
scored in the rubric. The leaves represent the two descriptive categories. As an example
of the icon’s function, a C-quality program may look like the inset.
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Figure 3. Distribution of percentage scores of programs rated in the first broad test of the
Science in Nature Program (SNaP) Assessment Tool. Figure 3a shows the distribution of
the final grade; Figure 3b shows the percentage scores based only on the science content
(gray bars=scores weighted by impression, maroon bars=science/education scores).
Letter grades associated with each bar are shown. The position of Fatal Flower’s score is
indicated by the arrow.
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